Some of the cases revealed committed by the Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola.

Crimes of the MPLA Regime
non-exhaustive list

- CASE No. 1 -

Radio presenter gunned down

On the 6 of September 2010 the journalist Alberto Chakusanga, of 31 years old, was assassinated by MPLA agents in the municipality of Viana, Luanda.

Following Sunday’s murder in Angola of Alberto Graves Chakussanga, a radio journalist with a station critical of the ruling unelected MPLA regime, authorities must conduct a thorough and transparent investigation exploring all possible leads and bring those responsible to justice, the Committee to Protect Journalists said today.

Chakussanga’s neighbors and relatives found the journalist lying in a corridor of his home in Luanda’s Viana district with a bullet in his back early Sunday morning, according to local journalists. He had been the presenter of a weekly, Umbundu-language news call-in program on private Radio Despertar.

The motive for the killing was not immediately clear. Colleagues told CPJ that the only item missing from the house was a bottle of cooking gas. No arrests have been made.

“We condemn the murder of Alberto Chakussanga,” said Africa Advocacy Coordinator Mohamed Keita. “We call on Angolan authorities to consider every possible motive for this killing including his journalism.”

Chakussanga had a following with the Ovimbundu, Angola’s largest ethnic group who originate from the south of the country, a stronghold of former rebel movement UNITA, according to local journalists. Radio Despertar was launched in December 2006, under the terms of a 2002 peace deal between the ruling MPLA and UNITA.

In a press conference on Tuesday, Rui Falcão, secretary of information of the MPLA politburo accused Radio Despertar of repeatedly inciting the population to commit “civil disobedience” since Monday in support of the opposition former rebel movement UNITA, according to news reports. The accusations were based on interviews and commentary that criticized the government’s performance. In a press statement today, Radio Despertar rejected the allegations as “unfounded and slanderous,” and asserted its editorial independence. Local journalists said the station has been critical of both UNITA and the authorities, and they allege that the government electronically interferes with its frequency in parts of Luanda.

Chakussanga, 32, was also a lecturer at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Agostinho Neto state university and at the Angolan police academy, according to local journalists. A few hours before his death, Chakussanga had left his pregnant wife at a hospital where she gave birth later that day to a baby boy, colleagues said.

- CASE No. 2 -

Assassination of Professor Mfulupinga Lando Victor a major Political Opponent, leader of an opposition party

Professor Mfulupinga Lando Victor (54 years old born in Uige and Professor in the University of Agustino Neto), was assassinated (gun down) by the son of the Chief of Staff of the MPLA armed forces in Luanda in front of all present while leaving from a meeting in Luanda 2004.

This question will remain valid until the competent authorities will publicly disclose the identities of the men who on July 2, 2004 assassinated the founder president of the political party PDP-ANA, Professor M’fulumpinga N’Lando Victor.

Regarding this matter, the newspaper AGORA in its issue No. 484 of 8 July 2006, writes that despite numerous promises made by the justice agencies there has been nothing done yet been to clarified the circumstances surrounding the assassination of the founder and leader of the PDP-ANA political party.

“Two years after the assassination of leader and founder of the PDP-ANA, Professor Mfulupinga N’Landu Victor, the MPLA Regime and its bodies of “justice”, despite frequent promises, have not resulted, so far, in public explanations about the circumstances surrounding the assassination of what was seen as the most charismatic leader of the opposition to the MPLA Regime brutal and despotic Rule, “reads the AGORA newspaper.

In the session of the National Assembly on 25 April this year, when questioning the Government on the issue of internal security of the state, Mr Andrew Paul, the parliamentary group of the FNLA, asked the prime minister at that stage was the investigation on the death of Professor Victor Mfulupinga N’Landu. “

Yet according to the weekly, citing Sidiangami Mbimbi, “Fernando Dias dos Santos” Nando “, not only was unable to answer but gave little importance to this question.”

“It is with great sorrow and sadness that the MPLA Regime have not fulfilling its promises, because it can not put the its state institutions to function”.

Professor Victor Mfulupinga was assassinated on July 2, 2004. A Friday by unknown elements opposite the headquarters of the PDP-ANA in the neighbourhood of Cassenda in Luanda.

In that day, the deceased had just attend a meeting of the Council of the Republic where, according to sources familiar with that party formation, presented “clear and brilliantly” the position of his party on the upcoming elections that are subject to repeated and abusive delays.

The police have promised to reveal who the killers of Professor Mfulupinga where and making this information public, but so far nothing tangible has materialized.

Last year there were reports that gave account of the capture of alleged murderers, but then everything fell into a deathly silence.

To mark the passage of the second anniversary of the assassination of the leader of the PDP-ANA, it was held on Sunday 2, a pilgrimage to the cemetery of Santa Ana where homage was paid in memory of Professor Mfulupinga Victor and to all known and unknown heroes of all time without exception, who have shed their own blood for the noble cause of defending their homeland independence, and the ideals of freedom, democracy and justice.

On the occasion, said Mr. Sidiangani Mbimbi that July 2, 2004 left an unforgettable mark and memory of violence and insecurity in Angola. “It was exactly on Friday, July 2, 2004, that the Professor Mfulupinga was barbarously and cowardly murdered by the enemies of peace, democracy and tolerance policy in Angola, “he said.

The Mr. Sidiangani Mbimbi stressed, moreover, that the direction of his party will ask the National Assembly to draft and pass a law that enshrines the now murdered Member of Parliamentary Professor Mfulupinga as a national hero and martyr of democracy and much more.

- CASE No. 3 -

A list of 13 Cases of Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide committed by the MPLA

While negotiating the run-off, under a white flag of truce, the MPLA launched a holocaust against UNITA and other opposition parties, in a mass killing spree Australian reporter Jill Joliffe labeled the “night of the long knives,” carnage unsurpassed until the more recent Rwandan ethnic cleansing. UNITA diplomats, party officers and activists were slaughtered nationwide, with the body count estimated in the tens of thousands.

A leaked internal U.N. document proved the balloting rife with fraud. The run-off election between Eduardo Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi was never held.

Since 1975, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the MPLA armed forces and the police, committed crimes against humanity by the steady practice of acts of political and tribal genocide in Angola.

The following are examples of what took place in Angola and UNITA can produce documentary evidence to support the accusations:-

CASE A - In 1975, the pica-pau genocide in Luanda where the MPLA people’s power assassinated 300 (three hundred) UNITA militants.

CASE B -  In 1975, the MPLA armed forces with the complicity of a detachment of the Portuguese armed forces, carried out the massacre of more than two thousand UNITA supporters, on the bridge over the Kwanza river, in Dondo.

CASE C – In 1975, the MPLA forces murdered more than 200 (two hundred) UNITA militants in Kassamba.

CASE D – For a short period, from 27th May 1977, the MPLA armed forces carried out collective assassination of more than 40,000 (forty thousand) Bailundos, accused of being factionists and supporters of the leaders of an attempted coup-de-etat, Mr. Nito Alves and Mr. Van-Dunen.

CASE E – In 1992, genocide took place in Luanda, carried out by the MPLA militia, the rapid intervention police and the armed forces. More than 30,000 (thirty thousand) UNITA supporters and Angolans of ethnic ovimbundu and many thousand more in other parts of Angola were murdered. Amongst the murdered in Luanda were, 4 high ranking Leaders of UNITA: the Vice-President, Geremias Kalandula Chitunda, the Secretary General of the Party, Mr. Adolosi Paulo Mango Alicerces, the chief of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Military and Political Commission (CCPM), Mr. Elias Salupeto Pena and the Chief of UNITA administrative services, Mr. Eliseu Sapitango Chimbili. Their bodies are still under the MPLA custody in Luanda.

CASE F - On 22 January 1993, on a day known as the Bloody Friday, the MPLA militia, the rapid intervention police and the armed forces, carried out a selective assassination in Luanda of hundreds of Angolans of ethnic Bakongo.

Military, national police and civilians massacre civilians, mostly Bakongo, in several cities. Reports suggest this is a deliberate attempt to destroy the Bakongo (ethnic cleansing) who are referred to as “Zaireans” in Angola. The number of dead is thought to be in the thousands (most reports suggest between 4000-6000 dead). Some Ovimbundu were also killed.

CASE G – In 1994, the MPLA airforce carried out a deliberate bombardment of a primary school, in Waku-Kungo. More than 150 (one hundred and fifty) children were killed.

CASE H -  From January 1993 until November 1994, the MPLA airforce bombarded constantly the city of Huambo, causing more than 3,000 (three thousand) civilian victims, the old, the women and the children.

CASE I – From April 1997, during the implementation of the extension of central administration, under the Lusaka protocol, the MPLA armed forces and the police murdered more than 1,200 (one thousand two hundred) UNITA personnel of its national structural organisation.

CASE J – Today, more than two million Angolans are displaced within Angola. They have escaped the massacres perpetrated by the MPLA forces during the extension of State administration.

CASE K -  In 1998, the MPLA carried out selective assassinations in Luanda, of 150 (one hundred and fifty) Angolans of ethnic ovimbundu.

CASE L – In 1998, Monua confirmed the massacre of more than 100 (one hundred) business people, in Bula.

CASE M -  In 1998, the massacre in Malange of 300 (three hundred) people: Angolans, Congolese and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The long list of more than 100,000 (one hundred thousand) Africans, barbarically murdered by the Dictator Jose Eduardo dos Santos and his MPLA Regime, represent beyond any doubt, a strong case of crimes against humanity

The International Community has a strong reason to start the proceedings, for a law-suit to be issued against Eduardo dos Santos, to be tried in the national and international criminal courts.

We all issue a firm challenge to Eduardo dos Santos, to produce conclusive proof of his real place of birth.

- CASE No. 4 -

The assassination of Dr. Savimbi in cold blood, not in battle, 
but in an act of total cowards and against military rules.

Dr. Jonas Malleiro Savimbi, Assassinated by the MPLA unelected Regime the Henchmen the MPLA General Wala on the 22 February 2002. Dr. Savimbi was killed while pleading them no to kill him. He was criminally murdered. Comrade General Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda has informed that while Dr. Savimbi was resting in his tent they shot him he goes to the ground but is not dead so in his knees Dr. Savimbi says “It is me do not shoot”. Informed the Traitor Comrade General Nunda, to the act where also the Colonels Kivo and Calado both Traitors.

- CASE No. 5 -

Cold Blooded Assassination of Civilians in Cabinda by the MPLA Regime

Dans la nuit du 25 septembre 2008, un commando des FAA, composé d’un ex-élément de l’ancienne guérilla (FLEC Rénové), connue actuellement sous le nom de «Tchicuco», et deux militaires angolais ont pénétré à l’intérieur de la république du Congo-Brazzaville, dans une résidence située vers le village de NZassi dans la région du Kouilou, et ils ont exécuté à la «Catane», le Commandant adjoint des opérations des Forces Armées Congolaises Unifiées (FAC Unifiée) de la zone centre et du sud du Cabinda, Joäo-Maria Manuel Gomes, alias «Maymona», a informé une source de la résistance depuis le territoire du Cabinda.

Le «Commandant Maymona» 48 ans, appartenait à un groupe de guérilleros, ayant trouvé refuge dans le Kouilou et détenus par les autorités congolaises à Pointe-Noire, à la demande de l’Angola. Soumis par une intervention chirurgicale par les médecins à Pointe-Noire, pour l’appendicite, pendant sa période de convalescence, le détenu «Commandant Maymona» va demander d’être transféré dans le village de NZassi dans la région du Kouilou, près de la frontière de Massabi, et c’est de là, qu’il a été exécuté par le commando MPLA.

Selon la source de la résistance depuis le Cabinda, la sécurité congolaise aurait facilité l’opération du commando MPLA sur leur territoire national. Cette exécution apparaît après le début de la coopération militaire entre la républiques du Congo-Brazzaville et de l’Angola avec des patrouilles et des opérations militaires mixtes, le long de toute la frontière séparant le Congo-Brazzaville et le Cabinda.

Des témoins affirment que plusieurs femmes sont régulièrement violées, dans les villages frontaliers du Cabinda et du Congo-Brazzaville, par ces patrouilles mixées.

Selon une autre source de la résistance Cabindaise de Massabi au Cabinda, les responsables de l’assassinat du «Commandant Maymona» formant le commandant angolais en république du Congo-Brazzaville, sont des Cabindais, qui ont intégrés les Forces Armées Angolaise (FAA) au terme de l’accord de paix signé par l’Angola et l’ancien résistant Antonio Bento Bembé.

Selon cette même source de la résistance, de Massabi au Cabinda, les hommes opérationnels du commando qui ont éliminé «Maymona», en République du Congo-Brazzaville, ont pénétré dans la nuit du 25 septembre 2008, avec l’appui de «Saddam», un officier de la sécurité congolaise (DRM) qui participe aux patrouilles mixtes.

Le commando opérationnel qui était envoyé dans lé région du Kouilou, était totalement constitué des Cabindais: José Tchitembo Bissafi, Policarpo Mouélé Moulélé, Pédro Chicaya Nlembiano, Augusto Wanga et Francisco Mabiala, tous des transfuges des accords de pais signé entre l’Angola et l’ancien résistant Antonio Bembé. Ils sont tous, originaires des villages proches des villages de la région du Kouilou au Congo-Brazzaville, à l’exception de Pédro Chicaya Nlembiano.

Selon les informations recueillies par la sécurité FLEC vers NZassi en république du Congo-Brazzaville, du côté du commando angolais, cette opération était conduite par José Tchitembo Bissafi, l’home au 4*4 qui circule à peine entre Luanda, Cabinda et Pointe-Noire.

Par cette opération et cet assassinat du Commandant adjoint des opérations militaires des FLEC, les Forces Armées Angolaises (FAA), prétendent réduirent les activités de la guérilla Cabindaise.

Les obsèques funèbres du «Commandant Maymona» se sont déroulé Samedi 27 septembre 2008, dans la région du Kouilou, au Congo-Brazzaville, où, il avait été exécuté.

- CASE No. 6 -

THE ASSASSINATION OF RAFAEL CHIDUNDO

Cabinda 10 August 2007

1. Identity

Name: Rafael Chidundo (also known as Rafa)
Identification Card Number: 000094786CA014
Place and date of Birth: Chimpemba, Nhuca (Buco-Zau),  24/04/1974
Son of: Father name, Rafael Chidundo and of Mother name, Ana Maria Pemba
Marital Status: was living martially with Mrs. Maria Massanga, the couple has six (6) children. And resided in Chimpemba with his spouse and children.

2. What happened

On Saturday, 30 de June 2007: Rafael Chidundo (also known as Rafa) went to the fields to verify his traps. The Elders of the Village Conde Pequeno, inform that they heard screams from some one in panic. During the night Rafael fails to return home, so his family members alert the MPLA Regime local coordinator, Comrade Estêvão Corado who, informs the MPLA Commander of the Military Zone of Nhuca, Comrade Fereiro Nelito. This individual then phones the Commander of the Military Patrol troops, Comrade Rafael Mando Tshipa Tshica, who confirms that he as arrested someone, but promises to return the captive before the 15 of July 2007. 

Monday, 2 July 2007: The village elder and 3 other elders go to the fields, from where Rafael has disappeared and where Rafael had his field crops. They found traces of the passage of Military Troop boots on patrol. The Village Elder found the working tools left behind on the fields by Rafael. 

Before the day 15, the Military MPLA Commander Rafael Mando Tshipa Tshica returns with his military patrol to the village to reassure the family members of Rafael would be back to the village before the 15 July 2007.

Tuesday, 10 July 2007: The family members submitted the case to the MPLA Regime by presenting a petition addressed to the Provincial Comity for Human Rights (An office totally controlled by the unelected MPLA Communist Regime). Up to now Rafael gives no signs of life.

- CASE No. 7 -

Eight Cabinda civilians beaten up and tortured by the MPLA Regime

24 August 2006

The Republic of Cabinda hold responsible the MPLA Communist Unelected Regime and the Board of Directors of Chevron for the apprehension and the torture of the Following civilians on the 13th of August 2006 in Cabinda.

Maurício Mbizi, Bonifácio Nzau, José Deus-Dado, António Félix, João Maria Simba e André Massanga

and on the 12 of August 2006 the Angolan Armed Forces of Angola (MPLA) beaten up and tortured the Village Chief of Caio Poba and the village Elder Mr. António Simba of 64 year of age.

This people (normal citizens) where taken prisoners by the occupying Armed Forces of Angola (MPLA) which are directly sponsored by Chevron-Texaco corp. These Cabindas where charged with being part of the Human Rights Association of Cabinda Mpalabanda and tortured after they refused to participate on a church service by the Angolan collaborator and priest Mr. Gabriel Nzau.

- CASE No. 8 -

The Murderer of Tatinho Garcia Saianganhi 

12 September 2010

A citizen Tatinho Garcia Saianganhi, son of Garcia and Saianganhi Lotina Xavier, born on 4 June 1990, Natural of the local Casa Branca, Luzamba Cuango province of Lunda-Norte, was shot dead at eight hours and 30 minutes of the day September 12, 2010 in the area of the river Cambamba Camazanga Cuango by a group of elements the MPLA Armed Forces stationed in the areas. The deceased who was crossing the bridge, his body was thrown after into the water of the river Cuango. People who watched the murderous episode, informed that there was no voice contact of conversation between the deceased and the elements of the MPLA Armed Forces.

The Elder Soba Bungulo, told us that in recent months, has found in the woods dead bodies in a state of advanced decomposition and does not recognize the identity of the bodies. The victims are mostly young miners and women raped and killed and then thrown into the woods, “here in the Cuango region, we live in terror” – said Elder Soba Bungulo.

- CASE No. 9 -

The Assassination of José Gabriel Puati MPLA

Saturday 29 December 2007, around 17:00, Mr. José Gabriel Puati (also known as Gabby), of 24 years, natural of Chinfuca (near the village of Beira-Nova in the municipality of KaKongo) and resident in Caio-Contene (Ncuto), son of Gabriel Puati and of Teresa Malila, and father of two children, was murdered by bullet by the MPLA Military Regime, by military personnel of the MPLA Pangamongo Military Unit.


José Gabriel Puati Assassinated on the 29 December 2007 by the MPLA in the Republic of Cabinda

The act happened after and attack by Freedom Fighters of the National Liberation Army FLEC in the same day around 08:00, in the location of “Mongo M’lola” (down unto the M’lola creek), 50mt from the village of Seva, which is eight Kilometers from Pangamongo. In result of this incident, three citizens of Seva, Mr. Martins Yanga, André Nduli and Leão where arrested by the MPLA Regime Armed Forces FAA, under accusation of being involved in the attack. Apart from this, the MPLA FAA proceeded to the confiscation of Identity Cards from all village Elders among others Mr. Alberto Mbumba, João Buela and Afonso Massiala, who they demanded that they must appear in the MPLA Military Barracks in Pangamongo. 

And Mr. José Gabriel Puati returned to Buco-Zau, where he had returned to the night before in business. Arriving near the MPLA Military Unit in the village of Pangamongo, he was confronted by a group of occupying MPLA Military personnel, who tried to accuse him of being a member of the Freedom Fighters National Army of Cabinda FLEC, in manner to justify his trip. While trying to present his identification the unelected MPLA Regime Troops started to beat him up, and then they shot him, resulting in his death instantaneously. Eye witnesses to the event told that this MPLA troops where under the direct command of Comrade Lacrau, who have gone to Pangamongo to reinforce the MPLA Military presence and grip in the region. 

The three citizens who where arbitrary arrested where taken to Buco-Zau, and to the office of the municipality of Buco-Zau. The notoriously and famously Brutal Brigadier Wala, who went to the terrain to better control the situation, promised to return the prisoners to the village, due to the lack of proofs against the detainees. Never the less the where about of these prisoners is unknown; there are no news on the evolution on the requests for the presence of the villagers in the MPLA Military Barracks of Pangamongo. 

Apart from that the Elder of the Village of Seva, Mr. José Gime, better known as José Bota is reported missing. Finally, Mr. José Gabriel Puati is another victim of the present status of the social-political-judicial status of Cabinda, where the law of the bayonet is the rule. Mr. José Gabriel Puati is nephew of Mr. José Marcos Mavungo, vice-president of the now extinct Mpalabanda Human Rights Organization which was forced to be shut down by the MPLA Regime.

- Thursday 3 January 2007. The hunt by the MPLA Military Regime to the Elder of Seva continues. Around 05:00, Mr. Alexandre Mavungo (better known by the name of Bayona Mavungo), 70 years old, elder of the Neighborhood of Seva, and resident in Seva, son of Lamba Mavungo (better known as Chief Lamba Khuta) and of Bazonga, father of three children; and Cesar Ngimbi, where kidnaped by members of the MPLA Security and Defense Battalion, in the area of Madombolo, in the neighborhood of GIKA in the city of Cabinda.

The family members of Bayona Mavungo – Mrs. Teresa Nsuami (daughter), of 35 years of age; Mr. António Chibilica (son in law), of 45 years of age; and Willy (grand son), of 15 years – during the act, they thought better to take a lift in one of the two Jeeps of the MPLA National Police (PN) vehicles, who transported the detainees to an unknown place. At the moment we don’t have any information on the whereabouts of this citizens.

- CASE No. 10 -

Torture of an elder Cabinda Women 55 years old.

J.M. , a 55-year-old traditional healer from Ntsaca village. On 2 March 2003, she was beaten and imprisoned in a pit for three days at the military’s special Belize unit. She was accused of performing prayers for the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda (FLEC). On the fourth day, she was forced to dress in an MPLA Armed Forces uniform to serve as a guide to lead the army to her brothers, who were reportedly members of FLEC. When she refused, an officer slapped her 80 times on the hand with the side of a machete. She was released shortly thereafter.

- CASE No. 11 -

Public whipping, beating and firing of arms to the air in the Airport of Cabinda or the Humiliating scenes and the of apprehension of Cabinda Journalists and Human Rights Activists in Cabinda.

29 September 2006

The Journalist Raul Danda and the spokesperson of the now MPLA Regime closed MPALABANDA (Cabinda Human Rights Association), was detained for questioning on the 29 September 2006 at around 17:00 in the airport of Cabinda when he arrived from Luanda, Angola in the flight JEMINI in a trip with other Cabinda nationals and Human Right Activists in Cabinda.

After the arrival of the Airplane the MPLA Regime secret police closed the passengers terminal of arrivals placing the agents of Immigration, and Customs to search piece by piece paper by paper all documents brought by the Cabinda Human Rights Activists Mr. Raul Danda and Mr. Belchior Lanzi. 

Mr. Belchior Lanzi could pass the border agents because he had no papers in his cases. Mr. Raul Danda was taken to an office to be criminally investigated  and to declare why he carries with him so many documents which needed to be investigated one by one. While in the Airport the passengers from Lunda, Angola where barred from leaving the airport by more than an hour and a half while they conducted the interrogation of Mr. Raul Danda and Mr. Belchior Lanzi.  A group of 70 People Cabinda National gathered in front of the room where Mr. Raul Danda and Mr. Belchior Lanzi where being held and where dispersed by the MPLA Regime Police using whips, sticks and firing live ammunition.         

- CASE No. 12 -

Beaten and Disappearance of Civilians in Cabinda by the MPLA

24 September 2006 – A Cabinda man, Mr. José Jonatani, Elder of the village Conde Lintene, Community of Necuto, was brutally beaten by the MPLA Regime forces on the 20th of September 2006, for the reason of his beating by the MPLA Armed Forces was that they found at the entrance of the Village a Soldier of the MPLA Regime Armed Forces heavily drunken and laying down in the street completely drunk. Afraid some how of the situation of totally drunk soldier these MPLA Soldiers entered the village firing indiscriminately to everything and every one in the village, the population had to flee the village and take refuge in the jungle. The village Elder Jonatani, Chief of the village was brutally beaten and left half dead by the MPLA Regime Armed Forces.

Because of the injuries caused by the MPLA Military Regime the Elder was taken to the Capital city of Cabinda by the MPLA Military Troops. The family of the Elder Jonatani whent to the Capital City of Cabinda to all hospitals but he has not found in any hospital. The village Elder Jonatani was 70 years old when he disappeared.

- CASE No. 13 -

THE LAWLESS, CORRUPTION AND ILLEGALITY OF THE MPLA REGIME

MPLA troops invaded Cabinda on 11 November 1974. Cabinda was a Portuguese Protectorate since the signing of the Treaty of Simulambuco in 1885, and became known as the Portuguese Congo. Troops from Angola are still occupying Cabinda and committing organized atrocities against Cabindans including rape, summary execution, and genocide. The government of Cabinda and the heroic military forces of FLEC exercises control over the majority of the Nation. An MPLA military offensive begun in 2002 has included organized torture, rape, murder, and looting but has not broken the spirit of the Cabindan people.

The Criminal MPLA Regime in power since (1974) and under so called elections in 1992 of which was voided as a second round was needed to clarify the result, since 1992 no election has taken place the MPLA promised elections in 2001 and its now 2006 how many more years will the international community allow this to go on, one in each 4 children in Angola dies before it reaches 1 year of life, 14 years without elections, the MPLA is still invading Cabinda, a Cabinda National receives 50% of the salary that is paid to and Angolan, the Cabindan Clergy is not allowed to leave the Cabinda Nation, the Cabindan People are not allowed to go to their fields and cultivate them.

The charade of the MPLA regime and the control of one man over an entire nation since 1979

Flag of the Marxist MPLA party is used has the flag of Angola in another words the message is that the Marxist party in power since 1974 MPLA owns Angola.

Fulano José Eduardo dos Santos, Dictator of Angola
Unelected President of Angola (Head of State)
Unelected Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the MPLA
Supreme Court and separate provincial courts (judges are appointed by the unelected president)
5th Richest man in Brazil (source list of bank account holders and their deposited amounts in the Brazilian Banks)

Declarations by the Dictator Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos

“It is evident that not all people that have the confidence of the prime minister are the same ones that have the confidence of the head of state.“ 
Fulano Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, unelected President of Angola, self appointed Chief of the Armed Forces, etc….

”It is often said that the magnitude of a people is measured by their ability to know how to win. “ 
Fulano Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, unelected President of Angola, self appointed Chief of the Armed Forces, etc….

”Our goal is not to crush the enemy at any price, but to make it realize that it is illegal to take up arms to overthrow a democratically elected government.“ 
Fulano Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, President of Angola, self appointed Chief of the Armed Forces, etc….

”The current constitutional law places the president of the republic in an embarrassing situation.” Fulano Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, Dictator of Angola, self-appointed Chief of the Armed Forces, etc….

BLOOD FOR OIL: SECESSION, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND SUPERPOWER SILENCE IN CABINDA

- CASE No. 14 -

MURDER IN CABINDA

MPLA Armed Forces Torture and Kill Cabinda Civilians in new wave of Human Rights violations in Cabinda

20 DECEMBER 2006

Cabinda civil society has denounced that the violations of human rights in Cabinda continues. Accused are the MPLA the Armed Forces of Angola of beating up Cabinda citizens accused of belonging to and collaborating with the Cabinda Liberation Front, FLEC.

On the 20th November 2006, at about 15h00, António Zau (in the photo), 29 years old, son of Agostinho Nhimi and of Joana Lubanda, a father of 6, from Micuma II, Mayombe, living in the village of Mbongo-zi-Minu (MBuku-NZau municipality), “was shot dead (3 shots) by a group of MPLA-FAA (MPLA – Armed Forces of Angola) soldiers, on the road between Mbongo-zi-Munu the village of Nsindi” in Cabinda.

