Mr Jose Eduardo dos Santos was not a likely candidate for Presidency in Angola and must go right now

"March 7 Protest against the Joseduardized dictatorship. Angola says Enough! 32 years of tyranny and bad governance." New poster of the Revolution of the Angolan people. Shared on Facebook by the movement of same name.  “Protest against the Joseduardized dictatorship. Angola says Enough! 32 years of tyranny and bad governance.” New poster of the Revolution of the Angolan people.
José Eduardo dos Santos - Wanted dead or alive
José Eduardo dos Santos “Wanted dead or alive”.
 
 
Angola’s President Jose Eduardo dos Santos talks to journalists after a signature agreement ceremony held at Sao Bento Palace in Lisbon, Portugal, March 11, 2009.

After three decades in power, José Eduardo dos Santos is presiding over a resource boom. But too few Angolans are seeing the benefits  

Biography of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos was born in the Island and Country of Sao Tome in the village of Almeirim where he studied until the fourth class (that is primary School education).
His mother (Jacinta José Paulino) is of descent from people from Guinea and Cape Verde mixed with Sao Tomense after having immigrating to the island country of Sao Tome from Cape Verde due to the draught and hunger affecting that island.
Jose Eduardo dos Santos Father (Avelino Eduardo dos Santos) had originally as his family name Vandunen. The Vandunen are originally descendent from slaves, and they are from a Dutch polygamous father that had several offspring’s from different African women.
This name Vandunen comes from the Slaves and says nothing from the culture of Angola.
The Vandunen gathered a reputation for acting as mercenaries, assassins and thieves, this being the main reasons for the Father of Jose Eduardo dos Santos being ashamed of the name Vandunen and removed this name from his full name.
Jose Eduardo dos Santos is not and engineer of petroleum as we claims. He is lying to the people because he only studied until the 6th class in the High School of Salvador Correia in Luanda, after his parents immigrated to Angola.
He worked in a restaurant in Luanda and after an incident of removal and food theft, the Police agency PIDE was requested to apprehend him, thus is when he skipped as a fugitive to the neighbouring Congo.
Once in the Congo the MPLA Comrade Daniel Chipenda placed the thief Jose Eduardo dos Santos in a instruction course of telecommunications listening financed by the KGB, and it was due to this reason that Comrade  Agostinho Neto placed him as the chief of the Communications DISA. This was his first work after 1975, and because of this Agostinho Neto placed him to commence fractionising the population and political manipulation of the society in order to establish a Communist State with the aid of the Russians and the Cuban   Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is as cruel, conman, curruptive and babaric as his ever-placid expression and measured tone of voice.

The young former liberation fighter  Jose Eduardo Dos Santos was not a likely candidate for the presidency when Angola’s founding president, Agostinho Neto, died in 1979 – and many were surprised when Mr dos Santos’s MPLA party was returned to power in the country’s first multi-party election in 1992.

Yet for a man whose current position of power depends on having beaten the odds at least twice, he has displayed remarkable political dexterity in staying Mr dos Santos clearly does not intend to leave office right now.

In his speech to the MPLA central committee, he made it clear that elections were dependent on a return to stability in Angola.

 

Although he spoke of military gains by government forces, he emphasised the enormous job that it will be to return displaced people to their places of origin, and to allow the free movement of people and goods – conditions that both Mr dos Santos and his opponents would agree are necessary for a fair election to take place.

Mr dos Santos said that peace was not an absolute condition for elections, and that if necessary the government would deploy force to make sure the vote could go ahead whatever the military situation in the land.

But calling out the troops is still his own prerogative.

Options open

Hence while presenting himself as someone who is humbly preparing to step down, Mr dos Santos is still able to keep his options open.

Ultimately, he will have the final say over when conditions are eventually right for voters to go to the polls, and hence for him to bow out.

But there is also in another sense in which much of Mr dos Santos’s grip on power depends on the abnormal situation in Angola.

 

He narrowly failed to secure an outright majority in the 1992 presidential elections, which normally would have resulted in the need for a second round between himself and Unita leader Jonas Savimbi.