According to the document, distributed by the Human Rights (DH) activists in Cabinda, António Zau was returning from hunting in the forest close to the village, he was approached by MPLA Angolan soldiers who “immediately accused him of belonging to the FLEC resistance”, “this was motive enough for the soldiers to murder him in cold blood”. Following the shooting, “the executioners cut open their victims belly, spilling out his intestines”. News of the death of António Zau was spread in the village Mbongo-zi-Munu by the very same soldiers who “asked the family to keep silent, in exchange for which they would pay all funeral expenses”, a promise which would not be kept.

On the 25th of November 2006, the inhabitants of the villages of Massabi commune “had a terrifying start to the day”. Around 03:00AM, the MPLA FAA began an operation to “remove all male citizens aged between 14 and 60 from their homes.” According to the Human Rights activists, the “allegation put forth to justify the operation, led by the Chief of Staff of the Second Military Region (Cabinda), the MPLA General Carlitos Wala (the same who murdered Dr. Savimbi), was that “these villagers had been lending logistic support to FLEC forces” and that, “by dislodging them from their area, this kind of support could be reduced or even eliminated.” Therefore, according to the same source, all the men and adolescents of the villages of Nkumbu-Liambu, Caio, Liku, Icazu, Tchela, Loango Pequeno, Weca, Liambu-Liona, Tchiloti, Tchicamba, Tchibueti, Simu l’Incondu, Mandarim, Bitchékete, Mbuku-Sókotu, Ngomangu, kumbu-Liambu, Manenga, Tchissangu and others, were rounded up, “put on URAL brand military trucks and taken to headquarters of the local command zone”.

The friends and family women, upset by the soldiers` murderous actions, got together and “made their way to the place where their sons, brothers and husbands had been taken”, calling for their immediate release. These women “said that if the men were not released, they would not move, not matter what the soldiers did to them.” Due to the strong pressure, the soldiers “decided to let the prisoners go, but not before having photographed all of them and make a registry of their identification (name, age, parentage, etc…)”. The MPLA soldiers, however, “refused to take them back to their houses, a task entrusted to some local economic entities, who had their own means of transport.”

On the 2nd December of 2006, at around 10:00AM, Gabriel Buku, 42 years old, driver of the ETP bus, of the MAN brand, license plate CBA-74-42, which covers the Cabinda-Lândana – Mbuku-Nzau – Belize routes, son of José Jimbi and Antonieta Buku, father of 10, and his two helpers, José Bambi Muanda, 31 years old, son of Daniel Muanda and Angelina Pemba, father of 3; and João Hilário Capita, 20 years old, son of Lourenço Capita and Josefina Lubota, “were tortured by the Angolan MPLA FAA soldiers, in the village of Mbongo-zi-Munu”, denounced the same Human Rights activists.

In the document, they state that an unknown number of Angolan soldiers ordered the bus to stop, but “thinking they wanted to hitch a ride, the driver did not stop, but merely slowed down to signal to them that the bus was full and then carried on.” The soldiers, “annoyed, took a Toyota Hiace van, which happened to be passing by, and set off in pursuit.” Close to the village of Micuma III, the Toyota Hiace overtook the bus and blocked its passage. The soldiers “burst into the bus and began to beat the driver Gabriel Buku, forcing him to return to Mbongo-zi-Munu”. Here, all the passengers were forced off the bus, “and a real beating session began on the bus driver and his two assistants.”

Finally, the driver and his assistants, badly beaten, were allowed to continue their journey, but only “taking the women they were transporting”. The 20 or so men were forbidden to go on. The soldiers alleged they “stopped the bus to look for male citizens accused of being FLEC elements that travel on vehicles along that road, attacking FAA soldiers”. The same activists state that the “fate of the 20 or so men, aged between 14 and 60, are as yet unknown”.

- CASE No. 15 -

Murder in Cabinda by the MPLA Regime

MPLA Regime terror of the battalion 704 have assassinated the Cabindan citizen Agostinho Baza, son of Anselmo Bodo and Felicidade Bumba, natural of Bata Sano, resident in the village of Vito in Necuto, district of Buco-Zau, born on the 2 of July of 1980, was assassinated on the 16 of September 2004. The youngster was shot with 3 bullets to his abdomen.

- CASE No. 16 -

23 September 2010

Case of Intimidation and Torture in Cabinda committed by the MPLA Regime

Two weeks ago the Administrator of the Municipality of Kalussinga, Comrade Faustina Cmbundo in the province of Bie sent to be beaten and arrested the Village Elder Soba Bernardo Samangomba angolan citizen who had been detained in the police jail of that town, without any charges being made to him for 4 days, his only crime was that he attended a political rally of the UNITA party which he his a member of.

After a public complain made to the MPLA Regime Governor of the Province Comrade Boavida Neto he then went to the municipality of Kalussinga last week to make a public rally and with abuse of authority publicly threatened those who made the complain concerning the arrest of the Elder Bernardo Samangomba which is in direct violation of the Communist MPLA Constitution in its article 31 whereby all provincial governors must protect its residents.

In the last 48 hours in the municipality of Chitembo in the province of Bie where committed by the local police of the MPLA Regime 11 crimes against the freedom of the citizens of choosing which party they choose to belong to.

Also in the last 48 hours in the Municipality of Hengue and Village of Bailundo in the Province of Huambo, where committed violent crimes with fire arms against the physical integrity of its unarmed citizens Information given by Alcides Sakala Simões.

 

Cabinda 28 January 2006 Killing of Civilians by the MPLA Regime

Cabinda 28 January 2006 Killing of Civilians by the MPLA Regime

 

- CASE No. 17 -

MPLA The unelected Regime of Corruption and Theft

The business interests of MPLA ruling elite by Rafael Marques de Morais

2010-02-11

During the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s (MPLA)[1] central committee meeting in Luanda in November 2009, President José Eduardo dos Santos defined his challenges facing his party in terms of three fundamental questions: Keeping watch on government, the irresponsibility of government leaders, and fighting corruption with a policy of zero tolerance. In this investigation I deal with the transfer of state assets to the MPLA’s private businesses through a company called GEFI (Sociedade de Gestão e Participações Financeiras/Management and Business Participation Company), and the consequences of its involvement in such money making activities. In order to make clear the gap between the leadership’s words and its deeds, I will analyse those three main questions that dos Santos, both president of the Republic and leader of the MPLA, put forward during his speech when he opened the party central committee meeting on 29 November 2009. In this speech dos Santos spoke of the absence of scrutiny of the acts of government and the irresponsibility and bad faith of political leaders, and announced a zero tolerance policy towards corruption.

MONITORING, IRRESPONSIBILITY AND ZERO TOLERANCE

First, dos Santos accused his party of incompetence in ‘monitoring the government’s activities of governance, through the national assembly and the ‘tribunal de contas’ – the latter being the statutory body responsible for monitoring the use of state finance. This statement is contradictory. Dos Santos has been chairman of the MPLA and head of government for 30 years. His power in government as well as in the party is total. So it is dos Santos who bears primary responsibility for the MPLA’s performance in the national assembly.

The new constitution, approved on 21 January 2010, limits further the national assembly’s potential to keep a check on the government’s actions, because of the process that it lays down for the election of the president. Rather than being elected directly by the public, or indirectly by elected members of parliament, under the new system proposed by the MPLA the person at the top of the candidate list of the winning party in the election will simply be named president (Article 109).

This model invented by the MPLA rules out both the separation of powers and the accountability of the head of government, creating instead an excessive concentration of power in the figure of the president and the leader of the party. In the event that these two roles were not filled by the same person, power would be concentrated in the hands of the chairman of the party, even if he or she were not a member of parliament. In such a case, it is the party leader who chooses who is on the party’s list of candidates for the legislative elections, and which candidate is at the head of the list. The MPLA currently has an absolute majority in the National Assembly, with 191 of the 220 members.

With regard to the tribunal de contas, the president made a serious admission that has gone largely unnoticed by the public. In his speech of 29 November 2009 he stated that the MPLA had not been fulfilling its watchdog role through the tribunal de contas.[2] This apparently ignores the fact that the constitution provides for the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, and hence the independence of the courts. It is not the MPLA’s task to monitor the executive by means of the tribunal de contas. If the MPLA works through the tribunal de contas, this undermines its independence and the ability to perform its role. One example of this is when in 2005 dos Santos ignored the court’s finding that Isaac dos Anjos, at the time the Angolan ambassador to South Africa, had diverted money from pension funds, and convicted him in 2004 for such an offence. Dos Anjos was promoted to be governor of Huila province, with greater responsibility in terms of managing state funds and state assets.

Second, in the same speech the president condemned ‘irresponsible people, people of bad faith’ for taking advantage of the MPLA’s apathy, and ‘squandering resources and administrating in a way that is illegal, as well as dangerous or fraudulent’. The people he accused were members of his own administration.

This is the kind of language that the president adopts whenever he feels the need to reaffirm his authority at times of public discontent: He accuses his subordinates indiscriminately and asserts his own innocence. In 2007, during an extraordinary meeting of the central committee of the MPLA, the president condemned members of the government and administration officials over the use of public funds in their own businesses.

In 2001, the president assured citizens that democracy would allow them to participate in combating corruption and government inefficiency. In 1998, while opening the MPLA’s fourth congress, Dos Santos said that ‘corruption is a worrying problem that must be tackled by political and judicial means and by the police if we are not to lose control of it’. At an MPLA central committee meeting on 16 February 1996, the president spoke out against the ‘wild capitalism that has taken root in the country over the last three years’ and made clear that this practice among the ruling elite was destroying the MPLA and its fundamental goals: ‘the equitable distribution of wealth and national resources, solidarity and social justice.’ In an address to the nation during the 1996 economic crisis, the president called for transparency in government and measures to prevent corruption and influence peddling, at the government and state levels. Dos Santos promised that he would ‘put a definitive end to high-level crime, to organised theft and to the pillaging of state assets’.

Nevertheless, corruption continues to define the government’s actions, since the president and head of government has not taken serious and adequate measures to stop the looting of state assets. Responsibility for criminal acts committed by officials must in the first instance fall upon the head of government, who is exclusively responsible for appointing and dismissing members of government and for instructing, supervising and guiding their actions.

Thirdly, during MPLA’s sixth congress, on 7 December 2009, dos Santos repeated his promise of a zero tolerance policy towards corruption. Nearly two months later, neither he nor his government has presented any plan or programme to fight corruption. It has remained nothing but rhetoric. Nevertheless, the idea must be interpreted as an invitation to the nation to denounce publicly acts of corruption at the heart of government and in the public administration, the looting of state asses and the unjustified enrichment of the elite. Such a process of denunciation must be a fundamental step for nation-building, and to allow citizens to start thinking differently and to seek change in the areas of the law, politics, the economy and the ethics of Angolan society. This was what was recommended by the Interdisciplinary Commission to Study the Phenomenon of Corruption in Angolan Society, co-ordinated by the late minister of justice, Lázaro Dias, and created by presidential decree 22/90 of 15 September 1990.

THE MPLA’S BUSINESS INTERESTS

On 21 September 1992, a week before the first multiparty general elections in Angolan history, leading MPLA figures legally and formally established the ruling party’s business conglomerate GEFI (Sociedade de Gestão e Participações Financeiras/Business Management and Participation Company.) The company’s founding charter was signed by the following people, in the name of the MPLA:

- Francisco Magalhães Paiva, at that time minster of the interior, currently member of parliament and still a member of the MPLA Political Bureau – José Mateus Adelino Peixoto, then chief of staff of the president, currently secretary general of support services to the president of the republic and member of the MPLA central committee – António de Campos Van-Dúnem, then legal advisor to the president of the republic – Augusto Lopes Teixeira, at the time a member of the political bureau and chairman of the board of Angola-Telecom, a state-owned company – Carlos Alberto Ferreira Pinto, member of parliament and member of the MPLA political bureau – The Fundação Sagrada Esperança, the foundation which is the party’s social affairs and investment arm.

GEFI’s current business portfolio includes participation in 64 companies operating in the sectors that include hotels, industry, banking, fisheries, media, construction and real estate. Given the range of its business interests, this article presents merely an overview of GEFI’s activities, based on the availability of official documents. Moreover, this investigation focuses, in particular, on how the government has engendered the murky transfer of state assets to GEFI, for MPLA’s financial and patrimonial benefit.

AVIATION

In April 2009 the Angolan authorities granted permission for the airline Fly540 Angola to begin operating in the country. According to public statements by the multinational Lonrho, which has shares in the company, Fly540 flights would initially cover six of the country’s 18 provinces – Cabinda, Luanda, Zaire (Soyo airport), Benguela, Huambo and Malanje – using ATR72 aircraft.

GEFI has a majority (51 per cent) shareholding in Fly540 through its aviation company Planar, while Lonrho holds 49 per cent of the shares and has a right to 60 per cent of the profits, according to Lonrho’s press release of 2 October 2007. Planar contributed through its air service licence, a 1000m2 hangar at Luanda’s Quatro de Fevereiro International Airport which was given to it by the state, and offices.

The way in which Fly540 Angola was constituted presents a serious problem in terms of Angolan law. The current secretary of the council of ministers, Joaquim António Carlos dos Reis Júnior, in his capacity as manager of businesses for the MPLA and consequently of GEFI, is formally the major shareholder in Planar, with 20 per cent of the shares. In other words, the secretary of the council of ministers is GEFI’s figurehead in the aviation business. Four other individuals linked to the MPLA represent, in the name of GEFI, 60 per cent of Planar’s capital. The remaining 20 per cent is in the hands of individual shareholders. Thus GEFI in effect owns 80 per cent of Planar’s capital. Its management model and the way in which it does business are based on the supposed party loyalty of its members. This creates enormous confusion when it comes to distinguishing between the state businesses, party businesses and the private businesses of MPLA and government leaders.

Nevertheless, from the legal point of view, responsibility for the company’s actions lies directly with those who hold shares, and in the case of Planar, the major shareholder is the secretary of the council of ministers. Joaquim António Carlos dos Reis Júnior is covered by Article 10 (2) of Law 21/90, the law on crimes committed by holders of public office, which prohibits the holders of public office from participating in private business. Fly540 Angola, in order to operate, requires authorisation from the government, namely from the transport minister, Augusto Tomás. He, in turn, requires the authorisation of the secretary of the council of ministers in order to submit any kind of proposal for consideration by the council. The institutional relationship between Augusto Tomás and Joaquim António Carlos dos Reis Júnior creates a situation of influence peddling, according to the definition laid down in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Article 18, a, b), the SADC Protocol against corruption (Article 3,1,f), and the African Union Convention against corruption (Article 4, 1, f). These articles have been incorporated into Angolan law, and contravening them is punishable under Article 321 of the Angolan Penal Code, with aggravating circumstances provided for under Article 4(1) of the Law on crimes committed by holders of public office.

Lonrho, in turn, by associating itself with Planar, whose major shareholder, Joaquim António Carlos dos Reis Júnior, is in government and therefore able to influence its relationship with the state, creates a situation susceptible to active corruption according to the similar definitions in the United Nations Convention against corruption (Article 15, a), the SADC Protocol against corruption (Article 3, 1, b), and the African Union Convention against corruption (Article 4, 1, b). Lonrho is a company listed on the Johannesburg and London Stock Exchanges.

HOTELS

In Luanda, GEFI owns the Hotel Tivoli, has a 20 per cent share in Hotel President Le Meridien (20 per cent), and benefited from a 20 per cent concession in the shares of Serafim L. Andrade, the company that owns the Hotel Trópico, through the minister of industry’s Despatch no 55/00 of 10 March 2000. The other 80 per cent is owned by the investor, the Portuguese construction company Teixeira Duarte.

Also in the capital city, the privatisation process awarded to GEFI the site of Farol Velho, a restaurant on Ilha de Luanda, which has been destroyed to make way for a new hotel project. GEFI also has 25 per cent of the shares in Hotel Turismo, which previously housed some of UNITA’s (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) leadership and which was consequently destroyed during the fighting after the 1992 elections, while a further 25 per cent of shares are held by Sogec, a subsidiary of GEFI. A new Hotel Turismo is planned for the site.

On 20 May 2009, the state sold two properties in Luanda to GEFI for token prices. Hotel Zimbo cost US$527,000, and a residential, in Largo do Pelourinho, went for US$260,000.The state has also granted GEFA ownership or part ownership of the biggest hotel in Cabinda, Hotel Mayombe (51 per cent), the Hotel Central (80 per cent) in Luanda, and Hotel Grão Tosco (100 per cent) in Benguela.

BREWERIES

On 16 September 2005, Resolution 65/05 of the council of ministers approved the privatisation of the Cuca brewery, after the state secretly transferred 50 per cent of its shares in the brewery to Soba, a holding company owned by the MPLA, GEFI and Brasseries Internationales Holding (BIH), part of the French Castel group. The latter, as the only foreign investor, received 13 per cent of the shares in Cuca. The French company holds 75 per cent of Soba’s capital, and GEFI 25 per cent.

Although it is an MPLA company, no one knows what contributions GEFI has made in its partnership with BIH, in contrast, for example, to the partnership with Lonrho in Fly540. Nevertheless, it is important to look at how the government handled the creation of the business deal. The council of ministers is chaired by dos Santos, who, in approving the privatisation of Cuca, was clearly enhancing his own party’s business portfolio and the business interests of the presidential inner circle – including Adelino Peixoto, secretary general of the presidency of the republic – and other privileged government figures.[3]

Being leader of the MPLA and at the same time chairing the council of ministers, which approves the handing over of state assets to GEFI, puts the president of the republic in a serious situation of conflict of interests and in an embarrassing position with respect to what happens to GEFI’s profits: something that remains unknown even by some members of the Political Bureau. I return to this issue in the concluding remarks.

MEDIA, PROPAGANDA AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The MPLA has been the main beneficiary of the government’s project to create Angola’s first four commercial FM radio stations since independence. The radio stations were set up entirely with state funds in 1992, but ownership was transferred mostly to GEFI, the MPLA’s holding company. Through its subsidiary A Foto, GEFI owns 60 per cent of Luanda Antena Comercial (LAC), while the remaining 40 per cent is held by the journalists José Rodrigues, Luísa Fançony and Mateus Gonçalves. In Benguela, GEFI through its subsidiary Sopol owns 80 per cent of Radio Morena, of which the remaining shares are owned by António Mendes Filipe, a private individual. In Huila province another GEFI subsidiary, Pontual S.A., has 75.50 per cent of the shares in Rádio 2000, while its managers Horácio Reis and Carlos Andrade own the rest. In Cabinda, GEFI’s subsidiary Orion owns 60 per cent of Rádio Comercial de Cabinda, with the rest being owned by two former local directors, André Filipe Luemba (20 per cent) and Pedro Simba (20 per cent). Orion itself is an interesting case regarding the boundaries between the state and the ruling party. Orion is a partnership between GEFI, with 70 per cent, the former Minister of Social Communication (1992-2005) and current ambassador to Egypt, Hendrick Vaal Neto, who holds 11 per cent, Minister of Planning Ana Dias Lourenço, who holds five per cent, and other figures within the MPLA who own the remaining 14 per cent of the shares. Since 1992, Orion has been the lynchpin of government and MPLA propaganda. This company provides facilities and serves as a front for the Brazilian firm M’Link, owned by Sérgio Guerra, which plans, produces and oversees the broadcasting of MPLA and government propaganda in the media.

Over the past 10 years, the ministry of social communication has paid about US$24 million per year to M’Link for its services to the government and the MPLA, without distinguishing between the two. This agreement was signed by Hendrick Vaal Neto, who has also benefited directly from the profits from this work, in contravention of the Law on crimes committed by holders of public office, which prohibits people in government from using state functions and contracts to their own benefit.

M’Link’s managing director is the journalist and MPLA parliamentarian Luís Domingos, who in partnership with Francisca Pacavira holds 10 per cent of the shares. For several years now, Luís Domingos has presented the weekly propaganda programme ‘Angola em Movimento’ (Angola on the move), which is produced by M’Link on behalf of Orion and broadcast on the state television station, TPA. The constitution (Article 82,1,c) states that the duties of a member of parliament are incompatible with serving as managing director of a private company. Luís Domingos has not declared this conflict of interests and continues to play both roles with the blessing of the MPLA leadership. Pontual is a screen printing business privatised by the state: Its shareholders comprise GEFI (70 per cent), the secretary general of the MPLA, Julião Mateus Paulo ‘Dino Matross’ (5 per cent), the chairman of the board of GEFI and member of the MPLA Political Bureau Mário António de Sequeira e Carvalho (five per cent), and while the remaining 20 per cent is shared among the company’s former managers and party activists.

Other state businesses that were handed over to GEFI as majority shareholder are A Foto (73 per cent), as well as the printing presses Gráfica Impresso (41 per cent), in Benguela, and Edigráfica (27 per cent).

BANKING AND FINANCE In the banking sector, GEFI is the main shareholder in Banco Sol, holding 55 per cent of shares through its subsidiary Sansul, according to Banco Sol’s latest annual report. Sansul’s capital is in turn owned 99 per cent by GEFI, while four MPLA members share a token one per cent. Direct shareholders in Banco Sol, each with five per cent, include first lady Ana Paula dos Santos, the vice-chairman of the National Assembly and member of the MPLA Political Bureau, João Lourenço, and the MPLA parliamentarian and former minister of finances Júlio Bessa.

Banco Comercial Angolano is controlled by ABSA/Barclays (50 per cent) as investor, while GEFI holds a mere 1.8 per cent of the shares. But leading figures in the regime are numbered among the shareholders, including the MPLA secretary general Julião Mateus Paulo, the ministers of transport and fisheries, Augusto Tomás and Salomão Xirimbimbi, the governor of Huila province, Isaac dos Anjos, and members of parliament Fernando França Van-Dúnem and Dumilde Rangel.

GEFI’s interests also extend to offshore companies, namely Faierden, which it owns outright, and Invest, in which it has a 20 per cent share. Both companies are registered in Panama, but little else is known about their finances or their business activities.

INDUSTRY

In the industrial sector, GEFI’s role is curious when compared to that of MPLA leaders. The government transferred ownership of the country’s main flourmills to GEFI without any tender, while the leading figures in the regime enjoy substantial shares in petroleum and diamond concessions, for their personal benefit. The milling business is nevertheless of great political, economic and social importance since it means partial control over the manufacture of bread, an important food for the whole country, and maize flour, which is the staple diet of southern Angola.

On 14 July 2008, the minister of industry, Joaquim David, and the then secretary of state for public enterprise, Augusto Tomás, drew up Joint Executive Decree no 91/08, with reference to the total privatisation of the Cimor mill in Matala, Huila province. The beneficiaries were Seipo, a GEFI subsidiary (50 per cent), local businessman Fernando Borges (35 per cent) and other smaller shareholders including workers and local professionals (15 per cent). Seipo, in turn, is owned 55 per cent by GEFI, while MPLA parliamentarians João Marcelino Typinge and Alfredo Berner, as well as defence minister Kundy Paihama, have 14 per cent of Seipo’s shares between them, while other MPLA figures own the remainder.

From a legal point of view, the transfer of shares from the state to Seipo involves influence-peddling. Law 21/90 (Article 10,2) prohibits members of the government – in this case, the defence minister – from participating in business in which the state is also involved.

Until May 2008, Cimor was producing 300 tons of maize flour per day. According to information that its manager, Edgar Macedo, gave to Jornal de Angola, the mill intended to triple its daily production to improve the supply to the south of the country.

The decree in question explained the privatisation ‘in terms of a strategy to develop the food industry and to refurbish and increase the productive capacities of the maize milling industry’ as well as ‘to make the private sector participate in the development of these industries.

Ten years before, on 31 July 1998, the then ministers of industry and of finance, Manuel Duque e Alcântara Monteiro, had drafted Joint Executive Decree no 39/98, for the total and direct privatisation of the Heróis de Kangamba mill in Viana, Luanda, to the benefit of GEFI (60 per cent) and its subsidiary Sengoservice (40 per cent). According to the ministers’ explanation, the privatisation took place ‘in terms of the strategy to develop the food industry and the Bread Programme’ and ‘to make the private sector participate in those industries’. After privatisation, the mill – the biggest in Angola – was renamed Moagem Kwaba. GEFI subsequently sold 45 per cent of its shares to a foreign investor, the US-based Seabord. Nevertheless, since 2006 Kwaba has not been in operation due to managerial and investment problems.

As part of the strategy already referred to, and as part of the institutional norms for the privatisation process, all the mills ought to have been sold on the open market, with guaranteed shares for workers and small local shareholders. Formally, the ministers of industry and of finance announced that privatisation would be undertaken through public tenders in the case of 60 per cent of the shares of the Saidy Mingas and Aliança mills in Lubango, Huila province. Another example of public bidding in the same sector was the privatisation of shares in the Empresa Industrial de Produtos Alimentares (EMPAL – Industrial Food Production Company) in favour of Fundo Lwini, which belongs to first lady Ana Paula dos Santos. In Joint Executive Decree no 31/00 of 21 April 2000, the then ministers of finance and of industry, Joaquim David and Albina Assis, declared that ‘there was no public participation by individual or collective entities’ and, consequently transferred ownership of the firm directly to the first lady. Although this deal represents influence peddling in favour of President dos Santos’s wife, the trick of supposedly opening the deal to public tender demonstrates how MPLA leaders comply with the law and the rules of transparency selectively and at their own convenience.

GEFI, though its subsidiary Sogepang, also received 20 per cent of the shares in Cerangola, the second biggest grain processing factory in the country, in Benguela. Seabord was also asked to contribute its know-how to this project. The MPLA’s taste for the bread business extends also to the Sociedade dos Industriais de Panificação de Luanda (Luanda Baking Industries Partnership – Sopão), in which GEFI is the second-largest shareholder, with 20 per cent in relation to Martal’s 35 per cent.

Yet despite the privatisations, the state continues to intervene in the sector through mechanisms that raise further doubts. At the Conference on the Re-launching of the Food Processing Industry 2009-2012, held in May last year, the government announced an investment in US$100 million in the construction of two wheat mills, with a production capacity of 1,000 tons per day. JP Morgan and local banks will lend the money for the construction of the factories, which are to be built in the provinces of Bengo and Kwanza-Sul.

At the same conference, the director of studies and planning in the ministry of industry, José Gonçalves, unveiled plans for the imminent rehabilitation of the Kwaba, Cerangola and Saydi Mingas mills – the latter in Huila province – at a total cost of US$33 million, to be raised from local banks.

In the projects announced at the conference, the line between public and private investment is blurred. The government has increased investment in industry and other sectors, only to give away ownership of assets, virtually for free, to businesses that belong to government officials. This, however, is another story to be dealt with in due course.

THE MOTOR INDUSTRY

A clear example of the use of state power to the benefit of the private businesses of the MPLA and the country’s ruling families is the case of the Volkswagen and Skoda vehicle assembly plant in Angola. On 23 December 2004, the council of ministers passed Resolution 39/04, authorising Agência Nacional de Investimentos Privados (National Private Investments Agency – ANIP) to enter into an investment contract with the American Company Ancar Worldwide Investments Holding, worth US$48 million. On 26 January 2005, ANIP initialled the contract for the assembly of 160 cars per day at Pólo Industrial in Viana, Luanda.

This contract was signed after Ancar undertook to hand over 49 per cent of the shares in its Angolan offspring to five Angolan-based companies, namely: – Acapir Lda, a company that belongs to the president’s daughter, Welwitchia dos Santos, usually known as Tchizé dos Santos. – Mbakassi & Filhos, official representative of Volkswagen in Angola; – GEFI, the MPLA’s company; – Suninvest, investment arm of the Fundação Eduardo dos Santos (FESA), the President’s private institution; – Tchany Perdigão Abrantes, cousin of Tchizé dos Santos. Three days after the contract was signed, the chairman of FESA, Ismael Diogo, called a meeting at FESA’s headquarters, with a representative of Ancar, Carlos Garcia, the owner of Mbakassi & Filhos, António Mosquito, and as a witness, the then administrator of FESA and chairman of Suninvest, António Maurício.

Ismael Diogo called the meeting, as stated in the minutes, ‘according to a mandate from His Excellency the President of the Republic, Engineer José Eduardo dos Santos’, to clarify the circumstances and the reality that ACAPIR Lda. would have to participate in the ‘Ancar – Automóveis de Angola’ partnership, owing to the fact that one of the shareholders was the daughter of the head of state, to obtain his favour for the approval of the investment project.

Mbakassy & Filhos felt cheated at having had 16 per cent of the quota meant for them taken away in order to accommodate the president’s daughter, who was then named vice-chair of the board of Ancar – Automóveis de Angola. According to the minutes, ‘at no time did Ancar Worldwide Investments Holding explain the offer of 16 per cent to ACAPIR Lda. in order to benefit from the favours of His Excellency the President of the Republic in the approval of the project.’ The final decision in the council of ministers to approve Ancar’s project rested with President dos Santos, as head of government.

The point worth noting about the Ancar case is that a business row, not a dispute about the legality and transparency of the deal, took place at government level. Dos Santos was involved in a blatant act of influence peddling, in favour of his foundation, his daughter, and his party’s company GEFI, which received 12 per cent of the shares in the project. The case was considered worthy of a second stakeholders’ meeting in order to redistribute the shares among the presidential family, the MPLA’s business interests and those of Mosquito, a businessmen who has benefited from the MPLA’s wealth distribution policies.

Nevertheless, according to information published in the German press in July 2005, the chairman of Volkswagen, Bernd Pischetsrieder, delayed the plans to install the assembly plant owing to allegations of corruption surrounding the project.

Also in the motor industry, GEFI was the direct beneficiary of the privatisation of the Mabor tyre factory, now renamed Pneucar. GEFI received 60 per cent of the shares in the company that owns the factory, which is currently not operational.

OTHER BUSINESSES

In the retail business, GEFI benefited from the privatisation of the country’s largest hypermarket, Jumbo, in Luanda. GEFI formed a partnership with the third-biggest French company in the sector, the Auchan group, GEFI taking 51 per cent of the shares while the French company has since 1996 owned 30 per cent of Jumbo’s capital. Other partners, including the current secretary of the council of ministers, Joaquim Reis Júnior, and others linked to the regime control 19 per cent of the shares.

In the construction sector, the biggest growth area of the last few years, GEFI gained 20 per cent ownership of the metal structures factory set up by the Portuguese company Martifer in Viana, Luanda. Martifer is in turn a subsidiary of the Portuguese construction firm Mota-Engil, which is expanding its business interests in Angola through establishing partnerships with influential figures in the regime. This type of investment pattern is the secret of the success of most of the Portuguese and other foreign companies that are doing well in the Angolan market.

On the other hand, when it is unable to attract a foreign investor and manager, GEFI’s day-to-day management capacity is notable. Its subsidiary Sengoservice, which manages Feira Popular (People’s Fair), in Luanda, has turned the country’s biggest amusement park into an informal market selling clothes and household goods. The MPLA’s accumulation of private property, through the privatisation of state assets, also includes the fixed and mobile assets of the old button factory that is currently out of use, and bookshops in the city of Luanda. GEFI also sold thousands of Christmas hampers to state and private institutions, through its subsidiary Dilog, managed by a foreign national by the name of Amin Herji.

GEFI has negotiated with the ministry of fisheries over the management of the Kapiandalo fish-processing factory in Benguela as well as receiving 60 per cent of the company’s shares, with no public consultation, and no consideration to what benefit the deal might have for the state. Still in the fishing sector, GEFI co-owns Epata Fishing, which is licensed to fish in Nambian waters, as well as having shares in other fishing companies.

The MPLA’s incursions into the private security business are also worth noting. GEFI is the sole owner of Socorro, which protects the party headquarters and other buildings as well as its leaders. Sambiente, another GEFI company, is also involved in industrial security despite current problems.

On 16 March 2006, GEFI formed a partnership with the state businesses Sonangol (petroleum), Endiama (diamonds), Porto de Luanda (harbour), Fundo de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (social and economic development fund), Grupo Ensa (insurance) and a further 18 private entities, as founding partners in the Angolan Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores e Derivativos de Angola), which was constituted as a limited company and is expected to start operating soon.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite various enquiries to people close to the government about the MPLA’s businesses, all that emerges is a consensus about the lack of information, even by the party’s central committee and political bureau, about the amount of capital that GEFI has acquired, how it is managed, its annual profits and where the money ends up. After the party’s fifth congress in 2003, its chairman, José Eduardo dos Santos, put Manuel Vicente, a central committee member and chairman of the board and CEO of state oil company Sonangol, to audit the MPLA’s business interests with a view to better management and better returns. Yet what happens to the profits remains a mystery, as does the question of financial management.

In contrast, some figures in the MPLA speak of the exemplary way in which Maboque, another holding company created by the party, has presented its accounts and duly contributed to the MPLA’s coffers. Maboque is a company that has secured its reputation in Angolan society by offering an annual journalism prize worth US$100,000. João Melo, an MPLA parliamentarian and the director of the magazine África 21, won the prize in 2009. Still, the way in which the MPLA uses the contributions from Maboque raises other questions, which will have to be the subject of a future article on Maka Angola.

The transfer of state assets to GEFI must be understood in the institutional context of the dividing up of state resources among certain figures: The families of the political elite and their Angolan and foreign associates. From the research that I have been doing in the past three years, I have learnt of the workings of an office in the External Intelligence Services (SIE) which has been involved in the allocation of business privileges to political leaders, their families, associates and people co-opted. The office in question sets up companies, chooses their shareholders and suggests which state assets should be given to them, and which foreign investors should be brought on board as partners. The final decision in this regard always rests with the president of the republic.

During an extraordinary party congress in 1980, the MPLA’s biggest decision was the ‘subordination of the state and all economic and social activity’ under the party’s leadership. The subsequent liberalisation of the economy has been used to bring about a system even more perverse than the one created by the MPLA 30 years ago. Nowadays, the state, all economic and social activity in the country, not to mention the MPLA’s own structures, have been brought under the absolute private control of the business interests that benefit the ruling families.

With respect to the MPLA’s role as a party of the left, concerned with the situation of the most disadvantaged members of society, reaffirmed in its sixth congress, in December 2009, the reality is different and the ideology is irrelevant. The concept of social solidarity and equal opportunity applies only to select members of the ruling elite who have been given the task of looting the country.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article first appeared on Maka Angola. * Rafael Marques de Morais is an Angolan journalist and writer with a special interest in Angola’s political economy and human rights. * Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] MPLA is the Portuguese acronym for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. 
[2] In 2001, dos Santos appointed the then MPLA parliamentarian, Julião António, for a three-year term as Presiding Judge of the Tribunal de Contas. On 28 December 2008, José Magalhães, another judge of the tribunal, wrote a letter to the newspaper Seminário Angolense, complaining that Julião António had been occupying his position illegally since 2004 when his mandate ended. Since then, Julião António had not been reappointed in terms of the relevant legislation, which also imposes a two-term limit on incumbency as Presiding Judge. Magalhães notes that any decisions signed by Julião António therefore have no legal force. 
[3] For more information on who benefited from the brewery privatisations, see http://makaangola.com/wp-content/uploads/O-trafico-de-influencias-do-grupo-gema.pdf

- CASE No. 18 -

 

       

A CANALHA DO  MPLA

 
 
 

THE LIST OF THEFT BY THE MPLA REGIME, AN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GANG

O presente relatório revela o modo como a Presidência da República de Angola tem sido usada como um cartel de negócios obscuros e as consequências dessa prática para a liberdade e o desenvolvimento dos cidadãos assim como para a estabilidade política e económica do país. O texto responde aos apelos da política de tolerância zero contra a corrupção decretada pelo Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos, a 21 de Novembro de 2009.

Por uma questão de clareza, a investigação cinge-se a uma pequena amostra das práticas comerciais empreendidas pelo ministro de Estado e chefe da Casa Militar da Presidência da República, o general Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”. A este cabe a coordenação dos sectores de defesa e segurança do país. Com este dirigente, o chefe de Comunicações da Presidência da República, general Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento “Dino”, e o presidente do Conselho de Administração e director-geral da Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, formam o triunvirato que hoje domina a economia política de Angola, sem distinção entre o público e o privado. Manuel Vicente junta ainda, aos poderes acumulados pelos generais e a Sonangol, o facto de ser um dos membros mais influentes do Bureau Político do MPLA, como delfim do presidente e responsável pela fiscalização dos negócios particulares do partido no poder.
 
A petrolífera nacional é a maior empresa do país e o maior contribuinte das receitas do Estado. Vários analistas têm considerado a Sonangol como o principal instrumento da manutenção do regime de José Eduardo dos Santos nos domínios financeiro, político e diplomático, assim como é a principal fonte de enriquecimento ilícito dos seus principais dirigentes.
Em alguns casos são referidas as relações solidárias e de cumplicidade com outros membros do executivo e gestores públicos na realização de negócios que envolvem a pilhagem do património do Estado e outras acções de contravenção às leis da república. Sectores estratégicos como o dos petróleos, telecomunicações, banca, comunicação social e diamantes, fazem parte do império construído por tais figuras. A amostra refere-se às empresas Movicel, Biocom, Banco Espírito Santo Angola, Nazaki Oil & Gás, Media Nova, World Wide Capital e Lumanhe.
 
A Lei da Probidade Pública é usada amiúde, para melhor compreensão do leitor, mesmo para os casos que antecedem à sua aprovação, em Março passado, por ser uma compilação de diversos diplomas legais contra a corrupção, que datam desde 1989. Todos os artigos constantes na Lei da Probidade Pública se encontravam dispersos em tais diplomas. Por exemplo, a Lei dos Crimes Cometidos por Titulares de Cargos de Responsabilidade (Lei nº 21/90, não revogada pela Lei da Probidade Pública) proíbe o dirigente de participação económica em negócio sobre o qual tenha poder de influência ou decisão (art. 10º, 2).

Movicel

Actualmente existem apenas duas operadoras de telefonia móvel no país, a Unitel e a Movicel. A Unitel, a operar desde 2001, resulta da sociedade, por quotas iguais (25%), entre a Sonangol, através da sua subsidiária MSTelcom (ex-Mercury), a Portugal Telecom, GENI e Vidatel. A Movicel foi criada pelo governo, em 2003, como uma subsidiária da empresa telefónica estatal Angola-Telecom.
 
No ano passado, através da Resolução n.° 67/09 de 26 de Agosto, o Conselho de Ministros determinou a privatização expedita e sem concurso público da Movicel, a um consórcio de empresas angolanas, pelo valor 200 milhões de dólares. Para o efeito, o órgão do governo, invocou a dificuldade na mobilização de outros investidores para a privatização da companhia. Argumentou, também, sobre a urgência em gerar fundos para os cofres do governo “face à crise financeira mundial”; Essa decisão, segundo a referida resolução governamental, teve em conta a identificação de “uma estrutura do empresariado nacional, que assegura os recursos financeiros vitais para a aplicação imediata do plano de investimentos da Movicel e o encaixe financeiro esperado para o tesouro nacional”.
 
No entanto, 59% do capital da Movicel foi transferido para duas empresas afectas a altas patentes subordinadas ao ministro de Estado e chefe da Casa Militar, general Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”, a Portmill e a Modus Comunicare, conforme se descreverá. A 10 de Junho de 2009, o general Kopelipa, o general Dino e Manuel Vicente, apartaram-se formalmente da sociedade Portmill Investimentos e Telecomunicações de que eram proprietários, com 99,96% das acções equitativamente repartidas entre si. Cederam as suas quotas, por intermédio do português Ismênio Coelho Macedo, a um grupo de altos oficiais da Unidade de Guarda Presidencial (UGP), conforme tabela abaixo descrita. No caso da Portmill, o tenente-coronel Leonardo Lidinikeni, oficial da escolta presidencial, detém 99,96% das acções da empresa. Na Modus Comunicare, o tenente-coronel Tadeu Agostinho dos Santos Hikatala, responsável da escolta presidencial, é o titular de 99,92% das acções. A UGP está subordinada à Casa Militar.
 
Coube também ao gestor dos negócios privados do general Kopelipa, Ismênio Coelho Macedo, a operação de compra e reestruturação de uma pequena empresa de comunicação, publicidade e marketing, a Modus Comunicare – Comunicação e Imagem Lda., que não tinha expressão no mercado, colocando na sua estrutura accionista altas patentes do palácio presidencial. A empresa foi transformada em sociedade anónima, dedicada às telecomunicações, a 14 de Agosto de 2009. Essa data indica que o processo de reconhecimento legal da transacção, a sua transformação em sociedade anónima e alteração do objecto social apenas ficou concluído duas semanas após o governo, dirigido pelo Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos, ter atribuído 19% do capital da Movicel a esta empresa.
 
A 29 de Julho de 2009, o Conselho de Ministros aprovou a privatização de 80% do capital da Movicel a favor das empresas angolanas Portmill Investimentos e Telecomunicações (40%), Modus Comunicare (19%), Ipang – Indústria de Papel e Derivados (10%), Lambda (6%) e Novatel (5%). Por sua vez, as empresas estatais Angola Telecom e a Empresa Nacional de Correios e Telégrafos de Angola detêm respectivamente 18% e 2% do capital social da Movicel.
A seguir apresenta-se uma tabela das empresas beneficiárias e seus accionistas:
 
Portmill, Investimentos e Telecomunicações (40%)
Sócio
Função
Tenente-Coronel Leonardo Lidinikeni Oficial de Escolta Presidencial
Francisco Ndeufeta Unidade de Guarda Presidencial
Manuel dos Santos Rodrigues Cardoso             
Nelson Paulo António                    
Tenente-Coronel Francisco Mbava Acção Psicológica, Casa Militar
Modus Comunicare – Telecomunicações (19%)
Sócio
Função
Tenente-Coronel Tadeu Agostinho dos Santos Hikatala Oficial de Escolta Presidencial
João Ricardo Belarmino Unidade de Guarda Presidencial
Tenente-Coronel João José António Soares Conselheiro do Chefe de Unidade de Guarda Presidencial, General Alfredo Tyaunda
José Kakonda               
José Luís Alves                      
 
Ipang – Indústria de Papel e Derivados, Limitada (10%)

Accionistas
N’datembu – Comércio Geral, Importação e Exportação Lda.

A Ipang é a única empresa beneficiária que apresenta, na sua estrutura accionista formal, empresários. A N’datembu tem entre os seus accionistas Miguel Domingos Martins e filhos, o advogado Ildeberto Manuel Teixeira e o português José Mamade Etbal. Outro nome associado à Ipang é o do empresário espanhol Óscar Ouersagasti Soraluce. De qualquer modo, a entrada no capital da Movicel é a única actividade empresarial publicamente conhecida da Ipang.

Mais informações sobre este grupo e outros eventuais investidores serão actualizadas oportunamente.

Lambda (6%)
Sócio
Função
José Carvalho da Rocha Ministro das Telecomunicações e Tecnologias de Informação
Aristides Safeca Vice-Ministro das Telecomunicações e Tecnologias de Informação
Zulmira Mitange da Rocha Esposa do Ministro José Carvalho da Rocha
Arminda Vireya Safeca de Sá Parente do Vice-Ministro Aristides Safeca
Antónia Dias dos Santos Caxinda                                   
 
Enquanto director nacional das Telecomunicações, Aristides Cardoso Frederico Safeca integrou a Comissão de Negociação da Movicel, em cumprimento do Despacho n° 67/07 do ministro das Finanças José Pedro de Morais, datado de 19 de Janeiro de 2007. Essa comissão era chefiada pelo então assessor económico do Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos, Archer Mangueira.
Desde 2 de Outubro de 2006, Aristides Safeca exerce as funções de presidente do Conselho de Administração e director da empresa belga Parisa, S.A. O mesmo Aristides Safeca, em sociedade com os seus irmãos Alcides Safeca, secretário de Estado do Orçamento (Ministério das Finanças) e Amílcar Safeca, director da UNITEL, são os sócios maioritários da Trans Omnia, na qual se associam ao general Fernando Vasquez Araújo, chefe da Direcção Principal de Armamento e Técnica do Estado Maior General das FAA. A Trans Omnia tem sido privilegiada com contratos multimilionários para o abastecimento de bens alimentares às FAA, um assunto a ser abordado à parte.
 
Apesar da nova Lei da Probidade, Aristides Safeca continua, de forma impune, a acumular funções públicas com cargos privados. O vice-ministro para as Telecomunicações mantém-se como presidente do Conselho de Administração e director de uma empresa estrangeira, a Parisa (com sede na Bélgica), e a realizar múltiplos negócios com o Estado para seu enriquecimento, de familiares e seus associados.
Novatel (5%)
Sócio
Função
Hélder Bruno da Gama Bento               
Paula Sammer Pinto Jorge          
Aurélio Vimbuando Muelecumbi         
Onezandro Catinhe Mauro Santos Piedade             
Marília da Conceição dos Santos Kissuá  
 
A atribuição de uma quota à Novatel, na privatização da Movicel, é mais uma prova de desvio do património público em prejuízo do Estado. A Novatel foi criada a 29 de Abril de 2009, após apresentação do parecer da Comissão de Negociação da Movicel e três meses antes do anúncio formal das empresas beneficiárias, pelo Conselho de Ministros.
À data da privatização formal da Movicel, os sócios da Novatel, acima descritos, não apresentavam individual ou solidariamente quaisquer investimentos que os identificassem como empresários. Apesar das objecções de uma das figuras citadas em assumir a sua participação no negócio, devido à existência de expedientes jurídicos para encobrir os verdadeiros accionistas, as acções da Novatel são nominativas. Tal como os estatutos obrigam (art. 5, 1), as acções têm titulares precisos e determinados, conforme a lista acima descrita. Para todos os efeitos, são formalmente responsáveis pelos deveres e obrigações decorrentes da titularidade das acções, sendo portanto os titulares das mesmas accionistas formais.

- CASE No. 19 -

In 1983, 70 South African university students, who had joined the ANC struggle, were executed in the municipality of Cacuso, in the Northern province of Malanje. According to some sources, the ANC men were executed by the regime because they refused to fight against UNITA. The sources stated that the students believed that they were in Angola to receive military training and then to be sent back home to fight in their own struggle, and not to join another country’s civil war.

- CASE No. 20 -

The assassination of the King of the Bailundo King Utondossi II

The orchestrated Assassination of Utondossi II King of the Bailundos, who was physically assassinated by the Political Police of the MPLA Regime, with the go ahead from the Dictator Fulano Jose Eduardo dos Santos and of Augusto Kachytiopololo the death of King Utondossi II of the Bailundos People happened 2008 after an attempt to his life made on the 30 of May of 2007 at 18:30 hours in the village of Lunge where he resided.

In the occasion of the Assassination attempt which resulted a few months in the cause of the Kings death, the Secretary of UNITA issued the following statement concerning the assassination attempt suffered by the King.

REI DO BAILUNDO “UTONDOSSI II” FOI VÍTIMA DE TENTATIVA DE ASSASSINATO

31 de Maio de 2007

Bailundo – Um comunicado da Direcção da UNITA, que publicamos na integra, informa que o Rei UTONDOSSI II, do Reino do Bailundo foi vítima de tentativa de assassinato e apela a intervensão das autoridades competentes.

COMUNICADO

We give notice to the national and international public opinion the following facts:

1. Sua Majestade, o Rei UTONDOSSI II, do Reino do Bailundo foi vítima de tentativa de assassinato ocorrido ontem, dia 30 de Maio de 2007, por volta das 18 horas e 30 minutos na comuna do Lunge, área da Tunda, quando se encontrava na sua residência.

2. Sua Majestade, Rei UTONDOSSI II, encontra-se ferido em consequência dos disparos de armas de fogo de que foi alvo.

3. Esforços estão a ser envidados para a sua evacuação para o Hospital Municipal do Bailundo.

4. A Direcção da UNITA lamenta o facto de a criminalidade estar a alastrar-se e atingir índices alarmantes de tal sorte que também os cidadãos das longínquas áreas do País terem as suas vidas permanentemente em perigo.

5. Apelamos e solicitamos que as autoridades competentes investiguem com urgência mais este caso e que os actores deste hediondo crime sejam levados à justiça.

Luanda, 31 de Maio de 2007

Secretário-Geral, UNITA
Mário Vasco Miguel Vatuva

- CASE No. 21 -

Don Muatxihina Chamumbala

Death in the Prisons of the unelected and corrupt Regime of the MPLA, the 
First Martyr of the struggle of the Lunda Tchokwe People

Don Muatxihina Chamumbala Prisoner of the Communist MPLA Regime in the MPLA Prison of Condueje in Lunda North

3 October 2010

Dom Muatxihina Chamumbala 56 years old died on Monday 3 October 2010, around 20 hours in the Provincial Hospital of North Lunda, a member of the Manifesto and Son of the Lunda Tchokwe.

The first martyr to die in defence of the natural rights of the people of the Lunda Tchokwe. He was detained for 18 months since April 2009. Earlier this year became ill and was denied all forms of medical attention.

On 12 October 2010, the First Martyr in the defence of the Lunda Tchokwe people would be tried together with Dr Philip Malakito Jota and 33 other members of the Lunda Tchokwe Manifesto, however, illegally imprisoned by the unelected MPLA Regime which in its 35 years in power has only brought misery and death to the People of the Lunda.

The CMJSPLT Renders homage to this hero and son of Lunda Tchokwe People.

Follow up: On the 5th of October the MPLA unelected and Brutal Regime disposed of the Body of Dom Muatxihina in a common grave, not allowing the Family that where present to make a proper burial. 

O Ditador Fulano José Eduardo dos Santos e o seu Regime de Terror do MPLA

Cobardemente enterram o Primeiro Mártir da Lunda Tchokwe 
sem consentimento da Família e tão pouco respeitou as normas e costumes africanos.

6 October 2010

Dom Muatxihina Chamumbala Bonifacio, Primeiro Martir da Lunda Tchokwe tinha 56 anos de idade, era pai de 7 filhos e 19 netos morto pelo Regime Criminoso do Jose Eduardo dos Santos e a quadrilha de mMalandros do MPLA. 
Ainda assim foi ontem (5 Outubro 2010) a enterrar no Dundo sem o consentimento da sua família, nem respeito as normas e os costumes Africanos.

A Família Muatxihina Chamumbala Bonifacio, Primeiro Martir da Lunda Tchokwe chegou pela noite as 23 horas, vindo do Município do Cuango, na localidade de Cafunfo sua zona natal e foi surpreendida com a notícia, segundo a qual o corpo do Muatxihina Chamumbala Bonifacio, Primeiro Martir da Lunda Tchokwe foi enterrado pela Policia do MPLA em Dundo na vala comum, como de um Bandido ou de um forasteiro desconhecido se tratasse.

Don Muatxihina, foi raptado no Cafunfo na operação caça as “Bruxas” do Manifesto do Protectorado da Lunda Tchokwe, no dia 4 de Abril de 2009 conjuntamente com outros 270 pessoas acusadas de estarem a fazerem manifestações de um partido desconhecido. Posteriormente havia sido inventada outra calunia, segundo a qual haviam rasgado Bandeiras do Regime Criminoso e não eleito do MPLA, acusações estúpidas como é costume dos partidos Marxistas Leninistas.

Na triagem feita no Cuango, ele ficou entre os 34 elementos enviados ao Dundo com o Processo N.º 3450 – B/2009, que seria julgado este dia 12 de Outubro de 2010.

- CASE No. 22 -

THE KILLING OF THE BAKONGO BY THE MPLA, THE GENOCIDE OF THE BAKONGO
By the  MPLA unelected Communist Regime

22 January 1993: The MPLA Military forces and the Angolan national police have massacred civilians, mostly Bakongo in several cities.

Several reports suggest that this was a deliberate attempt by the MPLA (composed of Kimbundo & Sao Tomense ethnic tribes) to deliberately destroy the Bakongo Tribe, Ethnic Cleansing. The number of dead is confirmed to be in the hundreds, most reports suggest between 100 to 150 dead. Some Ovimbundu were also killed. This massacre, is called “Bloody Friday” perpetuated.

A N’Kongo, is a son of this land bequeathed by our ancestors which presently is annexed to something called angola.

In this non existent country product of the ignorant Portuguese colonial mind we find the Kimbundu tribe overruling the Ovimbundu and other tribes, in this fictitious Country referred form now on as angola. The capital of this fictitious state is called Sao Pedro de Luanda to give its full portuguese colonial name and was established as the fictitious angolan country’s capital by the Constitution; no one knows who voted for such a constitution.

It is funny that a city that occupies an area in Kimbundu’s tribe was chosen as the capital. In this fake state called angola if you are from Luanda or knowing the Kimbundu language makes you a true angolan, or “more” angolan than others, we Bakongos are not angolans and we wish nothing to do with the angolans if the Kimbundu and the Ovimbundu wish one another so mote it be but we Bakongos wish neither.

We would like to remind the International Community of our feelings, just as BEN GURION extolled for the creation of today’s State of Israel.

Consult history, it is written by men, we, Bakongos, already had our State, we do not need to create it again because it already existed, and it still exists.

We are not “Zairians”, the name Zairian comes from the Zaire River that was written by Diogo Cao because he did not know, how to pronounce the word “N’zadi”. We do not belong to the colonial invention of angola, or anybody. We have our history and culture, and we will never succumb to its destruction, no matter who that would be, kinfua nfua kimpinga m’pinga vo ka mu ntekelo ko, mu muana.

Let it be known that we are Bakongos, children of King N’Zinga a N’Kuvu, from the Kongo, and neither murderers nor public infractions will make us turn our backs to our African and Bakongo dignity.

It is terrible to die just for being Mukongo. Who is the native that cannot live in the capital of his country? Why is it a crime being a Kikongo? No one will be able to say that this oil that angola is so proud of comes from the Kikongos land. Have we ever asked for compensation? Or put this in a check? Who are the ones that kill us? And why do they kill us? Aren’t we humans?

We demand an explicit action by the unelected State Government of the fictitious state of angola and the religious authorities, and the unelected political parties, without pretexts or hidden motives. Shall we continue to watch impatiently our brothers die just because they do not know how to speak Portuguese well? What is the official national language, portuguese or Kikongo? Who is angolan, Paulo Dias de Novais or Nimi a Lukeni? What’s the crime for wearing the cloth? In Africa, only the “exiled” wear the cloth. In Togo, Nigeria, Zambia, Cameroon, Congo, Zaire, and even Mozambique, has anyone ever killed a person for wearing the cloth? We are all tired of knowing that during Carnival in Victoria, angolan traditional party, people dance with cloths in the parades. Why don’t they dance with wearing pants, which is considered other people’s culture? Is this African? Let’s think about the ones that are against the cloth…

Why are people in this fake state of angola killed because they don’t speak portuguese and they only speak kikongo? What’s the reason for this sacrilege? Why are we the ones to be sacrificed? Is it because we are weak? Less fanatic? The ones that like the Bible?

During the fight against the European coloners the Bakongo people where at the forefront of the fight and the list of Kicongo great heroes is long. But let’s remember only the leaders Benedito, Bufa, M’Bidi Emilio, N’donda and others… in the so called second war of liberation; no one remembers commandant Mawete, and Moni mambu. In the end our contribution was nil. And now, talking about the exiled ones who during the colonial oppression did not go to Brazil, Portugal, Zambia, Zaire or Congo looking for tranquillity?

Nevertheless, whomever is the exiled will be also the next category of innocent children that escaping this month in Soyo to Zaire, as well as in the Lundas to the same destination? Why aren’t we understood in the countries where we went looking for asylum?