Mr Savimbi’s return to war ruled out the second round – but it still leaves Mr dos Santos, technically, as an interim president for the last nine years.

After dismissing several prime ministers, Mr dos Santos then took on the duties of prime minister for himself, as well as remaining as head of state and president of the ruling party.

Relying on crisis

He has sought to justify this concentration of power – which critics have condemned as unconstitutional – in terms of the state of crisis prevailing in the country.

But increasingly, his tenure as president has come to rely on a delicate balancing act involving the party, the government, and the presidential inner circle.

A gradual withdrawal from power, as one would normally expect from a man in his position, would involve him relinquishing one role at a time – and there has been talk that he might yet appoint a prime minister before the elections.

But on Thursday Mr dos Santos hinted at the difficulties that have arisen from wearing three hats at once.

.

“The current constitutional law places the president of the republic in an embarrassing situation because (according to the constitution) the president of the republic may not take the initiative of forming the government, despite the fact that he was elected in 1992 as the leader of the majority party,” he said.

“If today for example, I were to nominate someone for the position of prime minister, the current government will consider itself dismissed and this prime minister would propose his own government to the head of state.

“It is evident that not all people that have the confidence of the prime minister are the same ones that have the confidence of the head of state.”

Having woven the web that keeps him in power, a man whom one diplomat dubbed “Africa’s Machiavelli” is now having to use all his political cunning to extricate himself from it if he is to enjoy a happy, peaceful and prosperous retirement. He is a big thief stolen huge sums of money from Angola leaving the country poorer and poorest. He must go out of Angola and stop him from doing any bussiness he must die in a plane crush with his entourage as soon as possible.

The anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International rates Angola 19th out of 180 countries by perceived levels of corruption. Despite its vast oil and mineral wealth, an estimated two-thirds of Angolans live on less than $1 a day, according to the World Bank 2011 statistics.

One of Africa’s longest serving leaders has used state funds to enrich himself and those close to him. Today we start by reproducing an investigation by Rafael Marques de Morais, an Angolan journalist and human rights activist who has written a seven thousand word report on how low Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has stooped in dipping his hands into the country’s coffers. Mr Morais begins by pointing out the three men President dos Santos has used to President’s three henchmen lead the plunder of state assets in Angola

Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Has amassed and embezzled enormous wealth from public funds for himself and his cronies and entourage.

In his latest report, “The Angolan Presidency: The Epicentre of Corruption”, Mr de Morais focuses on the illicit business links of a powerful triumvirate of officials close to President José Eduardo dos Santos. These officials are the head of the Military Bureau of the Presidency, the head of Telecommunications at the Presidency, and the CEO and chair of national oil company Sonangol, respectively General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”, General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, and Manuel Vicente. “Their dealings acknowledge no distinction between public and private affairs, and this has allowed them to channel millions of dollars worth of state assets into their own private businesses,” Marques de Morais says.

One of the tools used by these officials for their private operations, according to the report, is the power and the international reputation of Sonangol as well as their influence on the presidential decisions as the head of the executive, which approves all investments worth over five million dollars. Through their company Nazaki, the trio established a partnership with Sonangol and Cobalt, a US oil company listed in the New York Stock Exchange. This consortium holds the license to explore two deepwater oil blocks ( 9 and 21) in Angola, awarded by the executive without public tender. With Sonangol and the Brazilian multinational, Odebrecht, the group also formed a consortium, through their company, Damer, for a 272.3 million dollar project for sugar, ethanol and biofuels production. This project was approved by the Council of Ministers.

The same individuals, according to the report, used senior military officials in the presidency as fronts for a company, Portmill, which paid 375 million dollars for the purchase of 24% of the shares in the Portuguese Banco Espírito Santo. The same company received 40% shares in the recently privatised mobile phone company Movicel. The report questions the origin of the incredible sum of money paid by the military officers, assigned to the presidential staff, to the Portuguese bank. It also raises the question of whether Banco Espírito Santo is wilfully involved in laundering money either stolen from the state coffers or of obscure origin.

The author details how the Generals Kopelipa and Dino and Manuel Vicente also built a media empire to strategically control the private media sector, among other business interests. “These officials break the laws with blatant impunity”, says Marques de Morais. He explains that “the law on the Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers, in force since 1990, forbids public officials from engaging in business deals with the state or even private ones in which they have power of decision or influence, for personal benefit.”

The author further argues that while there is a growing pressure on governments and companies to be more transparent, with initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Publish What You Pay, “in Angola, such safeguards exist only on paper and the same names of prominent officials and generals come up time and time again in their double life as the country’s political and business elite.” Furthermore, according to Marques de Morais, “the complex web of political/military/economic power is lubricated by funds either plundered from the state or of obscure origin, and often in partnership with foreign companies and governments.”

Marques de Morais, who has been investigating corruption in his country for years, has little faith in the President’s public stand against corruption. “In reality, the zero tolerance policy against corruption, trumpeted by President Dos Santos, stands as a mere mask covering up the plunder of the country by his inner circle,” he says. Some western governments, spearheaded by the United States, have been jostling for political influence and access to Angola’s oil and other riches, and have paid lip service to the need for good governance in the country. On July 8 2010 The US and Angola signed a Strategic Partnership Dialogue to increase “energy, security, trade and democracy promotion”, according to the State Department.

Meanwhile, other major economic players in Angola, such as China, Brazil and Portugal fuel outright corruption through oil-backed loans and opaque economic bilateral agreements. This ensures that nothing much changes in the oil- and resource-rich southern African country, except that the sums of money involved get bigger and bigger. “The spoils of power in Angola are shared by the few, while the many remain poor,” Marques de Morais concludes.

Throughout this week, we will reproduce Mr de Morais report to show our readers what some African leaders are up to. As soon as we have finished with dos Santos, we will expose the other most corrupt African leaders. Follow this link to read more about Angola’s corruption.

On the other hand President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has committed atrocities on humanities and worsened the standard of human rights situation in Angola to below expectations. I am an example I was held prison at the Angoal Presidential palace for 30 business days without reason by himself and his sister Dona Marta they almost killed me there in an uprising by his militant followers UGP guards.

In connection with the same albatrouse and barbaric Jose Eduardo do Santos held me prison at the Angola’s  presidential palace in Luanda for 30 business days. The whole story started when Jose Eduardo dos Santos so called President travelled to attend the Lusaka Protocol in the Republic of Zambia which was aimed to disarm and ceasefire the UNITA and MPLA prolonged waring factions. During his travel to Lusaka he carried my photos and documents where he went to confess that I am his son he openly started looking for my Mother Domingas Satundu and claimed that she is his wife and I am his son. Eye witnesses are ready to encounter him to explain better. When he arrived in Luanda his bloody extended family begun to look for me and found a way of discussing with me mentioning Lucrecia da Natividade dos Santos and Dona Marta dos Santos as their family as the key figures and snipers. Jose Eduardo dos Santos  used his sister  Dona Marta dos Santos to successfully imprison me which is why Jose Eduardo dos Santos refuses that did not imprison me. Just after my release from prison the President of DRC died in a sneak attack prior  to my release from prison they almost killed me there in an up-rising there . During the period of imprisonment they used to ask me questions related to President Laurent Desire Kabila and the CIA. During all this time Jose Eduardo dos Santos used such silly methods of killing people pointing to Claudio his nephew as the serial killer and sniper-for-this-program.
 

To this end, I write to inform you that we are attacking the Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos shown above with his Government in order to cause a terrible manufestation accompanied with heavy shelling which will be unpreventable even by the international community any time from now. We dont want him he must go out with all his team in the government they are thieves.  United States and other super powers say they are not ready to continue encouraging Jose Eduardo dos Santos to steal like this. So it is better for us to conduct a sneak attack of  live open file from AK-47 to eliminate him. He is stupid and must die!!!.