Does any portuguese suffer retaliation at the beach? Or is any angolan exiled from Portugal told to stop the taxi and be forced to speak Kimbundu as a life saving test? This is hatred and surpasses the justification for power and people’s rage, after all, what people, the same ones that we are part of, and no one help us during that bloody Friday, nor protected us from the crazy policemen. IT’S ALL A LIE, no victim in this world is able to forget his aggressor; we saw a police car (Nissan) using speakers at the Asa Branca square saying: “Let’s get rid of all exiled ones, it’s not by accident nor is the people the perpetrators of these horrendous crimes inspired by our democratic press, the popular educator that since 1976 has never been able to see the difference between a Mucongo and a Zairian, consequently, some of the dead (N’Simba Antonio…) did not know where Zaire’s border was, they were born in colonial ruled Mbanza Congo Angolan and killed in Mbanza Congo MPLA Angolan Army controlled territory, therefore, where were they exiled from? But the MPLA unelected Deputy Minister of Communication that controls everything is not passed just because he is not from Uige, was never in Zaire, even in FNLA and afterwards USA? Only if he is “zaza” not American nor Uncle Sam nor Yankee. This is dangerous. Would it be a vendetta against the Bakongos? We cannot continue to cry, they attack us Bakongos everyday. There’s not a day that goes by that an exiled person is not beaten and people get money in the Kwanzaas and Congolese’s.

Why do the policemen that patrol Mabor and Palenca walk around with pockets filled with money? We do not have a newspaper to help us Bakongos.

Why? Is it fear? Or familiarity and crime complicity? Who could accept seeing a dead woman with a knife in her vagina? Where are the human rights? Just because she wore the cloth? Unfortunately, besides the accidents that cannot be helped in Bakongo territory, there are also incomprehensible murders. An exiled man was cut up just because decided to sell his things at the “Roque”. Where is the crime?

What happened to the public peace? When the MPLA police in plain view of the Congolese shot a young lady because she pronounced the letter “R” with a stronger accent while pronouncing the word Rice (Arroz).

At lgreja Evangelica Baptista de Neves Bendinha (Neves Bendinha Baptist Church), our bibles were burned by the MPLA. Why throw rocks at the worshipers at lgreja da Samba (Samba Church), when all of us heard the MPLA unelected government’s “commitment” during the Pope’s visit to Angola? If you want to see for yourself go to Neves Bendinha and you will see that the church’s lot was divided by people that built their houses with parts of the church, and all of this was done without the unelected MPLA government’s interference.

Why all this anger, the vote? Dr. Savimbi won the elections in Uige and Zaire provinces or was UNITA the winner? But, who are the ones that accuse us of voting for UNITA, and why should this be a crime?

Today, in the artificial country of Angola newspaper, they have in the past printed and accusing us from coming to their capital Luanda wearing slippers and today we have homes and video.

These same newspapers remain silence in reference to the origin of the money of many, foreign cars, and houses repaired with foreign money, and also by foreign companies.

After all, who owns the apartment in the City of Porto in Europe where the unelected MPLA Deputy Minister of Education goes during is repeated vacations? Is she also an exiled? Has the press ever told the people about the punishment received by Monty that watched a warehouse burn during the South African march, and afterward became the Minister of Oil and left the Bakongos land? Stole money and went to France, the whole press heard that, but now with his reappearance in Luanda, he is remodelling his mansion along with Dnefa, right in front of that same Angolan newspaper.

We are Bakongos; they force us to consider ourselves as such because we do not see other crimes.

If it is the fact of being Zairians, why not invade the Zairian Embassy that is located in Vila Alice instead of looking for them at the square and surely not finding them. Getting them mixed up with Bakongos, 40 people dead is not the balance of the Blood Friday massacre, or three injured, we know the victims because the majority are our mothers, aunts and sisters: the grieve belongs to all Bakongos, you see in their sad faces…. It is not worth just crying, the democracy will come someday and we will have other journalists and certainly not the Kukas and Kokas, that the biographies are not interested in mentioning.

Everyone should seriously meditate about the jokes and caricatures shown in the Angola newspaper that insults and aims always at the Bakongos before the silence from all Bakongos…. If someone could lend us a Nelson Mandela instead of those that carry around diplomatic passports, each and everyone should seriously ponder at home, work, street, church, beach, and everywhere, about the next massacre, are we going to be alive? Despite the police being well equipped like any modern police force in the planet and without UNITA in Luanda, they displayed inaptitude, and even helped to kill. It is not a coincidence nor a crime committed by the “lumpanos” as they intend to claim. How can it be explained the crimes taking place at the same time, during the same time frame, in the same day, miraculously coinciding with the siege of Palanca, Petrangol, and Mabor to Rocha Pinto where traffic police were seen armed with AK machine gun.

We have our land, our towns Landa, Soyo, M’Banza Congo, Kimbele, Sanza Pombo, Zombo, Damba, Bembe, Negage, Cangola, and others are Bakongo land, and there we were never considered foreigners. We would like to question ourselves and to have an explanation regarding the oil that is taken from Cabinda and from Soyo, Bakongos land. How can we be victims of this oil? Or victims of the arms purchased with the money from this oil? We heard the civil defence people say: let’s get rid of all Zairians. Everyone knows that in Luanda there is no distinction between the two categories, despite the fact that the second ones were also victims of the first ones during the exile in Zaire and in Congo. Where should we go? We will be in agreement to evacuate Luanda, but the Government of the national unit must comply with the following conditions:

1. The dismissal of all Bakongos from the FAA (MPLA Armed Forces) because no foreigner dies in a foreign land and in no country of the world a foreigner is admitted into the armed forces;

2. Provide means of transportation: planes, trucks and boats to be leased with money from our oil and from our coffee so we can return to our native provinces;

3. Registration of the ones who do not wish to return to the provinces, with resident alien cards, with the process in DNEFA, so they can also earn compensation like others we cannot mention here.

We do not want to play with the soul of our loved ones. We have religion and culture. Because of this, any Mucongo in Angola, wherever you are, should always remember Bloody Friday as a day of Remembrance; another massacre just took place in the country, the strongly desired to exterminate Bakongos has started due to the austerity of our Culture and Traditions. They consider us passe… the massacres in Malanje, in Lubango (neighbourhood of Mitcha), and in Kuito (Girao Hotel), where it is understood that the victims were associated with UNITA, a grey war zone, but there is no justification for 22 January1993 massacre of the Bakongos, because, for a long time now, the unelected government has been in control of the public order in the town. Each one should draw his own conclusions.

Who wants to exterminate us? Who do we bother? Do not sleep brothers.

UNITA members are not the only one that can fire a gun. We can crown our King because the heir to the Bakongo Throne still exists and we know him we have with us a copy of the letter sent by Eduardo Pinnock, the father, not the famous son Johnny Pinnock, to the State Department of the United States on May 20, 1956 and signed by Barros Nekaka and others this does imply us with UPA. We also have the movement manifesto of Fuberto Youlou’s regrouping the Congo people, and also the foundation of the Portuguese Congo in 1884 by the invading Portuguese colonial authorities which we did not invited.

We know where to start because history will not forgive our weakness. Congo existed once as a State and it can exist again.

The MPLA press only writing articles whenever a plane from Lisbon or Paris arrives in Luanda with suitcases filled with clothing, but look for “exiled ones” to sell in Roque and afterwards divide the money. We are not the ones; we cannot continue to die in silence.

After all who are the ones that deceive us, exiled or not? Who gets us killed? When the human rights problem encountered by Angola has caught the attention of the UN committee? Who are the ones that benefit with this? We cannot remain silent. There is not reason for slums in Luanda when everywhere you look in Luanda you can see cars that cost as much as a three bedroom house. After all who are the thieves, is it the exiled that condemn the people to live in this poverty? Have you ever met a “retro” that has purchased super stores in Alvalade or Miramar? Have you ever seen the name of one of them in lists that they are going to buy such factories, industries, pharmacies, etc…. that are for sale? What’s the reason for such anger?

The Bakongo Nation, Mbanza-Kongo, January 26, 1993

- CASE No. 23 -

United Nations reports MPLA torture abuse in Cabinda

3 October 2007

United Nations Human Rights investigators say that they have found evidence of arbitrary detention, torture and other human rights abuses in Cabinda.

A working group led by Algerian lawyer Leila Zerrougui spent 10 days interviewing more than 400 detainees.

In a statement released to the media, Ms Zerrougui says they saw detainees who “showed visible signs of torture”.

The statement from the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva says, “The present institutional and legal framework governing the aspect of deprivation of liberty is still flawed”.

The working group found evidence that torture and ill treatment were used to extract confessions from suspects at two prisons.

The Cabinda question. The investigators also said there were credible allegations that civilians are held incommunicado at military facilities in the oil-rich nation of Cabinda.

“They are never produced before a judge,” said Ms Zerrougui.

“The right to access to a lawyer and a corresponding legal aid system as guaranteed by the MPLA constitution, exists only in theory”.

The group were denied access to Cabinda military prison where the alleged “secret detentions” take place.

Last month, a pro-independence Cabindan civic group complained that some of its members were arbitrarily arrested ahead of a visit to Cabinda by gang leader of the MPLA the well-known Bastard Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

- CASE No. 24 -

Child Slave Labour Camps in Angola

16 December 2010

Local villagers report to Voice of America that 200 underage children work in forced labor camps 15 hours per day in Communist Chinese run rice fields guarded under the eye of Presidential Armed Guard personnel. This children where kidnapped by the MPLA Regime in the provinces of Benguela, Kwanza-Sul and Huila, without access to any medical assistance.

- CASE No. 25 -

Pregnant Woman Assassinated by the MPLA Regime

The spokesperson of Mpalabanda the Cabinda Civil Association also denounced last Friday that the MPLA Regime army carried out “yet another violation of human rights” in Cabinda.

“It happened in Dinge, when a soldier opened fire on a lorry in which were several civilians, traveling to Ncutu (municipality of Mbucu-Nzau, Mayombe) to sell their products.” The source revealed that the shots wounded two civilians, “Elisée Khonde Muanda, 28 years old and eight months pregnant, and Paulo Conde, 25 years old”. The pregnant lady did not survive; she finally died Saturday at dawn. “Elisé Muanda leaves behind her husband Panfilo, from Ncutu, and little Elisabeth Conde, who is eight years old”.

Paulo Conde “is still struggling between life and death, in the intensive care unit of Cabinda Central Hospital, where the two victims were transported to, following these acts of barbarism carried out by MPLA Regime soldiers, whose identity and whereabouts are as yet unknown.”

“Even so, the unelected MPLA Regime maintain there are no human rights violations in Cabinda”, concluded the Mpalabanda the Cabinda Civil Association spokesperson.



Elisée Khonde Muanda
28 years old , 8 months pregnant
assassinated by the MPLA Regime on the 28 January 2006 in Cabinda

13 February 2006 Cabinda: WS on Human Rights Situation in Cabinda

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Sixty-second session Item 9 of the provisional agenda

QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD

Written statement* submitted by the International Federation for the Protection of the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Minorities (IFPRERLOM), a non-governmental organization on the Roster

The Secretary-General has received the following written statement which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31.

Cabinda,The human rights situation in Cabinda is characterised by a heavy army presence, following the earlier military offensives launched by the Government. The army presence is extended to all localities and is largely interpreted as having the intent to control and intimidate the population. The Angolan Government has done little to address the resulting human rights violations, which have been compiled in several reports, produced by the civil society association Mpalabanda.

The report of Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders, 21 February 2005, states that representatives of state prosecution and judiciary in Cabinda claimed they had not received any cases of human rights abuses and merely alluded to instances of “overzealous” action by the police. The report concludes that either the judiciary does not receive the cases or chooses not to address them.3

Harassment and intimidation in the territory continue on a daily basis. A strong contingent of “anti-riot” police is present in the capital and has been used to prevent civil society meetings and initiatives. The anniversary of the treaties signed between Portugal and Cabinda are always a time of particular tension. On the anniversary of the Treaty of Chinfuno, a visit to the monument commemorating the treaty was marred by police intervention. Twenty five people were detained, Anselmo Conde Nzau, deputy secretary of Mpalabanda, was beaten by police officers. Mpalabanda’s conference during human rights day was similarly forbidden. On 10 December 2005, fifty youths who went to the conference at Landana, were surrounded by police and military and temporarily detained.

Six members of Mpalabanda were criminally prosecuted; the court absolved them of any wrongdoing.

A march for peace programmed for the 29 January 2006, to commemorate anniversary of the Treaty of Simulambuco was banned. The houses of the main Mpalabanda activists were surrounded by police and riot police were stationed throughout the capital. Two days earlier, on 27 January, Angolan soldiers opened fire on a truck, killing Elisée Khonde Muanda, who was eight months pregnant and wounding another youth, Paulo Conde. This act was preceded on 2 January by the killing of Francisco Banheva, 40 years, old from Mbucu-Chivava. He was working on his land in Mbata-Missinga when he was surprised by a group of soldiers who beat him to death. He had been working on a Monday; a curfew had been imposed in the area whereby people are only allowed to go to their work in the fields on Tuesdays and Fridays.

Concerned at recent development in Cabinda, and alarmed by rising levels of violence, IFPRERLOM calls upon the Commission on Human Rights:
to condemn the use of lethal force by security forces of the government;
to ensure that all extra-judicial acts of killings be investigated thoroughly and impartially
by an independent international body in accordance with international standards;
to put pressure on the government of Angola to stop ongoing human rights violations; and
to request standing invitations of the Commissions thematic mandates to visit the regions in question.

- CASE No. 26 -

Crimes Against Humanity committed by the MPLA Regime

One of the most outstanding facets of the conflict in Cabinda is the consistent violation of human rights. This report intends to call to the attention of the authorities and governmental army, the guerrillas and the national and international public opinion the urgency of putting an end to the barbarism that is happening in Cabinda.

For that purpose, we present, in this first report, as summarized as possible, some cases as an illustration of the actual reality in Cabinda. A more exhausting and detailed report will be presented in due course, with the title of “Cabinda: The Bloody Oil”.

3.1. Summary executions, shootings and murders

October 3, 2003 – FAA soldiers killed two citizens of the DR Congo who were fishing in the Chiloango River on the Angola-DR Congo border, on the outskirts of the village of Massamba, 70 km east of the town of Belize. The two Congolese were in their canoes when the soldiers ordered them over to the riverbank. According to local witnesses, the soldiers tried to interrogate the Congolese, but failed because of the language barrier. Villagers say that the soldiers then shot each man in the head and pushed the canoes back into the river where they drifted with the two bodies.

August 24, 2003 – Joel Bumba, 80, and Joana Maiandi, 77, killed by an FAA corporal, in the village of Maluango-Zau, commune of Quissoki, municipality of Belize. The corporal returned to his unit drunk on “kaporroto,” a homemade drink. He grabbed a weapon and began to fire into the air. A colleague disarmed him, but several hours after the incident, the corporal grabbed the weapon again, and went into the village. He found Bumba and Maiandi seated around a small fire talking. The corporal approached the elderly couple and, without saying word, began shooting at them. On returning to the unit, the corporal told witnesses that he had killed the couple because he thought they were witches.

August 23, 2003 – Faustino Nvindo, 36, a father of six, and Mateus Nsaco, 31 years old, a father of three, shot and killed by FLEC guerrillas. The two men worked as tractor operators and were clearing trails and secondary roads in the village of Caio-Lintene, Necuto commune, when FLEC guerrillas attacked them. The guerrillas shot Nvindo in the back as he fled into the bush. Nsaco was killed sitting on his tractor. FLEC has been trying to interrupt government projects to open trails and grade tertiary roads by attacking civilian workers. In response to the shootings, FAA soldiers raided the area and detained Pascoal Ngoma, 27, and João Codia, 19. The soldiers accused the two men of masterminding the attack, and tortured them by placing heavy beams of timber on their chests as punishment. Ngoma and Codia were released several hours later. The men reported the incident to the area coordinator, and after three days Codia died of injuries resulting from the abuse he received from the soldiers.

July 31, 2003 – FLEC Guerrilla fighters indiscriminately attacked a group of civilians, and shot and killed a woman and two children in the Caio-Guembo–Alto Sundi section, between Vaku I and Luango Kimbama. Mavungo, 25, a resident of Luali, Belize, and Daniel Mabiala, 40, a Congolese citizen, were wounded as a result of this action.

July 16, 2003 – Paulo Mambo João, 40, a coordinator of Micuma I village, was killed by FAA soldiers. Joao and most of the men from his village were hunting for food when, according to a report from a former FLEC soldier and participant in the FAA’s “cleansing operations” in Micuma I, the military ambushed the victim at dawn as he returned from the hunt. The guide for the operation, “Decidido,” a former FLEC officer, recognised Joao and thought leaving him alive might lead to accusations of treason and bring shame upon his family. According to the same witness, João was tied to a tree, interrogated by “Decidido” and, at approximately 05:30, killed with two shots to the chest by the former FLEC officer. The victim was found six days later, tied to the tree and rotting, according to the testimony of one witness. The family identified Joao’s body from the clothes and a rosary around his neck. João’s mother, Ruth Tombo, died from cardiac arrest at the Central Hospital of Cabinda on July 24, 2003 after receiving confirmation of her son’s death.

July 16, 2003 – Nicolau Nkula Macumbo, 40, and Artur Kinangi were found dead and beaten close to Rio Luali, Belize, three days after their detention at the Iona Commando base. Witnesses said the two victims, both from the Democratic Republic of Congo, met at the river to talk. A soldier, known as “Chorão,” overheard the conversation and sought reinforcements to arrest them. Macumbo and Kinangi spent two days at the Iona base. Their bodies were found on the third day and a village chaplain presided over their burial. The two had lived in Iona village since 1999.

July 14, 2003 – FLEC killed three woodcutters and one child and injured two others, in Vaku, Belize municipality. Maria Nkulukua, 39, whose jaw and teeth were shattered by a bullet, continues to be fed by a tube. The victims were cutting timber when several shots surprised them at around 10:00. One woodcutter was hit in the chest and saw his two colleagues next to him die instantly. The wounded child, a girl about 12 years old, recognised one of the guerrilla fighters and spoke to him in Ibinda (the Cabindan indigenous language). The guerrilla fighter fired at her head. The harvesting and exploitation of timber is a source of great conflict in the area. FLEC demands payment of a “revolutionary tax” from the woodcutters, while members of the military in areas controlled by government forces often exploit the timber resources for their own businesses and personal gain.

June 17, 2003 – Sebastião Lelo, 60, and Teresa Nzati, 47, were killed by FAA soldiers in the village of Buco-Cango around 02:00 during a search operation conducted in some residences. The military began the search at 20:00 to find guerrillas presumed to be hiding in the village. The victims resisted the soldiers’ efforts to search their residence, accusing them of being saboteurs. Confronted by a number of villagers angered by the search, the soldiers withdrew and returned at 02:00. For an hour, soldiers continuously fired their weapons and terrorized the village. During this time, they took Lelo and Nzati from their houses and killed them a few meters outside the village. At daybreak, Nzati’s husband, André Mabiala, found his wife dead, lying in her torn clothes with two shots in the chest. Lelo’s body lay a few steps beyond, with a shot to the head. At approximately 08:00, an FAA officer, identified as Major Tomás of the 115th Battalion, ordered the detention of André Mabiala, José Nhimi, and Marcelino Baquissi, coordinator of Buco Cango, because they had presented a complaint to the town administrator about the deaths of Sebastião Lelo and Teresa Nzati. After a long interrogation they were released. At about 11:00 the three men were authorized by officers identified as Lieutenant Colonel Estanilau da Conceição “Lacrau” and Major Tomás to remove and bury the bodies.

June 05, 2003 – Afonso Bulo, 20, a native of Ncoi, served as a guide for FAA soldiers who massacred several families taking refuge in the forests during a “cleansing operation.” Bulo recounted seeing helicopters flying over the area weeks before. On June 1, people displaced from other villages travelled through Ncoi on their way to the border. They described the impact of “cleansing operations” on their villages and advised Ncoi residents to take refuge in the Congo. On June 4, the residents of Ncoi also decided to leave the village. Bulo said the villagers walked about 6 km to a nearby village and intended to continue the march early the next morning. Bulo decided to return to the village and on the way was stopped by the FAA. They interrogated him and forced him to indicate the whereabouts of the people who had abandoned the village. Once Bulo had guided the FAA to the villagers, soldiers tied him to a tree. Although Bulo had repeatedly told the soldiers that the villagers were civilians, the FAA troops surrounded them and fired indiscriminately at the group, which consisted of about 14 families. Bulo managed to escape when one of his captors was distracted by the gunfire and the arrival of army helicopters. Bulo is wracked by guilt because he was forced to disclose the villagers’ location and hopes that the remains of his lost friends and neighbors will eventually be recovered and properly buried.

May 17, 2003 – Cornélio Albino Macosso, 41, son of Cornélio Macosso and Cecília Malonda, born in Conde-Bumba, Buco-Zau, was found dead on the path between his house and the River Chiloango, in the administrative centre of Necuto commune. The victim had been detained at the 115th Battalion headquarters, on suspicion of supplying fuel to FLEC. Villagers found his body three days after his detention.

May 10, 2003 – Joaquim Machienga, coordinator of the village of Buco-Cango, was killed in his home for supposedly disobeying the orders of FAA soldiers. During a “cleansing operation” in the area, FAA soldiers used various catechists and village coordinators as guides. On May 7, FAA soldiers detained Machienga, also known as “Velho (Old) Kim,” in his field and forced him to identify people supposedly linked to FLEC. When Machienga did not return home, his family notified the traditional village authorities and were informed by the civil education official at the 115th Battalion that Machienga had been detained and would be released soon. The next day, Machienga came home without any physical injuries. Witnesses said Machienga had been ordered to report to the battalion on May 9, but did not do so. On May 10, a sergeant went to Machienga’s home and informed his wife that a commanding officer had ordered Machienga to report to the base by 17:00. His wife said she told her husband to follow the officer’s order. At about 18:45, several soldiers surrounded the house, ordered anyone inside to come out, and then started shooting in all directions. When the family returned home later, they found Machienga alive but lying on the floor with bullet wounds in his back. He died shortly afterwards.

May 2, 2003 – Samuel Bumba, 60, son of Samuel Bumba and Pelágia Conde, born in Cungo Butuno, Necuto, was shot dead by FAA soldiers while working his land.

April 25, 2003 – Inácio José Joreca, 38, son of Sebastião Batche and Maria Pola, born in Tando-Caio, Necuto , was accused by FAA soldiers of belonging to FLEC-FAC and summarily executed.

April 20, 2003 – Martinho Buange, 50, son of André Massanga and Cecília Simba, was shot dead by an FAA soldier because he refused to accept his daughter’s relationship with the soldier.

April 19, 2003 – David Macaia, 54, son of Abraão Quionga and Ruth Bumba, born in the commune of Miconje, was shot dead in his home in the presence of his family by FAA soldiers at 06:00 on suspicion of having links to guerrillas.

April 5, 2003 – Luís Massanga, 44, son of Bernardo Batsimba and Pascoalina Cumba, born in the village of Buco-Cango, Necuto, was shot dead by an FAA soldier in the early hours of the morning after an argument between them.

April 4, 2003 – Lourenço Gomes Pitra came across a group of 18 civilian prisoners, including an elderly man, being transported from Zala-Ngó to Talibeca, Cabinda. Pitra testified that the prisoners had been taken out of several pits located in the military base for questioning. He identified a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the group who did not know how to speak Portuguese. According to Pitra’s account, an officer identified as Major Nelo from the 124th Commando Battalion, said he was not prepared “to keep Zairians,” tied the foreigner’s arms, and ordered him to run. According to Pitra, the man ran several meters and then the officer discharged a burst from his automatic rifle, which hit the man directly. The man took a few steps and collapsed into the tall grass where his body was left to rot.

April 3, 2003 – Vicente Ngoma, born in Mongo-Conde, Belize, and his son-in-law, Filipe Maiúlo, of Pângala, were picked up by FAA soldiers and tortured while traveling from Ngoma’s village to the neighboring village of Sindi. After being beaten, Ngoma was stabbed and his corpse abandoned. The soldiers also tortured Maiulo, but spared his life.

April 3, 2003 – Fredyck Ntoma, 40, a male nurse, was killed by FAA soldiers in Alto-Sundi. Ntoma had lived in the village for five years and was the only nurse in the district. On April 3, six soldiers from a detachment of the 709th Battalion, operating in Alto-Sundi, Miconje commune (municipality of Belize) came to Ntoma’s clinic. Ntoma’s assistant, Palmira Bungo, 27, witnessed the event. She said some soldiers engaged her in conversation, while others entered Ntoma’s one room clinic. They found Ntoma and dragged him into the yard, ordered him to take off his shirt and interrogated him about why he had provided first aid to a FLEC guerrilla fighter. Ntoma admitted attending to the wounded person in the course of his “professional duty.” One soldier told the others not to waste time with the “Zairian” and fired at his right thigh. Another fired a lethal shot to Ntoma’s chest and the soldiers quickly left the area.

April 2, 2003 – Anselmo Bonge II, 35, son of Anselmo Bonge I of Pelágia Keuque, from the village of Buco-Cango, Necuto commune, was shot down by FAA soldiers while he was hunting in the forest, between the Litis and Buco-Cango.

March 31, 2003 – Estêvão Puna, 47 years old, son of Paulo Puna and Rebeca Yelo, born in Cungo Xionzo, Necuto commune, was killed in the village of Buco-Cango by FAA soldiers from the 115th Battalion who were operating in the area. Puna was one of the dozens of local people who had previously sought refuge in the bush during intense military operations but later heeded calls by local officials for people to return to their areas of origin. After returning, Puna was frequently summoned to the battalion command and interrogated. On March 31, he tried to run away from the village. FAA soldiers found him and arrested him on suspicion of belonging to FLEC-FAC. The soldiers bound Puna up in front of his wife and took him away. His body was later found about 9 km from the village.

March 17, 2003 – António Félix, 45, son of António Félix and Mónica Ndumba, born in the village of Cungo Butunu, Necuto commune, was shot dead at midday by the FAA while cultivating his land in Buco-Cango.

March 15, 2003 – Valério Pereira, 33, and João Maria “Diata- Bau”, 36, were found dead in the village of Ncungutadi, after a week of detention in the “Dragoons” unit of the FAA battalion stationed in Caio-Guembo. FAA soldiers arrested the two in their residence, after finding a hunting gun without a license. Helena Malonda, 55, discovered the victims’ bodies, with weapons beside each one. She informed the village coordinator who contacted the local military command. The military said that Pereira and Diata-Bau had escaped from the military jail and probably died during the army’s efforts to recapture them.

March 11, 2003 – Jorge Macaia, a.k.a. “Mais Velho Chikoti,” 70, born in Caio-Poba, municipality of Buco-Zau, was decapitated by FLEC. Macaia, a retail merchant, was regarded with suspicion by FLEC because of his possible business relations with soldiers and elements of the MPLA. After an FAA operation, FLEC accused Macaia of being an informer and kidnapped him from his business at about 10:00. The following day, the villagers found his headless body in the bush. March 08, 2003 – João Félix Mavungo, 36, of the village of Dinge, was abducted from his property by four soldiers at approximately 17:00. The soldiers accused him of violating legal restrictions concerning work on the land, beat him in front of his wife, Maria Simba, and then took him away. Simba alerted the traditional authorities who pressured the Military Command to release Mavungo. In response to this pressure, the military returned Mavunga’s body to his family. Army officials claimed he had died from illness, but his corpse showed clear signs of torture and beating. In addition to his wife, Mavunga left behind three children.

February 2, 2003 – Joaquim Bonifácio, 60, also known as “João Mibali,” was killed by the FAA in the village of Buco-Cango during a military “cleansing operation” there. He was trying to escape along with a group of villagers when the soldiers shot him in the back. His cousin Afonso Vidal witnessed the shooting, and said that he himself was lucky to have escaped.