 

 A Blue metal fence runs through Zango, a commuter town along the main road out of Luanda, Angola’s capital. On one side stand new apartment buildings for civil servants, with luxury kitchens and a sprinkler system embedded in the lush lawn. On the other sit the farmers who used to till the land until they were evicted. A mother scratches the dry ground outside her hut, begging for a few mouthfuls of water. “We used to have corn and potatoes and cassava before the government took our fields,” she says.

Since ending a 27-year civil war in 2002, Angola has become one of sub-Saharan Africa’s richest countries. Angolan mines are the fifth-largest source of diamonds worldwide. Its oil wells already produce 1.9m barrels a day; on present trends, it could overtake Nigeria to become Africa’s largest producer. It has huge agricultural potential. Roads and railways that were destroyed during the fighting have been rebuilt. New schools and hospitals have sprung up.

But Angola is also one of the world’s most unequal countries. (Its Gini coefficient—a measure of income distribution in which zero indicates perfect equality—is 0.55). Most of the benefits of the resource boom have gone to a fairly small elite that lives in an African version of St Tropez, with ritzy beach clubs inside walled enclaves. A crop of skyscrapers encircles a harbour decorated with sleek motorboats and a Ferretti yacht costing $5.5m.

The musseques, as the self-built settlements of the poor are called in Angola, used to start right behind Luanda’s white sandy beaches. Now they have been pushed inland, away from the most desirable spots. Land seizures have become an explosive political issue, as the capital’s hinterland fills up with the displaced. These people are given tin sheets to build shanty towns—but no compensation. Only 9% of Luanda’s population of 5m has running water, a lower share than during the civil war. Across Angola, half the population of 18m has virtually no access to health care. The country has one of the world’s highest rates of infant mortality, and the only known cases of urban polio.

The government says all the right things about the need to improve public services. It promises “water for all” and pledges to build “one million houses” (dubbed by critics “one million dollar houses”, since most of those it does build are unaffordable to all but the rich).

The government’s budget is about $40 billion, bigger than that of some European countries. But aid agencies are still the best hope for ordinary Angolans. In Kilamba Kiaxi, a suburb of Luanda, 1m people got their first taste of running water last year when Unicef set up a few dozen taps. Local officials had told residents they lacked the funds to pump water along existing pipes. In one case Unicef paid a $200,000 fee to the state water company to turn on a tap.

Part of what ails Angola is a lack of skilled civil servants, as well as too much red tape. After officials recently bought 3,000 new buses they could find only 1,500 drivers. The bureaucracy is grossly inefficient. When the World Bank offered a loan to Angola, it took two years for the paperwork to come through. In particular, the private sector suffers. It takes 56 laborious steps to set up a business.

Critics complain that the government, a prickly but proud bunch of mainly former guerrillas, pays vast sums for white elephants intended to make it look good. It spent more than $1 billion on four stadiums for the Africa Cup of Nations, a football tournament. It also built an imposing stock exchange, though there is no bourse.

At the trough

Big projects offer the richest pickings too. In the ranking of perceptions of corruption published by Transparency International, a Berlin-based lobby, Angola has fallen from 22nd from the bottom to 10th in the past two years. Rafael Marques, a local campaigner, takes visitors on a “corruption tour” of Luanda, pointing out which presidential crony or cousin owns this building or that bank.

The government’s defenders say that at least not all the money is being stolen outright. But as well as contract padding, Angolans have lost out as officials seize state assets through rigged privatisations or rip off the public treasury in bail-outs of private companies. At almost every turn, someone connected to the state is seeking a pay-off. A farmer gets $10 for a box of 100 avocados. By the time they reach Luanda the price has risen to $5 each, thanks to cuts paid to officials, soldiers and policemen along the way. A doctor close to the top of the ruling party has a concession for rubbish-collection in Luanda: he has kept out competitors but fails to provide any service in poor districts. Streets are filled with rotting fruit, faeces and other disease-spreading detritus.