January 31, 2003 – Gervásio Ngulu, 40, was killed by FAA commandos while hunting with several residents of Keba Diela, Belize municipal district. Commando fighters stationed nearby had trailed the group as they hunted on the outskirts of the village, on the right bank of the River Lufu, which divides the village of Belize. The commandos fired several bursts and the group dispersed. After some time, the other hunters returned to the area of the shooting and found Ngulu’s bullet-riddled body. They informed local authorities about the incident, but received no response.

December 8, 2002 – André Mavungo, 12, and his brother Joaquim Mavungo, 10, children of Rafael Mavungo and Suzana Buanga, were shot dead by an FAA patrol in the village of Micuma III while they harvested fruit from the papaya trees in their mother’s plantation. It appears that the soldiers used the children for target practice. The head of the MPLA Parliamentary Bench, Bornito de Sousa, happened to be stopping over at the main town in the district for an MPLA anniversary event on December 10. The State Security and the National Police prevented the parents of the dead children from presenting their bodies to the visiting official.

December 2, 2002 – Erdionia Meno, 14, and Delfina Mbuiti, 16, daughters of André Baza and Rebeca Bilala, residents in Mongo Mbuku, were killed by a Special Forces corporal, identified as Michel Guga. Guga was part of a group of soldiers who were billeted in the residence of church worker André Baza. It is a practice in several regions of Cabinda to billet soldiers in villagers’ residences against their wishes. Guga appears to have been enraged by Mbuiti’s rejection of his advances. After noticing Mbuiti and Meno heading toward the village to shop, Guga followed them and set up an ambush in the area between Mongo Mbuku and Penekakata. Three women working in the fields nearby fled as he approached, but Guga managed to catch and rape a woman known as Dona Teresa, who had remained in the area. He then waited for the two girls to arrive at his ambush point and led them off the main path. Once out of view, Guga killed Meno by shooting her in the arm and stomach. He grabbed Delfina, who had tried to flee, and raped her and then shot her to death. Guga finished his spree of cruelty and violence by hiding the bodies under some leaves and calmly returning to the girls’ home. Because of the trauma suffered by Dona Teresa, she did not identify the location of the incident, and the bodies were only recovered on December 5 by a hunter. According to the girls’ father, the FAA has only acknowledged the extent of its responsibility by flying in two coffins from the city of Cabinda. (see Disappearances, Arbitrary Detentions and Torture, September, 3 2003, André Baza)

Perpetrators Unidentified

December 3, 2002 – Six people were found in the area of Buco-Cango, Cata-Massela and Vemba Siala in Necuto commune. Four of the bodies were buried up to the neck while two other bodies were half-buried. All showed signs of having been shot.

November 26, 2002 – Four bodies were found in the village of Buco-Cango and Quicuango at approximately 05:00. Filomela Munto, 12, discovered the weighted down bodies in the Missengui River as she was doing her laundry. When she took hold of what looked like a piece of abandoned cloth, she spotted a corpse. Frightened, she told adults in the village who then recovered the decomposing bodies of two men and two women.

- November 22, 2002–João Rodrigues Lourenço, 53 years old, church worker, was brutally beaten his village, Cochiloango, municipal district of Cacongo, by elements of the military police, that demanded information on the guerrilla movements in the zone. The FLEC men had ambushed a vehicle of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and, as a consequence, some villagers were forced to give leads. Pedro Rodrigues was found dead, by his relatives, three days later, in the forest close to the village. 

- November 12, 2002–Chisselena Muaca, 50 years old, farmer, witnessed the death of 30 villagers, in a field close to the village of Caio Segundo, Necuto commune, from the bombardment action of a FAA helicopter. According to the villager, the helicopter detected the concentrated presence of people in the fields and fired several projectiles. These forces were operating in pursuit of FLEC-FAC headquarters, which were in the vicinity of the village. In the disordered escape, Chisselena Muaca had seen tens of dead dispersed in the forest and along the route she took to the Democratic Republic of Congo, with her family. She managed to reach Tchela-Mbata Phangui, Lower Congo, in DRC, with her daughter Dorina Kango, 23 years old, and her one and half year old grandson, José Malonda. In the hospital there, they became aware of the official ban on rendering any medical assistance and medication to the people from Cabinda. Thanks to a priest’s assistance, her grandson was saved from his illness, due to the journey under rain and lack of food. In turn, Dorina Kango reported the destruction of crops by FAA and the execution of several civilians that took a risk of seeking food, during the escape and at night, in some fields.

- October 20, 2002– A FAA soldier killed Amélia Teco Luemba, a.k.a. Arlete, 16 years old, in the village of Cata-Chivava, Necuto commune, with a salvo in the back, when she was trying to escape rape. Soldiers entered her house and when they took off her clothes, Arlete managed to flee half-naked outside the house, where she was shot.

- September 19, 2002– Tiago Macosso, born in 1976, son of João Ngola and Ismali Mpassi, was killed in the Necuto Garrison, when he tried to flee after several torture sessions. According to eye-witnesses, Tiago Macosso, from the village of Piandinge, was shot and later burned with a tire that was placed around his neck and then set on fire with gasoline. FAA soldiers had detained him, in the company of other six fellows, when they were at a wake. Three of the detainees were released while the whereabouts of the other two remain uncertain, as will be explained further on.

- August 27, 2002– FAA soldiers detained Vaba, from the village of Mbamanga, by the River Chiloango. He was beaten, tied to a stone and his body thrown into the river. His body was later recovered. The young man was hunting, in the company of a woman, who was released by the military, while he was accused of spying for FLEC.

- In June of 2002, three youths were killed by a FAA military patrol in Micuma village (Buco-Zau). The villagers were prevented from burying them, and the bodies were already in decomposition when the municipal authority obtained authorization to do so.

- February 18, 2002– A police officer shot dead Francisco Malesso Buca, 32 years old, from the Democratic Republic of Congo in the middle of the S. Pedro Market, in the city of Cabinda. The police officer was patrolling the market, along with two other colleagues, asked for the victim’s identification card. According to eye-witnesses, upon realizing that the DRC citizen had no legal status in Cabinda, he demanded 1,000.00 kwanzas (less than US$10), to release Mr. Buca. As the victim could only make an offer of 400.00 Kwanzas and, for lack of an agreement, the police officer pointed the gun at the Congolese citizen’s head and fired. ? February 05, 2002–Maria Builo, 32 years, mother of four, was shot dead at point blank range by police officers that were pursuing a group of civil demonstrators from the Gika market. She was in the backyard of her residence. Two stray bullets penetrated the backyard directly and they hit Maria Builo in the chest and in the abdomen. The demonstrators were protesting against their forced resettlement, from Gika market, in the center of the city, to another market outside the city. 

- February 02, 2002–Lourenço Nkoko, 20 years, was killed with a shot to the stomach by a police officer, named Francisco Paulo, of the Cabinda Provincial Command. The youth tried to pass through a cordon placed around the Gika Market, a plastic tape, and was shot immediately without protest or appeal. The local police command thereafter granted a press conference announcing that the agent would be held to justice and that the deceased had disobeyed orders from the authority. Nothing is known about the result of the reports; neither did the family receive any apologies or offer of compensation.

- January 20, 2002 – Male nurse Artur do Carmo responded to Voice of America on the existence of six unidentified bodies in the morgue of the Central Hospital of Cabinda. According to the male nurse, the bodies were taken there early one morning, six months ago, by a FAA military vehicle, Ural, without the military personnel ever returning to recover the bodies. The case came to public through another employee of the morgue who saw the bodies and informed Cabinda Commercial Radio. The doctors placed the bodies on display to see if locals could identify them, some of who affirmed that the corpses were unclothed and showed signs of beating and bullet wounds. The cadavers ended up being buried in a mass grave.

- November 20, 2000–the correspondent of Voice of America in Cabinda reported the death, by a FAA soldier, of a 16 year-old youth during the discovery of an arms cache, located in the village of Luango, municipal district of Cacongo. According to the Voice of America, the cache was discovered by a group of people who, thereafter, communicated it to the FAA. But in addition, according to VOA, the people who revealed the existence of the cache were forced to give names on the ownership of the arms found there. The dissatisfaction of some FAA soldiers on the lack of expected answers, led one soldier to fire at the youth in question.

- September 26, 2000–The Tatoss brothers, Afonso (42 years old) Melo Tatoss, Francisco (40 years old), Lourenço Mazungo (35 years old), Lua Pedro (33 years old) were shot by firing squad in the FAA Military Instruction Center, in Villa Lândana, Municipal district of Cacongo, on suspicion of collaboration with the FLEC. The shooting took place as a consequence of an attack by the FLEC on the referenced center, which happened on the same day. The unfortunates happened to live close to the center. The military raided their respective residences. After the shooting the bodies were handed over to the families for burial.

- January 29, 1999 – Filipe Cuanga Mamputu Vemba, son of David Mavendebele, was killed in Chimongo (Cacongo), by FAA soldiers, around 15:00 hours. He was 45 years old. ? December 04, 1998–António Sumbo, 37 years old, resident of Chapa (Cacongo), son of Luís Bayakana (Vuda-Vuda) and Maria was shot dead by the military from Dinge.

- September 10, 1998–Pedro Zacarias Lello, born in 1957, was kidnapped in the city center and tortured at the Plains Military Unit, of Malembo, attached to the commandos. Recently an old hunter reconfirmed his description of what happened since he watched the military at a distance (the unit went into the forest and it is only fenced with a few strings of barb wire) an act of torture. As the soldiers interrogated Pedro Zacarias Lello, they cut the fingers off the hands and afterwards the toes off the feet, then the feet themselves. The eye-witness did not have the strength to endure the barbarism to the end. Before that, according to the hunter, the victim was beaten in such a way that his nephew, António Zacarias, 14 years, kidnapped with the uncle, tried to escape and was killed with a shot in the back. Once again, the mere suspicion of collaboration with the FLEC justified the behavior and the total impunity of the military.

- December 19, 1997 – Casimiro Dunge, also a resident of Lico, son of Luciano Tati and Ermelinda Issita, was killed, at 27 years old, by the FAA military in Dinge. ? December 12, 1997—FAA soldiers, from the Dinge garrison, killed, in Lico (Cacongo), Luís Nguba, born in 1946, son of Tiago Bundo and Inês Minga,

- April 10, 1997–Dominique Puabo, 30 years old, resident of Viede (Belize), a village in which he was also a church worker, was killed by FAA soldiers in his village. He was son of Alberto and Tela Bacâmbana.

- CASE No. 27 -

3.2. Disappearances, arbitrary detentions and torture

October 7, 2003 – FAA soldiers travelling in two trucks arrived before dawn in the village of Tandu-Bulazi and began a manhunt. The deputy coordinator of the village, Januário Ngola, 49, son of Afonso Futi and Isabel Chibumba, suffered the most during the manhunt operation. Soldiers entered his house and beat him and his wife, Elize Mavungo, 45. According to her testimony, the soldiers kicked Ngola in the area of an existing intestinal hernia and ordered Mavungo to prepare a change of clothing for her husband. The soldiers also seized all the agricultural tools they could find, stole 10, 000 CFA francs (U.S. $10), and threw the family out of the house, while continuing to beat Ngola. His older sister, Virgínia Bumba, was also beaten by the soldiers. Ngola was not protected by his status as an active member in the MPLA (he joined the party on December 13, 1997). The soldiers took him away with other villagers, and his whereabouts remain unknown at the time of publication. Soldiers also entered the house of Ivo Cubola, 25, and beat him, his mother, Charlote Macosso, and her younger daughter, Mataia Macosso, 7. Macosso tried to protect her daughter, but said that she and her daughter were held so a soldier could slap both of them. She also said her son was tied up and thrown to the floor and then taken by the soldiers to an unknown place. The soldiers took Cubola’s official documents and all the farming tools they could find. António Gimbi, 60, and António Camilo, who neighbors say was at least 50, were also taken away after soldiers beat them and various family members. After the manhunt, the remaining men in the village feared for their lives and left their families in the village to take refuge in the city of Cabinda.

October 7, 2003 – Ivo Cubola, 25, son of Jacinto Macosso and Charlote Macosso, born in Piandinge, was accused of being the son of a high-ranking officer in FLEC-FAC and tortured for 12 days by an army officer identified as “Lacrau,” Cubola was tied up in the “rabbit position” (elbows behind the back and tied to the heels, and knees to the chest). He described three pits at the 708th Battalion’s base, for three categories of prisoners: one for the “least criminal” suspects – those accused of collaborating or sympathising with FLEC; another for “criminal” suspects – former FLEC soldiers who had given up guerrilla warfare but continue to live in villages without notifying authorities and are suspected of providing logistical support to the guerrillas); and a third pit for suspects considered “highly criminal” – those captured in combat as well as known activists and other individuals involved in the armed movement. The depth of the hole and the treatment meted out to the captives varies according to their status. Cubola said he was part of the “least criminal” group and of the 13 individuals rounded up that morning, six were in the same pit as Cubola. He endured three sessions of interrogation and beatings before convincing the soldiers that he was not the son of a guerrilla commander. Three other men from Cubola’s pit were released on the same day he was.

October 7, 2003 – FAA soldiers attacked the village of Tandu-Macuco, Necuto commune, Buco-Zau, in an operation in which women and children suffered the worst of the soldiers’ violence. Alexandre Maluvo managed to escape despite the soldiers laying siege to his house. As a result, his daughter Sofia Landu, 30, received a blow with a rifle butt to her left side which knocked her to the ground, while his two wives, Albertina Futi and Maria Mbumba were repeatedly punched by the soldiers. Rafael Puati, 37, son of Alice Pena and André Puati, was absent from the village during the attack. Soldiers used their hands, feet, and rifle butts to beat his wives, Inês Landu and Magarida Baza. Puati’s son, Joaquim Puati, 8, was also beaten. The soldiers found, beat and detained Jerónimo Conde and Adriano Pedro Suami. Suami’s wife Maria Landu, 22, was also beaten by the soldiers. Soldiers entered the house of Catarina Nvulu and asked for her husband. She told the soldiers she was not married. The soldiers beat her and seized all the money in her possession, 1, 600 kwanzas (U.S. $20).

October 5, 2003 – Following a landmine attack on a military truck between the villages of Talicuma and Talibeca, government soldiers from the battalion stationed at Chinguinguili captured Lourenço Gomes Tibúrcio, 27, son of Joaquim Tibúrcio and Beatriz Lando; António Francisco Tati Tomás, 33, João Batumba, 30, António Willy, 25 (born in Mazengo, Tando-Zinze commune) and José Capita, 28, born in Talibeca (Subantando traditional authority). The soldiers threatened the men with death and used them for five days as guides during military operations. According to the men, the soldiers fed them only salted biscuits. They were not allowed to show any signs of fatigue during the operation, on pain of death. There were no military confrontations during the patrols and the soldiers released the men once the operations ended.

October 3, 2003 – At approximately 01:00, soldiers surrounded the village of Panga-Mongo, Necuto commune and made their way to the homes of half-brothers José Massiala Ngoma, 23, André Simão Luemba, 27, and Bernado António Yambi, 30, the sons of Helena Simba with, respectively, José Massiala, João Khondi and Marcos Afonso. The soldiers alternately beat the three men and hit them with rifle butts in the presence of their families, and then took them to the military command in Necuto, a few kilometers away. On the same day, some of the villagers found out that their neighbors were at the military command. Since then, villagers and the relatives of the detainees have had no information of their whereabouts and fear the worst. According to the few men who decided to remain in the village after the soldiers’ activities, the soldiers acted according to a list containing the names of villagers to be beaten and detained.

October 2, 2003 – Bernardo António, 30, António Simão, 29, and José Massiala, 23, the sons of Marcos Afonso and Helena Simba, born in Panga-Mongo, in the traditional authority of Panga-Mongo, Necuto commune, were rounded up by the FAA at 02:00 at their parents’ home, tortured and taken to the 708th Battalion base. There they were accused of being former FLEC-FAC combatants. They were questioned by a military security official who had come from the city of Cabinda, and before whom they had appeared seven times. They were then cross-examined by General Luís Mendes who had travelled by helicopter from the city of Cabinda to the pits at Necuto. They were released on October 17. While in detention, they met 17 other captives. Based on their experience Antonio and Simao have confirmed testimony about the 708th Battalion provided by another detainee, Ivo Cubola.

October 2, 2003 – Unknown numbers of FAA soldiers surrounded the village of Tandu-Macuco, Necuto commune. They detained and beat Alfredo Mbuemba, Kembo Lelo (a citizen of DR Congo) and Alexandre Tati. The soldiers carried off their families’ meager belongings. It is still unknown where the three men were taken. The soldiers grabbed Mbeua Tati, the two year old daughter of Tati’s wife, Maria Ndele, 22, and threw the child to the floor where they kicked and slapped her. Her mother however, said that the child was not seriously injured. Pedro António, 8, was also thrown to the ground by a soldier. The soldiers did not find his father, also called Pedro António, 40, at home. His wife, Matilde Builo, 40, said the soldiers stole two sheets from the house. She also described daily attacks by soldiers looking for money, chickens or food. The soldiers also assaulted Nataniel Gimbi, 50, a small man who was in bed with his wife when the soldiers arrived. They dragged him out of the house, beat him, and then left him. In the village of Sevo da Buala, Necuto commune, soldiers went looking for Felipe Manuelino at his house. They did not find him home and proceeded to beat his wife, Maria Pedro, 33, with their rifle butts. They also stole whatever money they could find, about 600 kwanzas (U.S. $7).

September 28, 2003 – During the night, FAA soldiers carried out an operation in the village of Panga-Mongo, brutally beating and imprisoning villagers João Duda, 30, Buange Dunge, 23, and a DR Congo citizen known only as Duda. The detainees were accused of supporting FLEC. Since the incident, men and women from the village have stopped going to their fields. According to an elderly man, anyone found in the fields is accused of being the enemy, an accusation that carries serious consequences. The villagers have suffered from hunger as a result.

September 24, 2003 – José Buimi II, 45, was captured by FAA soldiers in the village of Vite Nove, Buco-Zau while on his way to the fields. Soldiers used Buimi for one week as a guide during military operations in the area. He returned home safely once the operations concluded.

September 11, 2003 – Paulo Bilundo, 18, 6th grade pupil, born in Chivula, was forced to eat chilli peppers to the point where he could no longer breathe. Around 09:00 he was confronted by soldiers on the road between Necuto and the village of Necuto, while gathering palm fruit to eat. The soldiers suspected he was on a mission for FLEC, and that his explanation about collecting palm fruit was an alibi for carrying out guerrilla activity. They forced Bilundo to go with them. When they arrived at a field where chilli peppers were being grown, they forced the youth to eat all the peppers he could find, threatening to kill him if he stopped. The young man continued eating until the strength of the chilli started to affect his breathing, at which point the soldiers gave him a green banana to try and neutralise the effect. He was left to “recover” in a pit, and remains in detention at the time of writing.

September 3, 2003 – André Baza, 38, was beaten by police from the municipal command of Buco-Zau. Baza was returning from the dowry ceremony of his daughter when he was picked up by a sergeant known as “Kito”. Kito interrogated Baza about the hunting rifle he was carrying. Kito was unsatisfied with Baza’s explanation and transferred him to the village of Buco-Zau, where an sergeant named Mateus received him and gave him a beating. Mateus then had Baza tied up and began firing into the ground near him. Baza, whose two daughters were raped and killed by an FAA commando in December, begged them to kill him, due to his indescribable suffering. Sergeant Mateus promised to mete out the same treatment reserved for Baza’s “FLEC brothers” but was disarmed by his fellow soldiers who pointed out that the witnesses to Baza’s detention might cause problems he was killed. A parish priest, Father Andre, secured Baza’s release by begging the soldiers and describing all the pain and suffering he had endured due to the murder of his daughters. Baza’s life continues to be in danger because he has outspokenly attributed his daughters’ deaths to Corporal Michel Guga.

September 2, 2003 – João Paulo Paiado, a 34-year old father of nine, was beaten in the village of Pove by soldiers from Zala-Ngó. A group of about 20 commandos, guided by a former FLEC guerrilla fighter known as “Manuelino,” went to Paiado’s residence at dawn. They knocked on the door and then broke it down. The soldiers dragged him in his underwear outside the house, and beat him in front of his family. Later, the soldiers took Paiado in a truck to a field, where they accused him of having contacts with FLEC. The soldiers conducted a “summary judgement” and dug a grave to bury Paiado. However, due to lack of “incriminating evidence,” the military tied up João Paulo Paiado with wire and kept him like that for two days. Paiado’s father and brother, Paulo, 58, and Lourenço Mambuco Paulo, 23, were tortured by FAA soldiers after they attempted to defend Paiado. Ngoma Gabriel, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo working on João Paiado’s farm, received five bayonet wounds from Corporal Pedro Piedoso. Gabriel was suspected as being a FLEC collaborator. Two soldiers, known as Baptista and Zé António, from the battalion in Chinguinguil, intervened and prevented Piedoso from stabbing Gabriel to death.

August 30, 2003 – Paulo Macuaco, 19, son of Enoque Macuaco and Alice Lilendo was beaten and stabbed in the abdomen at 14:30 in Binga-Pequeno, municipality of Buco-Zau. Macuaco was bathing in the River Luali, in an area reserved exclusively for men, when a girl known as Alice appeared. Paulo demanded she leave. After an exchange of words, three soldiers from the Alzira da Fonseca unit arrived and ordered the girl to leave. Sergeant Mateus Buio, without asking what happened, pointed his AKM weapon at the youth and threatened to kill him. Another soldier broke Macuaco’s hunting rifle by beating it against his naked body. Because the youth Macuaco continued to resist and the sergeant interrupted the beating session and began to stab Macuaco to avoid the sound of gunfire. Eventually, a number of Macuaco’s friends who witnessed the attack were able to help him. The soldiers’ unit commander ordered first aid for Macuaco, but it was insufficient relative to the seriousness of his wounds. The sergeant continues to freely walk around Buco-Zau, indicating that no disciplinary measures have been taken against him.

August 28, 2003 – Alberto Bungo, 36, was detained and stabbed with a bayonet by junior FAA officer, known as “Rasgado.” FAA soldiers from the BIQ-708 Battalion had detained Bungo after raiding the village of Conde-Lintene, Necuto, in response to an attack by FLEC. According to Bungo, “Rasgado” interrogated and threatened him with a bayonet in an effort to make Bungo confess to participating in the FLEC attack. During the interrogation, “Rasgado” stabbed Bungo in the foot and the back. “Rasgado” then ordered medical personnel to administer first aid to Bungo and detain him until further notice. Three days later, Alberto Bungo was freed and he returned home.

August 28, 2003 – Afonso Vidal Paca, 41, married with seven children, was tied up and beaten with a piece of timber and with a rifle butt by FAA soldiers in the village of Caio-Lintene, Buco-Zau. In response to a call from the government, he had recently returned to Caio-Lintene after living in the bush. The soldiers accused him of being a FLEC collaborator and beat him in their attempt to extract a confession.

August 24, 2003 – Alberto Nhimi, 31, son of Benjamim Alfredo and Maria da Conceição, born in Necuto, was detained and held for five days in a pit at the Necuto military base during FAA reprisals after an FLEC attack. Soldiers stationed in the village of Cata Chivava began rounding people up in an effort to find anyone who might have been involved in the attack. In the village of Caio-Contene, they detained Nhimi, who was found on the road leading to the location of the attack. He was accused of being a FLEC spy, beaten, and taken to the military base for interrogation by an officer identified as Lieutenant Colonel “Lacrau.” Nhimi’s Portuguese is limited, and several times he responded “yes” to questions when he meant “no”. The commander ordered Nhimi to be placed in a pit, where he remained for five days. Nhimi said he was only let out of the pit twice to drink water. He slept in the pit as well as performed his bodily functions there, until the commander released him after five days. During his captivity, Nhimi was beaten and stabbed with a bayonet and received no medical treatment. The conditions for his release were not specified. José Kumbo, also known as “Willy”, son of Alberto Mango and Josefina Bumba and born in Bembica, was also detained during the FAA reprisal. Like Nhimi, Kumbo was also abused and put into a pit by soldiers apparently acting on the orders from “Lacrau.” Kumbo was tied up with his elbows bound together behind his back, his hands in front, and his knees bound to his chest. He remained tied up like this for several days, and almost lost his limbs as a result.

August 23, 2003 – Lúcia Mbéua, 45, tried to prevent the abuse of her son by the FAA following a FLEC attack on the FAA base at Necuto, which resulted in the death of a civilian and a soldier. Tired of seeing youths being tortured with no response from the traditional or local authorities, Mbeua decided to save her son, Lourenço Barnabé, 22, and several other who were being held by the FAA. Upon witnessing her son being maltreated by a soldier known as “Rasta,” the mother hit the soldier over the head with a bamboo cane. The soldier reacted by reaching for his knife and striking Mbeua on the head, knocking her to the ground. Soaked with blood, she was helped by local people who were passing by. She said she would sooner die at the hands of the soldiers than see youths being tortured in her presence. Due to her intervention, her son managed to escape and survive, unlike his friend who did not. She advised her son to leave the village and go to the city until the local FAA commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel “Lacrau,” was transferred.

August 23, 2003 – Berta Umbelina Estanislau, 23, a primary school teacher in Bata-Sosso, was beaten with a machete along with a number of her collegues, by FAA soliders. Civilians in the area said that a group of FLEC guerrillas attacked an FAA position in the village of Bata-Lembe, around 07:30. The FAA soldiers then surrounded Bata-Lembe and the neighboring village of Bata-Sosso. Teachers and pupils, hearing gunfire, tried to leave the area. The soldiers accused them of being complicit in the attack. They forced the teachers and pupils to undress and lie down, and then beat them.

August 20, 2003 – Manuel Gomes, 22, and Alfredo Buza, 20, both born in Caio-Poba, and the sons, respectively, of Manuel Gomes and Eliona Laura, and of Pedro Simão and Maria, were beaten by FAA soldiers who also stole a number of their possessions. In an attempt to protect their possessions from looting by the FAA, Gomes and Buza hid them in the bush, where FAA soldiers found them and collected them during their operations. The two young men went to the Caio-Poba military base to try and claim their possessions. They were suspected of being FLEC soldiers because they had hidden their goods in a place that the FAA thought was a FLEC hideout. The two young men were tied up and beaten and then sent home without their possessions.

August 18, 2003 – Two FAA soldiers belonging to the Buco-Cango Unit went to the home of village coordinator João Matoco in Cata-Liti, Buco-Zau and demanded that he allow them to date his daughter Maria Conceição, 15, and his niece Mónica Matoco, 15. Matoco rejected the soldiers request and asked them to get out of his house. One of the soldiers threatened Matoco. Three days after the encounter, the girls went to school and never returned.

August 14, 2003 – Maria de Fátima, a widow in her forties, daughter of Simão da Costa and Julieta Simba, born in Chivata I in the traditional authority of Caio-Contene, Necuto commune, was suspected of having two sons in FLEC and was detained at about 20:00 by a group of soldiers from the 708th Battalion who were patrolling near Yema Lintene, 3 km from Caio Contene. The soldiers took her to their base, where she was interrogated by an officer believed to be Lieutenant Colonel “Lacrau,” who accused her children of being FLEC soldiers, and of organising various meetings at her house. Fatima still bears scars from when “Lacrau” hit her during the interrogation. Fatima remainded at the base awaiting further interrogation from General Luís Mendes. When Mendes arrived he decided that Fatima was innocent and ordered her release on August 15, 2003, on condition that she persuade her relatives who might be fighting with FLEC to give up the guerrilla war and hand themselves over to the FAA. The village coordinator of Yema Lintene, who witnessed what happened, condemned it and expressed regret that the commune administrator had not spoken out against “Lacrau.”

August 4, 2003 – Luís Capita, 60, also known as Cento e Cinquenta (“One Hundred and Fifty”), son of Capita Chibundo and Celina Futy, native of Chivata I in the traditional authority of Caio-Contene, was tied up and beaten by soldiers from the 708th Battalion, based in the commune of Necuto. FLEC guerrillas had attacked an FAA position in the village of Chivata, injuring several soldiers earlier in the day and Capita was suspected by the FAA of being involved in the attack. Capita, one of the few people who still inhabited his village, was dragged from his home by soldiers and kicked and hit with rifle butts during the 8 km journey to the military base. At the base, soldiers were ordered to tie Capita up in the “rabbit position” – an excruciatingly painful and potentially fatal punishment technique in which the person is tied up with the elbows and heels bound together behind the back, while the knees are pulled up to the chest. The soldiers also beat Capita. An officer identified as Lieutenant Colonel “Lacrau” pronounced summary judgement on Capita and he remained tied up for five hours, before being released for lack of evidence of his involvement in the FLEC attacks.

July 27, 2003 – João Paulo Mavungo, 75, was hit in the leg by shots from an FAA soldier just before midnight in the village of Mbundo, municipality of Belize. Mavungo heard his chickens cackling loudly and looked out his door and found a soldier known as Mário with two chickens in his hand. The apparent thief threw Mavungo to the ground and fired several shots toward his leg and in the air. The Mbundo coordinator took Mavungo to the hospital shortly after the incident.

July 24, 2003 – Joaquim Mibinda (age unknown), José Ngoma, 77, and Tomás Macaia, 72, residents of the village of Micuma II, were ambushed by an FAA patrol close to the village and forced to walk for two days with the FAA patrol in search of FLEC guerrilla hideouts. The soldiers intimidated the men by placing them before a firing squad and interrogating them about the locations of FLEC hiding places. The men were released in the village of Pângala, Ganda-Cango, municipality of Belize, after local authorities intervened and convinced the soldiers to let the men go.

July 4, 2003 – João Kumbo, 24, son of Alberto Tomás and Helena Buanga, born in Bembica, was kept prisoner for one day in a pit at the 708th Battalion base in Necuto, for being a relative of César Pemba, a man wanted by the FAA who had moved to the city of Cabinda. Kumbo was captured by soldiers from the 708th Battalion who wanted information about Pemba’s whereabouts. Kumbo had not seen Pemba for more than a year and was unable to provide enough information to the soldiers who beat him until he lost consciousness and put him in the pit for almost 24 hours. He was released on condition that he was expected to supply the FAA with any information about Pemba and FLEC activities.

June 16, 2003 – Hilário Kinahimbo, 33, was beaten by FAA soldiers in the village of Mbombo-Pene while working as a driver for the administrator of Belize municipality, Kinahimbo was driving a white Ford vehicle, registration number CBA-44-42, from the municipality of Buco-Zau to Belize. Three soldiers belonging to the special unit of the Belize 2nd Battalion stopped him to ask for a ride. Kinahimbo told them he could not take them because the vehicle was fully loaded and it would be dangerous to mix civilians and soldiers in the same vehicle. One of the soldiers asked him if the separation between military and civilians was a guideline from “his FLEC bosses.” The soldiers then pulled Kinahimbo out of the vehicle and beat him mercilessly with their rifle butts. One blow hit him in the head and required 12 stitches.

May 22, 2003 – Lando Muaca, 36, and Josefate Luemba, 67 years, were found by a group of FAA soldiers on Muaca’s land in the village of Conde Lintene. Muaca and Luemba were inspecting palm trees that were being used to produce palm wine. The men were stopped because they were on the land at 17:20, in violation of the Army’s 16:00 curfew. The soldiers beat the farmers, undressed them, and forced Muaca to tie up Luemba. While drinking manjenvo (palm wine), the soldiers humiliated Luemba by “playing” with his genitals. The soldiers released Luemba after four hours but brought Muanca to the Necuto Battalion for four days of forced labor carrying water, washing uniforms, and cooking.

May 14, 2003 – Carlos Luís Dunge, 31, also known as Edó, was beaten by six FAA military stationed in the village of Necuto. Dunge was involved in a number of business ventures in Buco-Zau. Soldiers approached Dunge as he was unloading merchandise into his mother-in-law’s house in the village of Caio Contena. The soldiers’ commanding officer, Commandant Lacrado, ordered them to confiscate Dunge’s goods, claiming that they were used to feed the FLEC guerrilla fighters. The soldiers then proceed to beat Dunge. After the beating, the soldiers tied up Dunge and his teenage assistant and took them to the Necuto Battalion Command, where they placed Dunge and his assistant into a hole covered by a military tarpaulin. They ate, slept, and defecated in the hole for 15 days and were briefly removed only three times for interrogation. On May 23, the military freed Dunge and his assistant, but kept the confiscated goods.

May 6, 2003 – Ana Maria Chilanda Bula, 16, was beaten by a corporal identified as Fernando from the 708th Battalion (the comandos caçadores). According to Bula, she went to the soldiers to collect money the corporal owed for cigarettes and wine he had purchased from her. The Fernando denied ever incurring such a debt. When Bula explained she needed the payment to cover her household expenses, Fernando began to beat her. He warned that anyone who tried to intervene in the matter would be shot. The corporal stopped beating Bula after he hit her in the head with his rifle butt and knocked her unconscious.

May 5, 2003 –- Ernesto Dumbi, 27, Vicente Sunda, 31, Dinis Simba (age unknown), and a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo known as Kakoko, went missing after they were taken in by soldiers of the Belize 709th Battalion. The young men were travelling from the village of Quissoqui, went to Caio-Guembo, with a few kilograms of bean, rice, sugar, salt and a few litres of cooking oil. During the trip they were stopped and interrogated by soldiers who suspected they might be supplying the guerrillas. An old man who knew the men well and lived in the same village as they did, tried to intervene and win the men’s release. The soldiers told him that the men would be escorted to the Ganda-Cango military detachment for investigation and then released. The men have not been seen since and their relatives have presented a complaint to the local administrator and to the local authorities in an effort to obtain information about their loved ones.

May 3, 2003 – FAA Corporal Lázaro Canhongo, 24, shot by a colonel named Nzau Toco “Encomence,” in charge of the troops stationed in the Miconje commune. Canhongo tried to desert and to return to his home in Benguela province in southern Angola. The corporal had arrived in Cabinda on September 20, 2002, under the impression that he would wind up in Luanda, a reward promised to his unit by their commander to celebrate the end of the war against UNITA. After receiving three months wages late, Canhongo and two colleagues bought civilian clothes and tried to desert. The military police captured them in the municipality of Buco-Zau. They made the return trip tied up with electric wire. As punishment, they had to weed large tracts of land. One day, Toco took out his pistol and, to set an example of his authority, shot Canhongo in the calf. Canhongo was last described as walking on crutches living in fearing because of his disobedience in trying to return home. His current whereabouts are unknown.

April 14, 2003 – At approximately 17:00, an officer identified as Lieutenant Colonel Santos, of the 704th Battalion, used his rifle butt to violently beat Corporal Frederico Canganjo of the Kissamano garrison, because Santos found him chatting with a young girl from the Buco-Zau municipal administrative center. After beating him, Santos, in full view of several witnesses, tied Canganjo to his vehicle and dragged him across the asphalt to the barracks, several meters away. According to his colleagues, Canganjo was sent to the Military Hospital in Cabinda. They have since lost track of him.

April 21, 2003– Marcos Macosso, 60, was kidnapped at 17:00 from his children’s residence in the Tchiweca district near the Cabinda Airport by eight FAA soldiers, including a major and a captain from the military police’s regional command in Cabinda. Macosso had been in the city for two days, after arriving from the war-torn Mayombe Forest, Buco-Zau, where he lived. Macosso would travel to the municipal centre to sell his agricultural products and stay with his children. Macosso’s eldest daughter, Carolina Macosso, 36, reported the kidnapping to Cabinda Commercial Radio some hours after it happened. She described how soldiers had beaten her and her five siblings and she said the leader of the military operation had assured her that her father would be returned soon. According to Macosso, the operation leader told her that her father was only going to be interrogated about people in his village and nothing else. Macosso filed a complaint with the Police Command who told her that the case was “a problem for the Regional Military Headquarters.”

April 15, 2003 – Tomás Lelo, a former FAA soldier, said he acted as a guide for FAA commandos deployed in Belize to locate a supposed FLEC hideout in the traditional authority of Alto-Sundi, South of the Miconge commune. According to Lelo, the hiding place turned out to be occupied by civilians who offered no armed resistance to the commandos’ operations. Nevertheless, after securing control over the area at approximately 07:00, soldiers fired on one of the area’s 37 settlements for nearly two hours. Lelo said that about 50 civilians were killed or wounded. Several villagers were arrested and forced to dig holes to bury the dead as well as some villagers who were seriously injured but still alive. After the operation, the military blamed the survivors for bringing the carnage upon themselves because they had supposedly given refuge to FLEC guerrilla fighters. Lelo could not account for a number of the wounded because they were removed from the area in helicopters.

April 9, 2003 – Carolina Mataia, 29, Marta Tchelika, 41, Essingo Goma, 36, Paula Mambuco, 40, Valéria Maia, 33, Ariete Jorge, Maria Quitexe, and Maria Pólo, 39, were attacked in the village of Tando-Zinze.by members of the Fiscal Police. The women were travelling in a truck carrying wood and charcoal that they had acquired for resale. Inspectors at a control point demanded 500 kwanzas (about U.S. $7) from each passenger in order for them to proceed and avoid confiscation of their goods. As the group was negotiating their payment, one of the inspectors dragged Pólo from the truck and tried to rape her several meters away. Polo resisted and the inspector fired several shots, tore her clothes, and beat her. Pólo’s resistance infuriated the other inspectors who drew their guns, forced the women to lie down on the ground, and beat them with clubs.

April 3, 2003 – José Vindo, also known as Tudo Passa, a former FLEC guerrilla turned FAA soldier, moved from Sinde to Muanza, in the municipal district of Buco-Zau, with his two wives and his children. In Muanza, FAA commandos accused him of still belonging to FLEC and beat him in front of his family.

April 1, 2003 – Filipe Dembe Jesus, 23, and Samuel Cando, 43, both teachers, were on their way from Buco-Zau to their workplace in the village of Muanza when, in the Sinde-Muanza area, they were stopped by “red beret” Special Forces. The commandos accused the men of belonging to FLEC and beat them severely. Jesus and Cando said that the commandos do not recognise authorities in the municipal district, and only obey orders from their commander in Cabinda. Thus, there are virtually no constraints on their use of violence and abuse of human rights.

March 29, 2003 – Following internal pressures, the FAA released about 260 civilians held captive for three months in a warehouse in the municipality of Buco-Zau. Most of the detainees were women and children who had returned from the forests during the FAA offensive against FLEC-FAC military bases.

March 27, 2003 – Alexandre Bula Victor, 43, a father of 18, was taken at midnight from his house in the village of Caio Contene, Necuto by a group of FAA soldiers. The soldiers arrested Victor in front of his wife and children and took him to the Vitrina barracks, near the Catholic church and the rectory. At the barracks, the soldiers showed Vitor a sketch of FLEC base locations and asked him to guide them to FLEC-FAC hideouts. At 02:00, the military tried to force Víctor to dress in an FAA uniform for the search operation. He refused and proposed that they take him to the house to dress in civilian clothes for the operation. The soldiers agreed and, over the next couple of days, made several incursions into Tando-Caio and other difficult to access areas of the Mayombe forest. After three days of fruitless campaigns, the military beat Víctor and then released him. As a consequence, he abandoned his family to seek refuge and safety in Cabinda.

March 24, 2003 – Paulo Tati, was detained by an officer known as Captain Cambinda, in the village of Isúsu, about 20 km from the municipal district capital of Cabinda. Tati was accused by FAA soldiers of being a FLEC-Renovada informant. The army first took him to the Sintu Makanda barracks. From there, they led Tati on foot to the Nzala-Ngó camp for political prisoners, located a few kilometres from the Democratic Republic of Congo border. On March 25, one of the military chiefs beat Tati. He was also forced to work cutting and transporting wood with the other prisoners, at the army’s private lumber business. After his release Tati returned to Isúsu. Cambinda went to Tati’s house several times to insult him and his wife and threaten them with a pistol. Tati has taken refuge in the center of Cabinda town and has, so far unsuccessfully, appealed to General Luís Mendes to resolve his case.

March 24, 2003 – Vicente Matias Mbuiti, 37, a teacher from Cata-Chivava, Necuto – Buco-Zau, Caio Contene, was arrested and tied up by soldiers in front of his students at school while teaching. Mbuiti was subjected to this humiliating and degrading treatment because he is the nephew of Alexandre Bachi (aka “Stick”), ex-Chief of Staff of FLEC-FAC. The military accused Mbuiti of maintaining contacts with his uncle. After soldiers took Mbuiti prisoner, his students spread the news of his arrest, which eventually reached the administrator of the commune and the commander of the Border Police, who were already aware that Mbuiti had been targeted for persecution. According to local witnesses, the police commander reacted quickly, obtained Mbuiti’s release, and took him to his unit. For safety reasons, the commander kept him there for two days, after which he assured Mbuiti that the situation had passed and he could carry on with his normal activities. On the day of his release, Mbuiti was interviewed by an official of the FAA counter-intelligence who reminded him of his relationship with Stick and demanded that he collaborate with the special services. Fearing for his safety, Mbuiti abandoned the commune and took refuge in the city. His wife, who remained in the commune, has been harassed by the military.

March 16, 2003 – Januário Dembe, 55, administrator of Bembe Mbote, village of Caio-Contene, Necuto commune, was driving to the UNECA saw mill, when he was stopped by an FAA soldier who demanded a ride in the opposite direction of where Dembe was going. When Dembe objected to changing his route, the soldier ordered Dembe and his two children to get out of the vehicle. The soldier then began to discharge his AK-47, point blank at Dembe, hitting him in the ankle and damaging his vehicle. The soldier also fired at the victim’s children but they escaped unhurt. The soldier only stopped firing when he had emptied the ammunition clip.

March 3, 2003 – Feliciano Conde, 21, son of José Duca and Marta Pambo, and grandson of Chief Conde Abiniel Malonda of Chienzi-Liti, was beaten at a military base at Cata-Buanga. According to Conde, a first corporal, whom he knew only as Mário, contacted him and asked him to direct him to a witchdoctor with the power to protect him from bullets. Conde was reluctant to get involved in such matters, but nonetheless tried to locate a witchdoctor who could protect the corporal. When Conde failed to find a witchdoctor, he was taken to the base where he was kept in a pit for three days and beaten and forced to dig ditches.

March 2, 2003 – Joana Macaia, 55, from the village of Ntsaca, was beaten and imprisoned in a pit for three days at the military’s special Belize unit. The military accused Macaia, a well-known healer, of performing prayers for the FLEC. Macaia acknowledged that she had two brothers who were guerrillas and, did pray for their safety. The military placed Macaia in a deep pit, for three days, without any break. During this time, Macaia prayed aloud continuously in Ibinda (the Cabindan native language). On the fourth day of her captivity, soldiers removed her from the pit and forced her to dress in an FAA uniform to serve as a guide to lead the army to her brothers. Macaia refused to guide the soldiers and an officer punished her by slapping her 80 times on the hand with the side of a machete. A short time later, a priest, Gabriel Nzau, successfully appealed to the soldiers to release Macaia.

February 26, 2003 – André Quibindo, 26, employed at the Serrano service station in the city of Cabinda, had arrived at work early in the morning before the start of the business day. The provincial prosecutor, Pascoal Joaquim, arrived to fill up his vehicle. Although the station was not yet open, Quibindo made an exception for Joaquim and filled up his vehicle. Joaquim paid for the gas but Quibindo said that did not have the 10 kwanzas (less than U.S. $0.15) owed as change, because he had not served anybody beforehand. The prosecutor’s bodyguard and his two nephews who were in the vehicle, asked Quibindo if he knew with whom he was dealing. He answered that he did not care whether he was Eduardo dos Santos (Angola’s president) or anybody else. With this reply, the bodyguard and nephews began to beat Quibindo. One of his colleagues tried to help him, but was set upon in turn. The station supervisor asked the bodyguard and nephews to release his colleagues and they told him they would do so only if they kissed the prosecutor’s feet. None of the men agreed to this and Quibindo was taken to the Municipal Police Command and placed in an isolation cell where he spent five days without food and without visitation rights.

February 18, 2003 – Gabriel Buku, 46, a father of eight, was travelling on a bus from São Pedro, Povo Grande, a municipal market in Cabinda. Some soldiers were on the bus as well and before they reached their destination, the soldiers made threatening and offensive gestures to the passengers in the front of the bus. Buku, asked the passengers to remain calm and wait for the bus stop so they could get off. Sergeant Sete Vidas was one of several soldiers who then attacked Buku. The soldiers took his identity card and driver’s licence. Buku filed a complaint with the Ntó Battalion, where his attackers were stationed, but has yet to receive a response.

January 21, 2003 – FAA sergeants Sebastião Matange Luemba and José Guima Franque, after performing military service in the south of the country, went to Tando-Zinze to visit their relatives. The soldiers had not seen their relatives for three years and were warmly greeted upon their return. Their colleagues, stationed in the area, however, immediately accused the sergeants of sympathizing with FLEC, beat them, and then placed each of them in a 200 liter drum of water, where they stayed for two days before an officer known as Petróleo ordered their release.

January 20, 2003 – Ivo Macaia, 44, son of Estanislau Baxi Codo and Matilde Yoca, born in Ganda Cango in Belize municipality, was released after being arrested at his home in the city of Cabinda on November 30, 2002 by FAA soldiers. Macaia’s arrest was documented in the Terror in Cabinda human rights report published on December 10, 2002, at which time his whereabouts were unknown. After his release in January 2003, Macaia was accused of being the secret, local representative for the FLEC-Renovada guerrilla group. After his arrest, Macaia was taken to the regional military headquarters in Cabinda, where he stayed for three days. He was then taken by helicopter to a military base in the village of Prata, to the south of the city, where he stayed for 15 days. On his second day there, he was visited by General Luís Mendes, the regional commander for Cabinda, who wanted to see whether the detainee was being kept “in conditions that would take him to Hell.” The next day, another senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Delfim, seemed to contradict Mendes and told Macaia not to panic and that no one was going to kill him. During the entire period of detention, Macaia was kept in a pit, along with insects and a scorpion that stung him. He said that after five days of rain, the water in the pit came up to his neck. He was later taken back to the regional military headquarters where he remained another 20 days. On January 8, the Attorney General of the Republic ordered Macaia to court and the provincial prosecutor sent him to the police’s Criminal Investigation Department. Macaia then went to a civilian prison, where he received his release order after more than seven weeks’ detention. He later returned to his job with ChevronTexaco.

January 6, 2003 – Twenty three FAA soldiers were beaten, with some wounded by gunshots from their colleagues, when they supposedly tried to desert by sea. Two vehicles containing military police surprised the alleged deserters at about 09:45 on the quays of Cabinda. As soon as they arrived at the quay, the soldiers started firing causing panic among the workers and civilian on the quay. After several minutes, 23 alleged deserters were arrested, with two lying on the ground with gunshot wounds to the legs. A captain reassured quayside workers telling them that the arrested soldiers were “deserters who betrayed the homeland and will be executed, but relax, carry on working, everything is under control.” A young deserter, about 22 years old, tried to escape, but soldiers caught him and thrust his head under the water. He struggled for about 15 minutes, but eventually stopped moving. The soldiers took him out of the water and straight to the police vehicle. The wounded soldiers lying on the ground were kicked in the head, beaten with rifle butts and clubs, and tied with their own shoelaces.

December 15, 2002 – The inhabitants of the village of Ncaca, Tando-Zinze commune, were returning to their homes after having fled to the bush, when soldiers surrounded the village at about 23:00, made the villagers sit on the ground outside their houses, and interrogated them about FLEC. The soldiers arrested Francisco António Brás Taty, 52, and Rafael Ngaca Gomes, 37. The soldiers told the district administrator that they would take him with the two men and would release them as soon as they finished questioning them. The soldiers put the men in military trucks and departed. FAA soldiers also arrested Verónica Ntoto, 33, and demanded that she explain where her husband was. She answered that her husband had moved to the city of Cabinda. Ntoto was taken to the FAA unit, where she was questioned about her husband’s possible connection with FLEC. Ntoto remained at the barracks and was separated from her three young children for three days. When she was released, soldiers fordade her from communicating with anyone. The following day at 20:00, Ntoto was taken by soldiers to a waiting helicopter, which transported her to the city of Cabinda, where she remained for two days in the Military Police Unit. Again, she was interrogated about her husband’s whereabouts and told them that she did not know where he was in the city. The police also took Ntoto to a jail pit to see if she recognised any people who had visited her husband. The police released Ntoto two days later.

December 14, 2002 – At approximately 02:00, FAA soldiers arbitrarily detained the village coordinator, the village secretary, and eight youths from the village of Seva, commune of Nekutu. Soldiers tied the coordinator and the secretary with ropes and tortured them in an effort to confirm accusations that they belonged to FLEC. Meanwhile, the eight youths were transported by helicopter to the Tafi barracks, in the city of Cabinda for interrogation. The army released the coordinator and the secretary after their interrogation. According to the youths, General Luís Mendes ordered their release and they were flown back to the village by two military helicopters.

December 12, 2002– António Custódio, 34, Francisco Sardinha, 39, José Bento, 32, Paulo Sassa, 29, and Papi Samba, 22, were captured by the FAA, in the Champuto-Rico forests, a timber production zone. The FAA accused them of being FLEC collaborators and helping exploit timber resources to benefit the guerrillas. The accused were bound and gagged and transported by helicopter to the Prata zone, an area used by the military as a large detention camp. Sassa managed to escape from the Prata zone and said he had witnessed the shooting of 12 young men aged between 20 and 35. According to Sassa, the youths were prisoners in one of the many pits that had been dug there for the detainees’ captivity. Sassa recounted seeing officers using women prisoners as cooks and laundresses. Sassa said he had escaped when the military took him to the village of Nkaka, to show them the house of Verónica Ntoto’s husband, whom the military presumed to be a FLEC guerrilla fighter. Soldiers began shooting at villagers and Sassa said he escaped in the ensuing panic and confusion. Sassa continues to live underground out of fear of being detained again and possibly killed.

December 6, 2002 – José Simarro 28, disappeared, and Gabriel Malonda, 32 years, was mutilated when the two men were detained by five soldiers from the Alzira Unit, 704th Battalion, Buco-Zau. The army suspected the two men of being FLEC collaborators and soldiers apprehended the two men in their residences in the village of Conde-Liti. The soldiers beat the two suspects to the point where Simarro lost control of his bowels. The soldiers focused on Simarro because they thought he knew the location of the FLEC bases in the area. Based on Simarro’s information, the army went to Nsoquimina the next day but found no indications of FLEC activity in the area. The army then ordered Malonda to return to the village as an informant and told him they would kill Simarro if Malonda fled or provided incorrect information. After eight days, Malonda had not provided any information and he was rearrested and mutilated by a gunshot wound to his foot.

November 23, 2002 – Sebastião Lembe, 71, was beaten violently by FAA soldiers in the village of Mbata Bungo, Buco-Zau for not knowing how to speak Portuguese. The incident started when soldiers noticed that a mattress had disappeared from the area where they stored items they had plundered from the local population. They suspected Lembe and began interogating him in Portugese, which Lembe does not speak, and the soldiers became frustrated with his inability to answer their questions. They bound him to the column of a hut and beat him. The soldiers then untied him and left him lying unconscious in the dirt.

November 19, 2002 – Maria Rosa, 26, was shot in the left leg during an FAA attack against the village of Mbata-Bungo. The intensity of the attack drove Rosa’s relatives into the forest and she was left wounded with her one year old son Sebastião for five days without medical help.

November 18, 2002 – During operations in the village of Ncaca, FAA soldiers captured Francisco Liberal, 31. At approximately 19:30, government troops secretly entered the village and positioned themselves behind an elementary school. After several minutes, the soldiers opened fire on villagers who were out socializing and going about their daily business. Most of the villagers immediately fled to the neighboring village of Papela. The soldiers, accompanied by a civilian, then arrested Liberal, beat him, and took him to an unknown destination.

October 18, 2002 – Lourenço Gomes Pitra, 34, a father of five, was detained in the Military Unit of Matondo. At approximately 12:00, three soldiers in civilian clothes approached Pitra’s house, in the village of Mazengo, south of the city of Cabinda, where he was supervising bricklayers working on his home. The soldiers engaged Pitra, who owns a small tavern and restaurant, under the pretense of trying to sell him a case of canned sardines for 1,500 kwanzas (U.S. $20). Pitra agreed to the sale and the three soldiers asked him to accompany them to their place of business, in the Matondo Military Unit of the 118th Battalion (the commandos-caçadores) based near Nzala Ngo. At Matondo, Pitra was received by General Luís Mendes, who slapped him three times in the face. The soldiers then beat Pitra, tied him up, and threw him in a military vehicle. They took him to the Chinguinguili base, alternately interrogating and beating him on the way. A strong downpour interupted the beating and the soldiers left Pitra tied to the truck, while they took shelter inside the base. Once the rain stopped, the soldiers blindfolded Pitra and removed him from the truck. He was then interrogated about what he knew about a number of local priests, businessmen, and local officials.. According Pitra, Mendes conducted the interrogation and told him that if he did not talk he would “die like a dog, like so many others.” Pitra told Mendes that he did not know what any of this was about and would be willing to die because he was no different from the others. Mendes became furious and ordered Pitra to be taken to the back of the unit to be executed. While the weapons were being loaded, another commander suspended the execution because he wanted to try other methods to make Pitra talk. Pitra was then lowered by a rope into a deep pit. The following day he was given an FAA uniform and sandals and was used as guide in a military operation in Caio-Caliado. The operation was a failure and Mendes declared that it was Pitra’s last day alive. Mendes had his men lay Pitra at his feet and then tie wooden splints to his head which were tightened as Pitra was interrogated, causing him extreme pain. Pitra said he eventually lost consciousness and does not remember the remainder of the interrogation. At the end of the day, Mendes ordered Pitra to be thrown into a river from an army helicopter. During the flight, Mendes shoved Pitra’s head out of the helicopter and interrogated him about FLEC members and base locations. These methods failed to yield any valuable information and, instead of throwing Pitra from the helicopter, Mendes tried offering him a car, a house, and a job if he helped in forthcoming antiguerilla operations. On April 23, 2003, Pitra managed to escape and is currently in hiding.

October 24, 2002 – Lourenço Pitra Gomes, an escaped army detainee, witnessed a particularly cruel execution. On October 24, Gomes saw FAA soldiers with a prisoner about 40 years old who was wearing shorts and had a head bandage. Gomes knew that the man – a FLEC guerrilla who had been involved in an attack against an FAA patrol – had been captured in the Mayombe forest and had been shot in the head. The prisoner did not speak Portuguese and Gomes was asked to act as an Ibinda (Fiote) interpreter. General Luís Mendes was present and, according to Gomes, Mendes ordered Lieutenant Colonel Tussen to send the prisoner to hell. A soldier stabbed the prisoner several times, rubbed him with salt and “gindungo” (chilli peppers) and then buried him alive. According to Gomes, the general reminded him that he faced a similar fate if he did not collaborate.