The logic behind the kleptocratic system is complex. Having won the long civil war, members of the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) feel they deserve a share of the spoils. José Eduardo dos Santos, the president for the past 31 years, has seemed happy to oblige them to ensure their loyalty. His own family has stakes in several companies. Though publicly in favour of private enterprise and foreign competition, Mr dos Santos is a former Marxist, trained in the Soviet Union, and remains something of a protectionist. He appears to see the many barriers to trade thrown up by his rent-seeking minions as a means of preventing multinationals from taking over. He has a finely honed instinct for preserving his power and a relatively low appetite for outright brutality—Vladimir Putin rather than Joseph Stalin.

Already sub-Saharan Africa’s second-longest-serving leader, Mr dos Santos has changed the constitution so that he can stay in office until 2022 without having to face a direct election again. The changes eliminate elections for the presidency; instead, the leader of the largest group in parliament automatically gets the job. But power is still concentrated in the president’s office. It controls all budgets and appoints judges, prosecutors, generals, state governors and election commissioners.

Full steam ahead

Yet centralised politics and a grasping state seem unlikely to dim Angola’s economic future. On February 24th the government is due to announce new offshore oil concessions in “pre-salt” deposits that are geologically similar to those across the Atlantic in Brazil. They could turn Angola into one of the world’s leading oil-producing nations.

But without political change, the poor majority will benefit little. Not surprisingly, public anger has been building. Protests flared last month in Cazenga, a district of Luanda that has traditionally been an MPLA stronghold. Separatists in the province of Cabinda, who made headlines by shooting at the Togolese team during the African cup, are increasingly active. Soldiers complain that generals steal so much of the army’s budget that they don’t get boots any more. Oddly, even one of the president’s daughters has lashed out—at oligarchs who she said have created “the biggest number of tentacles possible to sabotage or destroy competing businesses”. Nervous Western oil companies give millions to local schools and hospitals to avoid being tarred with the same brush.

An uprising is unlikely, since memories of the civil war that killed 1.5m people are still fresh. But parliamentary polls in 2012, though probably rigged, will see more competition than last time, when the MPLA won over 80% of the vote. The president is already campaigning, having made his first state-of-the-nation address last October. Barring a vast drop in the oil price, which would threaten the patronage system, he will almost certainly win. Change may have to await the emergence of a post-war generation of leaders, free of old fears and prepared to challenge the man they call o pai grande, the great father.

 Recently this month april 2011 last week President Jose Eduardo dos was denying theft charges in the presence of Angop from information which was published on internet about his theft activities BUT, we know from reuters that a sum of $6 billion was stolen out of Angola in 2009 by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, according to new data on Wednesday that highlight how much of the war-scarred African nation’s oil wealth is stolen by a corrupt elite Jose Eduaedo dos Santos.

 Calculations provided to Reuters by the Washington-based anti-corruption advocacy group Global Financial Integrity (GFI) suggest funds worth nearly a sixth of Angola’s entire annual budget flowed illicitly out of the country in the last year for which data are available.

 The bulk of the flows was channelled abroad by a mechanism known as “trade mispricing” by President dos Santos of Angola.

 In this case, the way it typically works is that Angolan importers pretend to pay foreigners more for imports than they actually spend. The difference provides cash that can be discreetly put into banks or other assets abroad.

 Oil producers seem especially susceptible to this and other kinds of corruption and capital flight. Late last year, GFI estimated that in 2009 $27.5 billion flowed illicitly out of Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer and a country with eight times Angola’s 18.5 million population.

 Angola is Africa’s largest oil producer after Nigeria and a strategic supplier of crude to the United States.

 It has set its sights on producing 2 million barrels of oil a day, and says much of that revenue should be ploughed into rebuilding after a long civil war that shattered the former Portuguese colony before it ended almost a decade ago.

 But the secretive governing elite at the top of the ruling MPLA party has long been accused of graft on a grand scale and of plundering the oil wealth of a nation where the vast majority of its 18.5 million inhabitants live in squalor and poverty.

 There is a tight oligarchy around President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in that office since 1979, making him one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders.

 It is a daunting place to do business. On Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index, Angola ranked 168th out of 178 countries. And though most residents of the capital are all but destitute, more than one consulting firm ranks Luanda the world’s dearest destination for foreigners.