- December 02, 2002 – FAA soldiers, stationed in Mazengo plains, subjected António Francisco (18 years old), António Lelo (29 years old) and João Ngoma to public torture, in the commune of Tando –Zinze. The military beat the individuals in front of the population with the goal of obtaining information about FLEC. November 30, 2002–Ivo Macaia, 41, was detained, about 18H00, at the home of his second wife, Sedona, without any arrest warrant. The agents beat on the door and asked to speak with “Uncle Ivo”, with whom they had set up a meeting. The family called him and he was immediately arrested and taken to a vehicle. He is still missing. On October 25, 2002, “ninjas”, from the 11th Unit, were, at dawn, at the house, of his first wife, Silvana Zinga, with an arrest warrant. In Ivo Macaia’s absence, who was in Luanda, the special police detained his children as hostages. Gilberto Dias Macaia, 18, Vale Bernardo Macaia, 17, and a nephew named Pety all of whom had to answer for the father. Around 10H00 a.m., they were released from the 11th Unit, after the return of the father to Cabinda, on the same day. 

On November 12, 2002, investigator Oliveira, from the Provincial Direction of Criminal Investigation (DPIC) left a warning-notification “by order of the chief” at Ivo Macaia’s house. On November 13, Ivo Macaia went to the DPIC for questioning. For six hours, according to his wife’s accounts, Ivo Macaia was repeatedly accused of being a FLEC member. However, on the back of the warning-notification, now in the hands of the researchers of this report, investigator Oliveira wrote that the suspect was entitled to return to his work place and to earn wages for the day that he had passed in DPIC. 

Ivo Macaia is a ChevronTexaco employee at Malongo Oil Base. In her accounts, the wife stressed the presence of a security officer in Malongo, who went to her husband’s section to know of his whereabouts from his immediate superior Anselmo Duda. The wife ventured that the agent would have received information, at that time, from Anselmo Duda on Ivo Macaia’s time off. He works in a rotation of 21 days on duty in Malongo and 21 days off. Since October 25, Ivo Macaia did not sleep at home, as he explained to the to the researchers, who were already following his case, fearing for his disappearance. The fear is confirmed now. On December 04, FAA soldiers arrested mechanic Zito, a friend of Ivo Macaia, who regularly accompanied his wife in the efforts to search for his whereabouts. He was at work in his workshop, in Rua das Forças Armadas, in the center of the city, when he was detained. The military, according to witnesses, led him to the vehicle at gunpoint. He is also missing.

- November 26, 2002–José Mbachi, 37 years old, and Casimiro Maluango, 29 years old, a.k.a Queimado, under suspicion of being FLEC collaborators were detained by elements of FAA military police in the village of Pove, commune of Tando-Zinze. Only the military authorities know the final destination of the two citizens. 

- November 23, 2002–Maria Itula, 32 years, nurse from the Military Hospital of Cabinda, disappeared from her place of work, after resolutely refusing to render assistance to wounded soldiers, coming from Buco-Zau municipality. According to the victim’s friends, the nurse was crying alleging that she could not care for soldiers who were killing her relatives. At the end of her shift, she was called to the office of the Hospital’s clinical director, where she was directed to the Military Regional Command of Cabinda, from whence her whereabouts are unknown. The family contacted the clinical director of the hospital, Dr. Bungo, to learn of Maria Itula’s whereabouts, and received the information that she was detained to respond to criminal proceedings. Her relatives continued without any information on the nurse’s whereabouts and, obviously, unable to make any contact. 

- November 23, 2002 (6H00 a.m.) – António Fortuna, 33 years, employee of ChevronTexaco, resident in the Amílcar Cabral neighborhood, city of Cabinda, saw the windows of his house broken into by eight elements of the Rapid Intervention Police (Ninjas). The agents thrashed António Fortuna, causing wounds over his entire body. Only after the beating did they tell him they were beating the wrong man, because they sought the owner of the residence and not the tenant. The victim was abandoned there, and was helped by the neighbors who took him to the hospital. 

- November 23, 2002–Vicente Gomes, 36 years, was approached, in Mazengo village, commune of Tando-Zinze, by two plain-clothes elements, who requested indications as to the houses that sold “kaporroto” (Angolan cane liquor). After they left the place of the encounter, the two civilians gave a sign to the military police patrol. Subsequently, some townsfolk observed Vicente Gomes being transported by a helicopter, which was a certain distance away, in a field used for soccer practice. His relatives do not know his whereabouts. 

- November 22, 2002– Agents of the Information Services (Sinfo) arrested Lourenço Ngoma Pitra, 33 years old, son of André Pitra and Maria da Conceição Buca, father of five, at his house. According to witnesses, he was taken to Mazengo military garrison, where he was tortured. Since then, his status remains unknown. 

- November 20, 2002 – Bacumbo Bessa, Vicente Barros Buingui, António Barros, Joco, Gime Brás, Michel Sumbo, Miguel Feliciano, Eduardo Mbiona, José Tino Chinguende, Begami Macunde, André Tati Ntendekele and Filipe Lueia Casimiro were detained by FAA soldiers in the villages of Kungu and Chipita, up to now their whereabouts and the reasons for their detention are unknown. 

- November 19, 2002– FAA soldiers arrested Francisco António Brás Tati, 54 years old, son of Alberto Mbila and Carlota Zola, in Nkaka, municipality of Cabinda. He has gone missing. 

- November 18, 2002–Francisco Toco, 37, José Tigre, 33, old and Luís Poba, 36, did not escape the practices of FAA. The military removed them by force, at dawn, from their residences under the suspicion they had leads to the FLEC bases. Missing persons. November 15, 2002 (16H00)– Estevão Buinji, 42, son of João Tibúrcio and Maria Nzúmbala, resident of Lelo Mau, was arbitrarily detained by the military of the Recognition Unit, when he was driving through that unit, towards the city. He was stopped under the allegation of knowing where the bases and the guerrilla fighters of FLEC are located. Estevão Buinji is secretary of Papela community, in the village of Liambo, in the municipal district of Cabinda, and a catechist. 

-November 14, 2002 – Joaquim Tiemuna, driver, suffered a beating session at Ganda Cango FAA checkpoint, when he was transporting civilians. These were removed from the vehicle and the driver found himself forced to transport military personnel in his vehicle, for a military operation in a nearby village, of Viede.

-  November 13, 2002 – Alexandre Nhati, 34, presumed member of FLEC-FAC was detained, in the city of Cabinda, by members of the Rapid Intervention Police “ninjas”, of the 11th Unit, accused of having participated in a subversive meeting. For two days he was tortured with shock sticks, in morning and afternoon sessions. Interrogations were reserved for the nights with a pistol pointed at his head, in sessions of about 30 minutes each. The detention of the referred separatist, in the 11th Unit, consisted of being on his feet, arms shackled around a thick and high tree trunk. He slept like this and was not entitled to food or water for two days. He was freed afterwards. Alexandre Nhati, was in the bush, with FLEC-FAC, up to 1985, at which time he abandoned the forest and went to live in the city. From 1992 to 1994 he was imprisoned due to his implication in the purchase of weapons from government troops to supply the separatist guerrillas. 

- November 07, 2002 – Bento Banvu, 65, son of Estanislau da Costa Mamboma and Catarina Malalu, was detained by FAA soldiers, in the village of Susso, for harboring Fernando Mbele, accused of supplying FLEC guerrillas. On November 11, the military took Bento Banvu to the Iliongo Lake, where he usually goes fishing, through the placement of “zindika” traps, in search of possible leads that might confirm his logistical support to FLEC. The fisherman had the opportunity to pick up the fish from the traps, and was subsequently escorted to the village of São José Ngongo (close to the village of Susso). At that time the village was occupied practically only by military, due to the displacement of the local population, caused by the constant military confrontations. The following day, November 12, 2002, the same military drove him to his pineapple plantation, with the same purpose. After the mission, the military escorted him to the neighboring village of Chamaze, to contact some family members, having asked for some clothes and sent a message to his wife, who was in the city of Cabinda, so the she would send him his identity card, because, according to him, “he would shortly be sent to the city”. The commandant of the troops that accompanied him told the nephew (bearing the requested clothes) that his “problem” had been investigated and nothing had been confirmed, but that he would shortly be freed. Up till now, the family does not know of his actual whereabouts. He has gone missing. 

- November 05, 2002–João Barros Yenga, 32 years old, son of João Yenga and Teresa Malalo, was detained, by military, in the village of Susso, for leaving his house at dawn. Under suspicion that his departure at that hour implied he was with FLEC, he was taken to an unknown location, up till now, his whereabouts are unknown or indeed if he is still alive.

- October 29 (9H00 a.m.) 2002– A patrol of 10 “Ninjas”, without a search warrant, invaded the house of the widow Cândida Pena, 47, resident in the Uneca quarter, of Cabinda’s city. Her house was ransacked, in search of documents. The Ninjas took the entire documentation of her late husband, an ex-FLEC activist, in the refugee camps in DRC, in the seventies. Since early eighties her late husband used to work for the provincial government of Cabinda. Cândida Pena, a teacher, is well known in the province, for having led a march of 500 women against the drafting of their children into the army and for her mobilizing capacity on behalf of the citizens’ rights in Cabinda. For her activism she was once detained, with more 20 women. “They keep me under strict control, I never went into the forests, I never took up a weapon and I do not know why they persecute me so much”. The activist complained bitterly. 

- October 06, 2002 – Minutes after disembarking at the Cabinda Military Terminal, as part of a battalion returning from Zambia, a sergeant was beaten on parade, by his commandant, a colonel, for protesting against the disembarkation in Cabinda. According to the soldier, they were destined to disembark in Luanda, and to leave from the capital, to meet up with their families, as a reward for their efforts in the siege of the late political leader Jonas Savimbi. The act was witnessed both by the people that were in the civil terminal and in the military terminal.

September 23, 2002– FAA soldiers shot António Tebe, 39, in the legs. He was hunting in the village of Champuto-Rico, and after a brief interrogation session and a beating the soldiers took aim at him. Earlier in the morning, FLEC had carried out an attack against a FAA detachment that guaranteed the security for a visit by Governor Aníbal Rocha to the village of Subantando. The military accused the hunter of being a FLEC messenger, they tortured him and, when he tried to flee, he was shot and abandoned there. The villagers helped him a little while after the shots. António Tebe remains with his lower limbs immobilized and with no means to support his wife and six children, because he lived from hunting.

- September 19, 2002–Celestino Manduvo, 52, son of Agostinho Dembe and Inês Simba; Celestino Coelho, 22, son of António Ngimbi and Maria Sassa; Simão Carlos, 22, son of Carlos Babala and Suzana Bumba; and Tiago Macosso, 26 years old, son of João Ngola and Esmali Mpassi were detained by a military patrol, at a wake, in the village of Piandinge, and taken to the Necuto Garrison. Three other citizens, also taken at the same time were released while the stated persons were submitted to interrogation and torture. Tiago Macosso was shot dead and burnt with a necklace tire as above explained. Celestino Manduvo, Celestino Coelho and Simão Carlos continued in jail until October 04, 2002, at which time they were seen, for the last time, by traditional authorities called in by the commander of that military unit. According to the traditional authorities, the prisoners were in a pitiful state: they displayed visible signs of tortures, appeared very physically debilitated and were visibly despondent. It is not know whether such individuals are still alive or already dead. In the sequence of these events, the villages of Piandinge, Tando Caio, Conde Li Ntumbi I, Conde Li Ntumbi II and Tando Ibulassi were depopulated. The communities were displaced, in sub-human conditions, on the Piandinge cut-off, close to Panga-Mongo.

- September 17, 2002 (24:00 Hr) – About 15 “ninjas” knocked on the door of Domingos Luciano Francisco’s house, in the neighborhood of Luvasse, in the city of Cabinda, demanding that he hand over his son, a former combatant of FLEC. Manuel dos Santos Custódio Francisco, born to January 31, 1980, served in FLEC from age 16 to 21, in his area of origin, in the Necuto commune. In December of last year, along with 14 other guerrillas, he surrendered to the government forces in the city of Cabinda. After that, he joined his family in the city. Up till now, it is unknown the whereabouts of the young man. His father has lodged a formal complaint to the authorities, on his son’s disappearance. In answer, according to the father, the authorities just gave him the hope that in case they had some leads on the whereabouts of Manuel dos Santos C. Francisco, they would inform the family. 

- September 12, 2002 –FAA soldiers surrounded the village of Terra Nova, and opened fire on the residents, wounding 12 people and taking four men as prisoners namely, Domingos Tadeu, 33, farmer, José Mavinga, 29, driver, António Chocolate, 17, student and Manuel Fingo, 29, unemployed. FAA soldiers entered the home of José Imba, 26, and dragged him outside the house. He was interrogated about a FLEC attack and then they fired 6 shots into his legs and abandoned him there. This action took place in reprisal for a FLEC in the vicinity. 

- September 06, 2002– The brothers Alexandre Sumbo, teacher, and Manuel Barros, children of João Maria Tembo and Maria Perpétua Nhongo, and a friend Luís Fernando, suffered severe beatings, in the village of Mbamanga (Cacongo), from FAA elements of the Massabi Military Unit. Motive: They were suspected of collaboration with the FLEC. To their relief, they were just beaten. They did not disappear.

July 22, 2002 – In the sequel of a guerrilla attack at Rio Lulondo, the closest village, Champuto-Rico, suffered reprisals: it was besieged and some of the populace taken to the barracks, where they were tortured and suffered abuses, among them António Teba, with a fractured leg; Vicente Brás, with a fractured pelvis and Paulo Tembo, with a broken arm. The village, which had been pillaged and destroyed in 1993 – the consequences of which are still visible – is now militarized, with a FAA garrison.

June 22, 2002 (10:00) – FAA soldiers arrested Francisco Maneta, 42, and Cosme Brás, 51, in their residences, in Tando Zinze commune. The arrests happened as a sequel to an attack in the area by FLEC against three vehicles of FAA. The men were taken to the barracks of the Tando-Zinze Battalion, where they remained under torture and interrogation for three days. During the interrogations, Francisco Maneta was forced to sit down on the ground with legs stretched, and thus the soldiers kept on pounding on his legs, with a heavy wooden stick, while the interrogations took place. Francisco Maneta’s legs are paralyzed.

June 2002– When operating in the area of São José Ngongo and Cinto Macanda, the FAA captured two villagers: Pedro, from Cinto Macanda, a hunter, was suspended by his genitals from a tree, while the military enjoyed the spoils of his hunting. Then, they pierced his legs with knives; the other companion, whose name remains unknown, was brutally beaten.

- August 27, 2001 – José Zeferino Puaty, 31, was detained without charges. Spent 11 months in Yabi Jail. He was arrested, during labor hours, Malongo oil and gas compound of ChevronTexaco. Mr. Fialho, one of the security officials of Malongo, called José Zeferino Puaty, who was in English classes, to his office. ChevronTexaco security officials held a private conversation with the agents for about 10 minutes and, soon thereafter, handed over the employee in question to Mr. Oliveira, DPIC investigator (See Media, Manuel da Costa) and to Mr. Miúdo, of Sinfo. The detention occurred with no exhibit of any arrest warrant or any other document. Once in jail, the agents fired into the ground, in his direction, to force him to enter the cell, which had human excrement all over, without any formal charges. Mr. Puaty was verbally denounced as the “head” of a political organization, with ideals contrary to the Government’s policies. On September 04 and November 13, 2001, the prisoner suffered death threats at gunpoint, under the accusation of being a FLEC member. In February 2002, José Zeferino Puaty became seriously ill with malaria, he had to be evacuated at night to the hospital, in the shovel loader of a tractor, over a route of about 12 kilometers from the jail to the Central Hospital of Cabinda. The reason presented by the prison authorities that they did not transport him by car, was simply his political conduct. He spent 10 days in hospital, before returning to his cell. On July 04, 2002, on the eve of a visit by an official delegation, from the capital Luanda, to verify the situation of political prisoners in Cabinda, the supposed “leader” plus two other political prisoners received a visit from officials of the provincial court, who announced their trial for the following day. When confronted with the detainees’ protests about such a sudden decision and their lack of lawyers, the official explained that it was just a formality. The following day, they were released after signing a document granting them amnesty. One of the companions, Paulo Mavungo, 33, was the first to be detained, on July 07, 2001, with a public session of beating and transported to prison, in the trunk of a civil vehicle. The third André Mabedo, 29 years old, was detained on August 24 2001. ChevronTexaco readmitted José Zeferino Puaty without, however, compensating him, for the fact of having handed him over directly, in its Malongo compound, without any legal justification. The referenced employee saw his wages reduced from about a thousand dollars/month to about US$600/month and he is prohibited from entering Malongo oil compound. He now works at the clinic, located in the city. According to the referenced employee’s declarations, during his detention, the police confiscated his computer and five diskettes and took the material to ChevronTexaco IT specialists, in Malongo, for investigation.

- May 13, 2002– Bernardo Buela, 52, farmer, was ex-father-in-law of an FLEC element. In a raid against Chipito, a community of Liambo village, FAA soldiers acting on a tip off from the local populace, tied the farmer by his legs and suspended him head downwards by his legs from a tree. He spent the interrogation like this, accompanied by stabbings over his whole body, an act carried out by several soldiers. Satisfied, the military untied him and they returned him to the community. When he learned about the news, Fr. Casimiro Congo sent a vehicle to pick up the victim and to provide him with assistance. The military preferred to deliver medicines to a local male nurse so that he could treat Bernardo Buela in Chipito.

- March 12, 2001– Rafael Gime, 39 years old, leader of a potential demonstration of demobilized soldiers, suffered the arbitrary power of “ninjas”. Beaten to the point of receiving 12 stitches to his head. He talked to the Voice of America about holding the demonstration against the Provincial Government of Cabinda, to demand payment of their pensions, which were three years in arrears and, before this could happen, the “ninjas” crushed his intentions.

- December 24, 2000 – Police officers, detached in Tando-Zinze commune, approached the pre-deacon of the Catholic Church, Joaquim Bumba, who was traveling in a car accompanied by some church workers. The passengers were accused of collaborating with FLEC and tortured. The pre-deacon was shot in his right leg. He received medical attention in Luanda, at the Endiama Clinic. The Catholic Church sent the surgery bill to the provincial government of Cabinda that, subsequently, settled it. Joaquim Bumba, today, has steel pins in his right leg.

- January 15, 1998 – Alexandre Télica, 22, son of Gabriel Gomes and Albertina Bindele, was wounded by a shot from FAA.

March 03, 1997 – In Kissoqui do Luali, Municipal district of Belize, the FAA military carried out a series of outrages against the population. The minor André Simba Macundo, born August 02, 1990, son of José Mancundo and Alice Conde, was shot.

- CASE No. 28 -

3.3. Victims of sexual abuse

August 11, 2003 – Catarina Colo, 15, the daughter of Fernando Ntove and Maria Luengo was forced into becoming the mistress of Captain Félix Valentino, who commands an FAA detachment in Cata-Buanga, Buco-Zau. On August 11, Luengo sent her daughter out to find bananas. When her daughter failed to return, Luengo searched for her for several hours and then informed the traditional authorities who contacted the military. On the third day of Colo’s disappearance, they learned that Colo was being held by the Cata-Buanga detachment. Colo’s family contacted the commanding officer who refused to free Catarina. Instead, Valentino demanded a family meeting in the presence of the traditional authorities. According to the family, Valentino said he wished to marry their daughter, acknowledged that he had already violated her, and that he now wanted her to stay with him. Colo’s family demanded that they be allowed to take their daughter home. Valentino accused the family of being sympathetic toward the FLEC, offered them a dowry, and concluded by threatening their lives and the life of their daughter. Although she has repeatedly demanded her freedom, Colo remains Valentino’s mistress.

August 10, 2003 – Alice Nzuzi, 18. Nzuzi, the wife of a teacher, was raped by a corporal known as “Caiongo,” of the 704th Battalion stationed in Buco-Zau. Caiongo found Nzuzi washing clothes in the Luali River and asked her some questions of an intimate nature, which she refused to answer. Caiongo ordered his men to leave the area. Suspicious of the move, Nzuzi tried to escape. Caiongo caught her, threw her into the water and attempted to drown her. He then dragged her to the bank and asked his friends to help and take part in raping her. One villager, Dona Rosa, called other villagers to help Nzuzi. The soldiers fired several shots to drive away the villagers and then fled.

June 23, 2003 – Catarina Pemba, 16, was raped by four soldiers from the 115th Battalion. Pemba was coming out of the Catholic Mission Parish School when she was confronted by soldiers who were responding to an earlier FLEC guerrilla attack outside the village. The soldiers accused Pemba of being related to a FLEC member. One soldier quickly loaded his gun and threatened to kill her if she did not admit to the accusation. Terrified, Pemba was forced to admit that she was related to a FLEC guerrilla. According to Pemba, another soldier offered her freedom in exchange for sex. She refused and received a violent blow to the head. When she recovered consciousness, the soldiers were raping her. They left her naked and bleeding. Pemba still suffers pain and occasionally finds blood in her urine.

May 31, 2003 – Alice Matsuela, 11, daughter of Gabriel Muanda and Zorzete de Fátima, was raped by FAA soldiers near the village of Panga Mongo. She continues to suffer after the attack and her physical and mental health require careful monitoring.

May 26, 2003 – Odília Muanda, 12, daughter of João Muanda and Marta Teresa, was raped, along with her mother, Marta Teresa, by FAA soldiers in the municipality of Buco-Zau.

May 25, 2003 – Teresa Simba, 10, daughter of João Mateus Puati and Maria Pemba, was raped by an FAA officer, identified as Captain Mário in the village of Conde-Malonda, Buco-Zau.

May 14, 2003 – Marta Pedro, 11, daughter of Pedro Paca and Verónica Sassa, was raped by an army officer, identified as Commandant Tomás.

May 07, 2003 – Maria Lourdes Mataia, 12, daughter of Alberto Matoco and Lourdes Mataia, was raped by an FAA soldier in the municipality of Buco-Zau.

April 24, 2003 – Lúcia Puati, 13, daughter of Mateus Puati and Maria Pemba, was gang-raped by FAA soldiers in the municipality of Buco-Zau.

March 15, 2003 – Angelina de Maio, 12, daughter of Carlos Tomé and Margarida Bumba, was raped by FAA soldiers in the village of Caio Nguala, Buco-Zau.

February 20, 2003 – Maria de Fátima Lelo Kuaku, 16, daughter of Bernardo Kuaku and Helena Masanga; Susana Kibinga, 13, daughter of Rafael Télika and Rosa Mvumbi; Joana Kibinga Marcos, 12, daughter of Marcos Pólo and Rosa Kibinda; Inês Buanga, 11, daughter of Jorge Macaia and Isabel Matuba. The four girls were returning from the municipal capital of Buco-Zau to the village of Muanza when they were questioned at approximately 15:00 by four FAA soldiers from the Kata Buanga barracks. The soldiers stole the girls’ money and the items they had acquired in Buco-Zau. After this, three of the soldiers, one of whom was identified as Tony, each chose a girl. The fourth soldier refused to touch Buanga since she was so young and too thin. The other three soldiers tore the three older girls’ clothes off and gagged and raped them.

January 24, 2003 – 1st Sergeant João António Garcia, from the 118th Battalion, 2nd Company, 3rd Platoon, head of the 1st Section (stationed in Tando-Zinze) filed a written report that his 13-year old daughter, Ana, had been sexually abused by his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Elias Pitra Petróleo. Garcia sent the report to the commander of the 2nd Military Area, General Luís Mendes. According to Garcia, Petroleo came and asked him to give him custody of his daughter so he could “educate her and make her study.” Garcia refused and Petroleo took the girl on July 4, 2002, and forced her to spend nights with him. Petroleo kept her for about 20 days until she healed from the injuries caused by the loss of her virginity. On November 10, 2002, Garcia and his wife discovered that Ana was pregnant and they requested a meeting with the commandant. Petroleo repeatedly told the Garcias that he could “neither admit nor deny” responsibility for the girl’s pregnancy. According to Garcia, Petróleo mentioned the possibility of the child being born with his features but that the baby’s inability to communicate would absolve him of responsibility and legal penalties. A week after the meeting, Petroleo, ordered the construction of a small house in the battalion’s recreation area and had his guards bring Ana to live with him. On December 29, Garcia demanded a meeting at Petroleo’s home. In response, Petróleo insisted that Garcia address the matter to him in writing, because he did not want to directly deal with “lice” like Garcia. Garcia concluded his account of Petroleo’s actions with the following question: “Worthy sirs, this happened to my daughter …But what if I were to impregnate his (the commandant’s) underage daughter, what would happen to me?” In May 2003, Ana gave birth to a deformed stillborn baby (without cranium), in the Central Hospital of Cabinda. The local press focused on the unusual birth of a child without a cranium, without mentioning the circumstances in which the child had been conceived. As of the publication of this report, the family continues to wait for justice, while Commandant Petróleo enjoys all the privileges of a high ranking officer.

January 2, 2003 – An elderly woman, Maria Verónica, received an early morning visit at her home in Terra Nova, Necuto commune from soldiers, identified as belonging to the 115th Battalion. The visit seemed to be part of a routine operation and involved various residences. However, after the operation concluded, Veronica, who lived alone, was found close to death, and showed signs of having been raped. According to witnesses, two soldiers entered Veronica’s house and remained there for more than an hour without arousing any suspicions. At around 16:30, the victim’s neighbor, Dona Rosalinda, realised she had not seen Veronica all day. Rosalinda went over to her neighbor’s house and found her lying naked on the floor in blood-soaked sheets. According to the neighbours, the old woman told them she had been raped by the soldiers. Veronica’s neighbors’ efforts to get her medical assistance were in vain and she died the following week.

December 28, 2002 – Maria Pemba was among the many people who started to return to their villages in Buco-Zau with the conclusion of military operations in the area. When Pemba returned to her home, Lieutenant Colonel Santos Mainga, commandant of the 704th Battalion, accused her of being involved with FLEC, and had her taken for interrogation at the battalion command, where she was used as a sexual “slave.” Pemba was released three days later. Military officials warned her that she would be dead if she told the traditional authorities anything about what had happened to her. Nonetheless, news of Pemba’s abduction spread and many women who had taken refuge in the forests refused to return to their villages, for fear of being raped.

December 7, 2002– Pirska, 29, an Angolan refugee from the Republic of Congo, was raped by a group of FAA soldiers in the Mananga area on the border between Ponta-Negra, Republic of Congo, and Cabinda, Angola. Pirska was seven months pregnant. The soldiers took turns raping Pirska in the presence of her husband. The soldiers also took 120,000 CFA francs (about $120) from Pirska’s husband. Shortly after the attack, Pirska went into premature labor, and the baby died at birth. Pirska was part of a group that had volunteered to work with government authorities in an effort to return to their country. Pirska and her husband were held by the military for 15 days. They rarely saw each other and Pirska was forced to work as a cook and laundress. Pirska was also forced to sleep with the group leader, known by the nom de guerre of Violência. Pirska and her husband are just two of the many citizens in the area who have been abused by the military because they were suspected of belonging to the troops of the deposed Congolese leader Pascal Lissouba and supporting FLEC.

December 24, 2002 – Inês Cadi, 50, the ex-wife of FLEC-FAC’s military adviser, “Trator,” was sexually abused by military personnel belonging to the Luvege Unit. A group of 15 FAA soldiers, accompanied by a civilian named Mayeye, detained Cadi, in her residence in the village of Micuma II, Buco-Zau. The soldiers took her 8 km away to an officer in charge of the Luvege Unit. Cadi was questioned about the whereabouts of “Trator.” Cadi told her interrogators that she had been separated from her husband for three years. Then, Cadi said, the commander raped her, followed by several soldiers who guarded her during the six days she was detained at the unit.