 Because of the role of trade mispricing, the figures also highlight the extent of commercial graft, which exacerbates the persistent problem of capital flight and hampers the country’s chances of attracting non-oil foreign investment.

 The GFI calculations suggest an unaccounted $5.8 billion left Angola in 2009 — $4.6 billion through trade mispricing, and the rest probably via official corruption or criminal activities traced through balance of payments data.

Angolan government officials were not available to comment on the findings.

IMPORT LEAKAGE

GFI lead economist Dev Kar said the mispricing that caused the loss of capital was on the import side of the equation.

 “Angola in 2009 said it imported $20.5 billion from the world, and the world said it exported $15.9 billion to Angola. So you have a discrepancy of $4.6 billion,” he said in a telephone interview from GFI’s Washington office.

 In these calculations, costs related to freight and insurance are stripped out.

 The mispricing could be on big-ticket items such as oil-sector equipment, but Kar said other goods “are also likely to be involved. Angola has a diversified import base.”

 In an example of how it could work, a company or official could say a piece of imported equipment costs $100 million when in fact it was exported with an $80 million price tag.

 “An Angolan importer overpays the exporter, say in the United States, and asks the exporter to deposit the excess payment in the importer’s offshore account or a Swiss bank,” said Kar.

 And there can a double-whammy for the dodgy importer as the government may make scarce foreign exchange available at favourable rates.

 “There is a double gain — on the exchange rate and on transferring the money outside,” said Kar.

 There is also often a link between illicit outflows in petrol producers such as Angola, and the oil price.

 In 2009, oil averaged $61.80 a barrel. It traded generally higher in 2010 and is currently fetching above $120 a barrel, so the illicit flows out of Angola could swell.

 Angola is often held up as a prime example of the “resource curse” that prevents oil and mineral wealth from bringing broader prosperity to a developing country.

 This is because it is an easy and opaque source of revenue for governing elites, giving those at the top little incentive to pursue policies to diversify the economy.

 Such problems have led to a drive for greater transparency in extractive industries. But U.S. oil majors and lobbies are fighting to water down new rules that would require them to disclose their payments to foreign governments.

 In a report last year, GFI estimated that Africa alone lost $854 billion in illicit flows from 1970 to 2008, a key reason behind the continent’s high rates of poverty.

The government and corruption: The commissions of 1990 and 2009.

President José Eduardo dos Santos has consistently condemned corruption as Angola’s worst social ill. But in reality, the more the president talks about the subject, the more prevalent and the more obvious becomes the corruption within his own government himself the President Jose Eduardo dos Santos as the center and empowerer of corruption and theft, benefiting mostly its own leaders and his family funding projects in Sao Tome and Principe.

In 1990, Presidential Decree n° 22/90 established an interministerial commission to study corruption in Angola, particularly in the public administration and business sector. The study, led by the then minister of justice, Lázaro Dias, identified the main forms of corruption in the country as follows:

The abuse of power and other excesses of authority for personal benefit, this meaning any kind of personal gain whether material (including monetary) or spiritual in nature;

Influence peddling by the holders of public office so as to gain advantages or nurture the personal interests of themselves or of their families;

The fraudulent economic and financial management of state organs, public institutions and also mass (political) organisations and socio-professional organisations that results in the illicit appropriation of material and financial assets of their respective patrimony.

The generalised soliciting or acceptance of bribes by public functionaries, officials or employees in exchange for the performance of an act, legal or illegal, as part of their official duties, or, still more seriously, outside of their competence;

The unchecked diversion and stealing of state assets (…)

The study in question made clear that “corruption favours social injustice and the real inequality of citizens, thus violating their enshrined fundamental rights, liberties and guarantees”.

Faced with spiralling corruption, abuse of power and squandering of state patrimony since the 2002 peace agreement, in 2009 the president proclaimed Decree n° 20/09, which created another commission to develop legislation that would guarantee exemplary conduct from public servants, whether at the professional, political or public level.

How effective were the commissions?

It’s worth making two comments on the presidential decrees and the results that were hoped for.

First, the 1990 report observed that the laws and institutions already in place were enough to fight corruption, and offered three reasons for their ineffectiveness:

Recruitment of inappropriate personnel, as a result of which “agents with a sense of responsibility are mixed with others who can get away with almost anything.”

The fact that people of a certain class, namely government officials, act as though they cannot be touched by the law. The report explains how when top officials abuse their power under the cover of impunity “one cannot expect much from the lower ranks, because those who are honest feel frustrated and those who are less honest or dishonest feel inspired by the behaviour of those at the top.”

First, the fear of reprisals: The report cleverly used a fable to describe the fear that exists in society in relation to taking action against corrupt people at the top level of the state administration. According to the fable, a cat came into a storehouse where some rats were living peacefully. The cat went on a killing spree that obliged the surviving rats to call a general council to discuss the situation and find solutions. Many possible solutions were put forward and rejected, until eventually one was received with enthusiasm: ‘Attach a bell to the cat’s neck so that as the cat moves around, ringing the bell, the rats will be forewarned and will have time to save themselves.’ But an old rat, with the wisdom that comes with age, stood up and asked: ‘But who will put the bell on the cat?’ The meeting ended in deathly silence.

The second comment has to do with the moral, professional and political integrity of the members of the two commissions. Dias, who as minister of justice led the 1990 commission, had moral and political integrity that placed him above suspicion. This commission carried out its task in an institutional context of genuine concern with the workings of government, amid a transition to multiparty democracy. The 2009 commission, on the other hand, is seriously tainted. It is co-ordinated by the President Dos Santos’ Chief of Staff, Frederico Manuel dos Santos e Silva Cardoso. This top presidential official is co-administrator of the company Valleysoft, of which he owns 71.25% of the shares.

Valleysoft was responsible for the logistics of the Angolan legislative elections in 2008, including the supply and collection of voting papers and other materials. On the one hand, as a private businessman he was responsible for dealing with the electoral materials, particularly ballots, in a way that contravenes various provisions of the Electoral Law. On the other hand, as chief of staff for Pitra Neto, the then vice-chairman of the MPLA and the co-ordinator of the MPLA election campaign, Cardoso was instrumental in directing the party electoral strategy so as to deliver the MPLA’s 81.64% absolute victory. At the same time, Cardoso was a candidate in the elections and was elected to parliament, but suspended his mandate to parliament to serve as Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic.

The fact that Frederico Cardoso was named head of the 2009 anti-corruption commission represents a moral failing on the part of Dos Santos, as the head of state and head of government. There is no public information to suggest that Cardoso has stood down from his positions at Valleysoft and Grupo Ducard, the company that also owns the airline Air 26 and the oil services company Ducard Energy.

In June 2008, Dos Santos reiterated the need to make a clear separation between private business activity and political and business activity among government officials and in the administration more generally. The president demonstrated the urgent need to put an end to the practice of officials using their public functions to serve private ends. Yet the reality is that the president encourages and excuses such practices and draws from them social, political and economic benefits in maintaining his personal power.

For this reason, it is essential that society take an active part in overseeing the actions of government so as to ensure that the government serves the public interest, and not only a group of individuals led by the president.

Maka is a response to the public’s silence, whether motivated by fear or by complicity, in the face of the looting and destruction brought about by the actions of the current leadership, and by the venal behaviour of the public administration in general.

Maka is ready and willing to tie the bell to the cat’s neck. Why? Because no Angolan should feel ashamed or afraid to do what is right or to defend a just cause for the common good of Angolan society.

 To this end I am requesting you to make appropriate arrangements to call attention of this president and return this money to govenment as soon as possible or else we enter into another arms race. Infact he is not allowed to fly out of angola or we crush his plane. Dos santos is a thief. Its time for him to go or die.

 Cassidy Johns Chitali.

 Army Maj General and CIA Special Forces.

 Gamek, Luanda, Angola.

 Phone: +244937705925.

E-mail: cassidy_johns@yahoo.com

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