- November 28, 2002 – Maria Luendo, 46,, and Marta Conde, 40, were raped by FAA soldiers on the main road of Piandinge, Necuto commune, in the presence of their minor children. With the trauma they did not manage to count how many soldiers took turns to rape them. Maria Luendo had her children João Maria Cumbo, 7, and Maria Dembe, 5, while her companion had a minor whose name was not identified. Both were waiting for transport heading for the city of Cabinda, about 90 km. distant. Maria Luendo was evacuated, in a serious state, by her relatives, to the Central Hospital of Muanda in DRC where, according to information learned from family and close friends, she had to go into surgery due to the mutilation of her genitals.

November 08, 2002 –“Commander Decidido (Decisive)” raped Tina Passi, 16, at Ganda Cango village (municipality of Belize), who, after satisfaction of his sexual appetite, gave her to his men for the same purpose. According to information provided by the villagers, more than 14 FAA soldiers raped Tina. Two local witnesses, who left the village on December 05, confirmed the serious health condition of Tina, with the mutilation of her genitals, displaying various signs of beating. She is under the care of traditional healers, due to the lack of means by the relatives to provide better treatment. Tina is fatherless, and the mother, Dona Abi, fears for her life and that of her family. Witnesses refer to the constant practice of raping women by the “Commander Decidido”. According to these witnesses, in the absence of military operations that justify such acts, the women that do not present identity cards are the immediate victims of rape – with the label that they are wives or mistresses of FLEC guerrillas.

In the last few weeks, in Micumas, municipal district of Buco-Zau, several women have been systematically raped by military. The same military also forced the young males to dig their own holes, thereafter burying them more or less up to the tip of their noses. The victims are kept that way for some time until they provide information on the FLEC.

November 03, 2002– Three soldiers, from the unit stationed in Ganda Cango, raped Caty, 13, daughter of Alfredo Zau (deceased) and Maria, on the banks of the River Chibaca. Accounts from witnesses revealed that, a week earlier, soldiers had assaulted the girl’s residence, but unsuccessfully. The mother, upon protesting to the military command was accused of belonging to FLEC.

Two local young males have revealed to the researchers that it has become a high risk for them and his fellows to have any intimate relationship with local young women. “Jealous” soldiers can be subject them to abuses.

October 02, 2002 (18H00) – Three soldiers from the 20th Troop Battalion, detached to the N’tó unit, in the village of Subantando, raped Maria da Graça Fonseca Isabel, born August 04, 1975, in Cabinda. The woman, married and mother of three children left for the fields, in her mother’s company, when she was questioned by the military. The mother, Isabel Suca, 45, when she put up a resistance to the pretensions of the military was beaten senseless, while the attackers took turns raping the daughter.

June 22, 2002 (10:00) – FAA soldiers arrested Josefina Liambo, 38, and Fátima Lito, 36, teachers by profession, in their residences, in Tando Zinze commune. The detentions happened as a consequence to a FLEC attack against a FAA supplying convoy. They were taken to the barracks of the Tando-Zinze military command, where they remained, under torture and interrogation, for three days. One of the women, who asked for confidentiality, admitted she was victim of various sexual abuses, and assumed the commitment to secrecy, to guarantee her release and that of her remaining suffering companions

June 19, 2001 (22H40) – Joana Ndobe Fita Padi, 20, daughter of António Padi and Suzana Fita, resident of Fortaleza, was approached at her house, by armed soldiers, while she slept with her husband, André Sambo Zau, 21. The military took her to one of the units of the military brigade deployed in N’tó, on the way to the border of Yema (DRC). Joana Padi, could not specify to which battalion she was taken to, from not knowing the specifics of the different battalions stationed in Fortaleza. Several soldiers raped her. About 4H00 a.m. of June 20 she was released.

Several reports tell about the rape or sexual exploitation, by the military stationed in Fortaleza, of the girls that find their income in picking mangos in the area. On December 04, 2002, two of the researchers of this report traveled to the border, and verified the undisciplined presence of military along the main road. Several were seen selling mangos, many drinking at the houses of the local villagers and several dozens strolling about, along the way, in state unworthy of a national army. The population point out that the military forcibly took over the mango business, taking responsibility for picking the fruit and leaving the women to carry it to the main road, for sale.

May 08, 2002 – A FAA soldier raped Inês Lelo Tiago, 52, while two others stood guard, when she was on her way to the Catholic Mission of Cabinda. She was heading to Church for the 6:00 morning mass, when she was approached by the military. She managed to reach the church, from where she was taken to hospital for assistance.

November 08, 1994 – More than 10 FAA soldiers raped Angelina Bumba, now 30 years old, who beat her father with his own crutches to force him to watch his daughter’s rape. Gabriel Bumba, handicapped, seized by his hair and wrists, watched the gang rape of his daughter, in his own residence. To this date, Angelina Bumba only manages to move around with the help of a stick, with her three children (born) prior to the tragic event, in her brother’s care. Her husband, a police officer, abandoned her afterwards.

- CASE No. 29 -

3.4. Destruction and looting

December 04, 2002 – Ernesto Nkesso, a farmer, saw his house destroyed, in the village of Mbuco-Luemba, by a FAA helicopter. FLEC guerrillas had attacked, at that time, a FAA column that marched in the direction of Viede. In retaliation, a helicopter fired at his house, about 22H00, destroying it completely. Fortunately, his family was in the kitchen, some meters distant from the main residence, at an evening meal. About eight children and five grandchildren thus escaped along with other family members. 

November 23, 2002– FAA soldiers, stationed in Necuto commune prevented trade in the local market and occupied it, as a form of cutting off a possible source of supply to the FLEC. They thus imposed hunger as mechanism of applying pressure on the population. In the area of the great Maiombe forest, that covers the municipalities of Belize and Buco-Zau, the main staging area of the military actions, FAA soldiers are destroying the plantain plantations, the staple food for local populations. Farms also have the same fate, thereby generalizing, and the hunger in the area, which decimates particularly the children and the elderly.

November 11, 2002 – A group of six commandos forcibly took over the market of the municipality of Belize. In the armed attack, they took with them two radio-cassettes, bottles of wine, clothes, batteries and ointments. Beforehand, they beat the vendor Evelina and, at gunpoint, they emptied the pockets of the youth Bungo, who had 200 kwanzas on him, the equivalent of less than 4 dollars.

November 09, 2002 – A military group, of an unknown number, forced dozens of men, women and children, in a raid on Ntunga and Mandarin, municipality of Cacongo, to cut bunches of plantain (type of banana), from the surrounding plantations, and to carry them on their backs, to their posts, as part of their logistical supplies. On the other hand, the military burned all the canoes of the population that live on the banks of Lake Massabi, as well as all the fishing nets.

Before the major offensive currently in progress by the government forces, numerous villages were already uninhabited, in all the municipalities, such as Tali-Vista, Tali-Cuma, Tali-Beca, Zalangó, Prato, Chingundo and Nguelezo, in the municipality of Cabinda; Kissungo, Tando Massele, Tshaka, Viede, Mazinga, Bata Kango, Thanga, Keba Diela, Midumba, Bukongo, Diladi, Bata Kango, Masinga, Kingubi and M’bata Kingubi in the municipality of Belize, in addition to another twenty-four villages in the area of Miconje, off the main road. Many more villages have been destroyed, some repeatedly. The villages that are still inhabited live very precariously, the villagers have their scant belongings wrapped up and they are always ready to flee, at any sign of a serious threat.

October 24, 2002 – FAA burned three houses, a chapel of the Catholic Church, under responsibility of Fr. João de Brito Maiamba, in a raid carried out on the village of the Toma, in the Necuto commune.

October 17, 2002 – Joana Nzuzi, 52 years old, mother of seven children, was beaten in the military unit stationed on the Ranch, Ganda-Cango, along with five other farming women. Their crime: they went to the fields without military authorization. From 10H00 to 19H00 they suffered the worst instincts of the military from that unit. They were released without the cassava, firewood and other foodstuffs they had collected.

August 24, 2002 – FAA soldiers, from the Ntó Brigade, attacked the residences of the village of Fortaleza, in retaliation for the death of one of their colleagues, run over by a car. For thirty minutes, the military fired off rounds incessantly, dispersing the villagers and, consequently, looted the belonging of the population.

October 22, 1999 – As a consequence for an attack by the guerrillas, the population of Mbata Lemba’s village was looted and all their houses were burned. The villagers were displaced empty handed.

January 05, 1999 – FAA soldiers, in retaliation for a surprise attack by the guerrillas on their position, burned 31 houses and looted all the belongings from the population, in the village of Benfica, municipality of Buco-Zau. The village was left uninhabited.

December 04, 1998 – Thirty-eight houses were plundered and burned to the ground in the village of Chapa. Eight oxen were killed and all the population’s worthy belongings. The population fled the village due to the rages of the military, stationed in the Dinge base.

April 13, 1998 – FAA soldiers burned all the houses from the village of Sassa-Zau Velho, municipality of Buco-Zau as a punishment for the killing of three soldiers in a guerrilla attack in the vicinity.

January 16, 1998 – Government forces plundered and burned eighteen houses in the village of Vitu, municipality of Buco-Zau. 

January 06, 1998– In the aftermath of a military mutiny, in a FAA garrison, soldiers went on rampage to plunder the village of Fortaleza. Dozens of houses were burned and Priest Pedro Sevo was threatened with death, in presence of a Sister of Mercy and several ladies that were traveling in his vehicle.

- CASE No. 30 -

29 August 2006 – A man of 19 year of age was shot dead in the village of Buco Zau, Cabinda on the 29 of August 209 because he went to the toilet which is located on the side of his house.

- CASE No. 31 -

Cabinda: Mpalabanda Human rights organization banned

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Public Statement AI Index: AFR 12/006/2006 (Public) News Service No: 203 4 August 2006

Amnesty International is gravely concerned about the ban of Mpalabanda (Associação Cívica de Cabinda), a human rights organization operating in Cabinda.

In a case instituted by the MPLA Regime against Mpalabanda, the Provincial Court of Cabinda ruled on Thursday 20 July that Mpalabanda should be banned. Mpalabanda is appealing against the decision, which was apparently based on the Law of Associations of May 1991 (Lei das Assosiações de Maio de 1991).

Mpalabanda is the only human rights organization operating in the province of Cabinda. Amnesty International considers its members to be human rights defenders. The organization has been involved in the documentation of human rights violations committed by both the government and members of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC). Its closure will leave Cabinda, an area rife with egregious violations of human rights, without a human rights organisation to monitor and record violations of human rights.

Amnesty International is particularly concerned about the effect of the court ruling on Mpalabanda’s and human rights defenders’ freedoms of association and expression, and consequently, their ability to carry out human rights monitoring and evaluation. These freedoms are contained in the Constitution of Angola, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Angola is a party. Under international human rights law, no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of the right to freedom of association, other than those prescribed by law and strictly necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, public order, public health and morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others.

Amnesty International calls upon the MPLA Regime to respect and protect the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and expression.

In addition the organization urges the government to fulfil the principles contained in the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This Declaration recognizes the right of all, individually and in association with others, to promote and strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international level.

Background Mpalabanda was created in July 2003 in terms of the Law of Associations of May 1991 (Lei das Assosiações de Maio de 1991) and was officially registered in December 2003. In March 2004 the organization was allowed to hold its first meeting after two consecutive refusals by the provincial government to allow a meeting to take place. Since then it has been refused permission on several occasions to hold meetings and marches to commemorate Cabinda Day.

In 2004 FLEC, the Catholic Church, and Mpalabanda set up the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (Forum Cabindese para o Dialogo, FDC) to enter into dialogue with the MPLA Regime for peace in Cabinda.

According to reports, on Monday 19 June 2006, Agostinho Chicaia the president of Mpalabanda was summoned to court (tribunal da comarca de Cabinda) where he was issued with a copy of a government application to ban Mpalabanda. The application alleged that Mpalabanda incited violence and hatred. It also accused Mpalabanda of carrying out political activities rather than being a civil society organization. The organization was given ten days to submit a responding affidavit, which it submitted within the given time.

On Thursday 20 July the Court decided to ban the organization. Mpalabanda was informed of this decision on Monday 24 July.

There is no mention in the judgement that Mpalabanda promoted violence and hatred. Nor were any of the cited witnesses called to give evidence to this effect.

- CASE No. 32 -

Human Right Violations during 2004 committed by the MPLA Regime

List of Torture, Persecutions, Assassinations and Rape in Cabinda during the year 2004

Full report on Human Right Violations in Cabinda committed by the MPLA unelected Regime in 2004 in PDF

- CASE No. 33 -

Human Right Violations during 2005 committed by the MPLA Regime

List of Torture, Persecutions, Assassinations and Rape in Cabinda during the year 2005

Full report on Human Right Violations in Cabinda committed by the MPLA unelected Regime in 2005 in PDF

- CASE No. 34 -

Human Right Violations during 2006 committed by the MPLA Regime

List of Torture, Persecutions, Assassinations and Rape in Cabinda during the year 2006

Full report on Human Right Violations in Cabinda committed by the MPLA unelected Regime in 2006 in PDF

- CASE No. 35 -

Military Detention, Torture, and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda 2009

Persons Arrested in Rural Areas, Abuses by the MPLA Armed Forces Arbitrary Arrests Incommunicado Detention Torture in Military Custody, Violations of Due Process Rights in Cabinda during the year 2009

Full Report on Human Rights Violations in Cabinda by the occupying MPLA unelected Regime in 2009 in PDF

 

Osama Bin Laden Deceased a Military Explanation. US. Army.

A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency

NEW CONFLICT, OUTDATED STRATEGY?

Efforts to the U.S. Government launched Operation ENDURING FREE- DOM reaped Osama Bin LAden, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in response to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and in alliance with various nations. Many other nations objected to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussayn’s region did not, in their views, pose a credible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat as was claimed at the time, and because they believed that American dismantlement and occupation of Iraq would surely be interpreted as neocolonialist interventionism. Indeed, Islamist extremists labeled these as Crusader campaigns, capitalizing on the preexisting understanding of neocolonialism and fear of Western antipathy to Islam. In March 2003, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt predicted that the American-led war on Iraq would create “one hundred new bin Ladens.”1

The mushrooming of Islamist-extremist movements predates the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, emerging from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. Prior to 9/11, certain academic and security experts from within the region predicted continuing Islamist threats and further development of the broad-based Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, and beyond, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America. However, local security services, police, and the military in Muslim and Middle Eastern states, including Israel, had been engaged in the containment of Islamist radicals. Their governments pursued two basic strategies, including mass arrests and judicial processes, assassinations, and repression on the one hand, or co-optation and political bargains on the other.

Islamist extremism predated 9/11. The United States had developed policies against terrorist groups, including Islamist extremist organizations earlier, but 9/11 created an impetus and urgency for a more successful strategy of opposition to these groups. One could argue that America has not met its most important goals in the GWOT, as it has been defined since 9/11, in terms of denying sanctuary to terrorists, preventing further violence, and diminishing the growth of extremists. One might further argue that constraining factors are U.S. dependence on allied paramilitaries and militaries that carry primary responsibility in counterterrorist activities, for instance, in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other nations; and that the irregular nature of the combatants stymies our own military approach, or it is unsuited to what is essentially a police/security services issue. But the problem is deeper because of certain assumptions that fund various efforts the United States has made in the hopes of destroying or diminishing violent extremism.

Certain miscalculations, preventable or not, are now part of the calculus of battle with insurgents in Iraq. Here the U.S. understand- ing of extremist leadership and strategic communications of the Islamists may indicate the nature of battles to come. There is some disagreement about how badly the effort is going, and many hope that the establishment of democratic institutions in Iraq, along with the will of the majority of the Iraqi people, will help turn the tide against the insurgents. At the time of this writing, a high price has been paid. In 2005, the U.S. military launched counterinsurgent operations in Najaf, Fallujah, Mosul, Qaim, and Karabila near the Syrian border, but the frequency of insurgent attacks, particularly suicide bombings, increased from 69 in April to 90 in May 2005, and even more in June (killing more than 1,350 from April 28 to the end of June). Coalition deaths were 52 for April, 88 for May, and 83 for June, while 199 Iraqi military and police died in April, 270 in May, 296 in June, and 125 by mid-July. By October 25, 2005, 2,000 American troops had been killed in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared a war on Iraqi Shi`a in August and September of 2005. No one really knows how many Iraqi civilians have died since the initial invasion; the Iraq Body Count and Oxford Research Group reported 25,000 Iraqi deaths since March 2003 in a dossier released in July 2005, but the Iraqi government disputed some aspects of the report. We do know that, due to the insurgency, about 12,000 Iraqi civilians have perished over the 18 months up to July 2005, a rate of about 20 people per day. According to data provided by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, this amounts to about 800 Iraqi civilians, military, and police deaths per month, not counting deaths during U.S. military operations or those in the Kurdish areas.2 Previous data indicate that the largest number of victims have been Shi`i Iraqis,3 and more Shi’i mosques or clerics were reportedly attacked than others, but Kameran Qaradaghi, a spokesperson for the Iraqi president, commented that the interior ministry’s data show that civilians of all types and ages are targets, and he denigrated the notion of “honest resistance.”4 This exceeds the frequency of attacks carried out by Palestinians in the tense 2001-03 period of the al-Aqsa intifadha. In addition, recent attacks in Iraq have featured larger bombs, which have been increasingly lethal.5 Although some officials depicted the insurgency as waning, June, July, and August featured many brutal attacks. General Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated on July 21, 2005, that the attacks on U.S. troops were increasingly lethal and that assassinations of Iraqi officials had mounted.6 Attacks on Iraqi civilians are polarizing because they exacerbate sectarianism, and those on police and military recruits constrain U.S. efforts to speedily build up Iraqi military and police capacity. It is important to note that the insurgency, in both Islamist and nationalist aspects, is not an isolated phenomenon restricted to Iraq; it is part of a trend. We can call this a bi- or tri-regional, or even a global, insurgency. Even if one would not go that far, suicide attacks in Egypt in October 2004, and April and July 2005 are certainly ominous; as are continuing attacks in Afghanistan; the bombings in London on July 7, 2005, and the attempted bombings on July 21, 2005; multiple bombings in Bangladesh; and many other incidents. Both the “local” and the global nature of the threat should alarm the United States and its allies in the GWOT. Consider just a few of the major attacks launched since 2001:

• a suicide attack in April 2002 at a Tunisian synagogue killed 19 people.

• the bombing of a Bali nightclub packed with foreigners in October 2002. On October 1, 2005, three suicide bombers attacked three restaurants, killing 20.

• five suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003.

• bombings in front of two Turkish synagogues in November 2003 that killed 20 and wounded 300.

• Al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)’s violent attacks and bombings in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2004 including a beheading, and one attack launched on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah.

• a bombing at the Australian embassy in Djakarta in 2004.

• violence and bombings from January 2004 through May 2005 in southern Thailand.

• attacks on Shi`a mosques and Ashura celebrations in Iraq and Pakistan.

• bombing of early-morning commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004.

• the October 2004 hotel bombing at Taba, close to Eilat in the Sinai.

• bombings in December of 2004 in General Santos and February 2005 bombings in Manila by Abu Sayyaf.

• a March 2005 car-bombing in Doha, Qatar, in Yemen.

• the Shabab al-Mu’minun’s (an Islamist extremist group) clashes with the Yemeni government through 2004 and again from March to May 2005. Also Yemeni al-Qa’ida members who surfaced elsewhere in the Peninsula. Yemen had already faced a strong challenge from insurgent cleric Shaykh al- Houthi and killed him, but in the spring of 2005 followers of al-Houthi’s father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, mounted attacks.

• British-born Muslims from Leeds attack the London under- ground and a bus killing 37 and injuring more than 700 on July 7, 2005. These were followed by foiled attacks on July 21 in London by a different set of terrorists.

• 3 bombs in Sharm al-Shaykh are set off also in July 2005 at a resort town in Egypt’s Sinai peninsula which killed more than 88 people and injured more than 200.

• Just a few of the many attacks in Iraq included a bombing near a propane fuel tanker on July 16, 2005, south of Baghdad that resulted in a huge explosion, killing more than 60 and wounding more than 100; a fuel truck bomb on July 17, killed 98 people south of Baghdad, just as car bombs were also detonated in the Iraqi capital; insurgents killed Iraqi soldiers guarding a water plant north of Baghdad, as well as Algerian diplomatic staff members on July 27, and then attacked a train oil tanker. A suicide bomb attack was followed by the killing of new recruits to the Iraqi Army on July 29, and the next day two British private security agents were killed after an attack on a convoy in Basra; journalist Steve Vincent, who had been reporting on Basra police involvement in assassinations there, was kidnapped and assassinated on August 2; the next day a powerful improvised explosive device (IED) made out of three bombs put together killed 14 Marines and their translator in an amphibious assault vehicle near Haditha; Arab diplomats and embassy staff were kidnapped and assassinated, and al- Qaeda announced it would try victims in an Islamic court; 182 people were killed in a series of attacks in Baghdad in September 2005.

• 200 homemade bombs exploded at government buildings, courts, and in the streets in at least 60 different towns and cities of Bangladesh following Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s departure on August 17, 2005, for China.

• 62 people died and more than 200 were injured in a triple bombing in Delhi, India, on October 29, 2005. Islamic militants are suspected.

• Three Christian teenage girls were beheaded in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. Their bodies were discovered on October 29, 2005.

During the same post-9/11 time frame, Islamist suicide bombers were less active in Israel in response to a changing political situation and uneasy truce, but inter-Palestinian conflict increased the public’s trust in Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah as compared to the Palestinian Authority (PA). In the tumultuous period prior to the 2005 Gazan disengagement, the “secular” al-Aqsa Brigade fighters somewhat paradoxically claimed they would go to Iraq as mujahidin if only they could, since they are being repressed by the Authority.7

The Iraqi insurgents increasing use of car bombs, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and beheadings, and the fact that they have begun targeting foreign diplomats and diplomatic staff points to their efforts to heighten jihad before Iraqi stabilization can dismantle their latest sanctuary. There are a large number of extremist groups, and each has gone through transitions over the last 2 years. The significance of Abu Mus`ab Zarqawi’s group’s Jama`at al-Jihad wa al-Tawhid (the Group of Jihad and Unicity8) adoption of a new name, Tanzim Qa’ida Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Qa’ida Organization of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers) was that Zarqawi swore loyalty (the bay`a) to Usama bin Ladin. Bin Ladin constructed a unique oath as follows:

I recall the commitment to God, in order to listen to and obey my superiors, who are accomplishing this task with energy, difficulty, and giving of self, and in order that God may protect us so God’s words are the highest and his region victorious.9

Zarqawi then entered a second tier of bin Ladin’s lieutenants. By this linkage of Iraqi groups to bin Ladin, Islamist extremists were proclaiming to the world that the United States might have driven the Taliban into the Afghan hinterland and dismantled the government of Saddam Husayn, but they would wage jihad wherever possible. And they will do so until their deaths and beyond.

It goes without saying that we should distinguish those groups and individuals who have perverted Islamic principles from ordinary Muslims. On the other hand, it will not aid us to apply a universal strategy to all extremists and insurgents, or to forgo critical assessments of outcomes over time. And there is no unified or universal goal for all extremists, whereas Islamist extremists do assert similar aims. For instance, we commonly hear experts state that the goal of terrorism is to terrify. But Islamist extremists aim for much more: withdrawal of Western forces and even businesses from Iraq, Palestine, and the “land of Muhammad,” meaning Saudi Arabia; the dissolution of secular governments in the Muslim world, and transformation of Muslim societies, cleansing them of doctrinal innovation. All of this is to occur through the waging of jihad.

Young fighters, in particular, exhibit certain individual and organizational characteristics found in gang cultures. But can we apply the same anti-gang tactics developed elsewhere in the world by penetrating schools, neighborhoods, and families? These young men, for the most part, will accept no pay-off. Co-optation aimed at the leadership level might be a temporary solution. However, jihadist leaders often compete with moderate groups who believe that building a broad popular base is the first order of business and work with secularist governments if they need to. Extremists have usually avoided cooperation with secularist governments, fearing they will taint their jihadist image. These fighters use the term al-qa’idin (the sedentary folk) to ridicule and condemn those who will not adopt jihad. They recruit and are recruited through a belief in a recently- defined Islamic mission, or da`wa, and the glorification of jihad and martyrdom. We must not discount their ideological motivation, their recruiting talents, and ability to sustain morale, or we will not defeat them. While we have spoken often of encouraging the forces of moderate, conservative, or even liberal Islam to compete with the extremists, we need to remember that previous efforts of this sort on the part of Arab and Muslim governments did take place. Those efforts established a tension between authoritarian, Big Brother-like states and mobilization efforts by ordinary members of society.

Around the time that most Egyptian Islamists crafted a deal with their government forswearing violence in the wake of the 1997 Luxor attack on tourists, many academics were emphasizing the moderate potential of Islamism. Co-optation seemed a strategy preferable to repression. Certain French experts claimed that radical and political Islam had decreased, although it would be more true to say that despite ongoing Islamization (in places like Pakistan, Egypt, Lebanon, Nigeria, and the Kelantan province of Malaysia), Islamists had not achieved their political goals. A host of “Islamic Republics” like Iran had not emerged. One could point to Afghanistan or Sudan, but certainly no caliphate.

How could these individuals support a thesis of “post-Islamism” after 9/11? Giles Kepel, a French specialist on Islamist extremism in this camp, argues that 9/11 was merely an end-stage paroxysm, part of the death throes of radicalism.10 This may be similar to current American claims that Iraqi insurgents are in their last throes of violence, for if jihad is transported from Iraq to other locations, the GWOT will continue. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Porter Goss pointed out that “Al-Qaida is only one facet of the threat from a broader Sunni jihadist movement” and that “the Iraq conflict, while not a cause of extremism, has become a cause for extremists” and that economic development there has proceeded more slowly than hoped because of the insurgency.11

In the last 4 years, nonregionalists primarily responsible for the remapping of counterterrorism moved the discussion of Islamist threats away from regionalist oversight. This meant that more individuals with little in-depth knowledge of the area’s complex religio-political, ideological, or cultural history were in charge of developing strategies toward it. They brought in experts, or individuals from the region, but had no ability to discriminate between the different suggestions made or views proffered. Other difficulties arose because of the contradictions between the strategies of nation- and democracy-building and the need to destroy or contain Islamist cells and organizations that may directly threaten Americans and as American interests in the region, as well as allied governments.

Current U.S. grand strategy toward terror is hampered by disagreements about the definitions of global “terror” and the failure to address the specific nature of Islamist-extremist terror in that strategy. In other words, our analysis of the conflict and the defini- tions of the enemy are unclear and remain so. This is true of many governmental agencies, and the media as well. In the wake of the London bombings, Fox News correspondents blasted the BBC for removing the term “terrorist” from their coverage. Others are still debating the conversion of the term “terror” to “insurgency.” Next came a disagreement about converting the phrase “war on terror” to the “struggle with extremism.”12 To some degree, the urgent need for a response to a continuing threat is clouding our vision and statements. Al-Qa’ida’s 2001 attacks were vivid declarations of a state of warfare, just like the attack on the USS Cole, unfortunately misread by some. But they were also the logical progression of jihadist efforts underway for nearly 3 decades. Since regional governments tried various tactics which we now mirror (from expulsion to combat, and incarceration to amnesties), we need to review their failures, understand where we may be reinventing the wheel, and build a strategy should we be unable to contain extremist Islamism.

The lessons of regional strategies are confusing precisely because the proponents of the carrot or stick tend to abide by their preferred method despite the incomplete success or outright failure of both strategies. And other political processes and Islamization were affecting these nations simultaneously. Middle Eastern and Muslim governments often tried to contain Islamists simultaneously while some elements in the military apparently colluded with or made little effort to capture militant Islamists, as in Western Pakistan. Elsewhere (for instance, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) one could observe security and governmental agents simultaneously torturing, excluding, and radicalizing some Islamists, while being influenced by other Islamists who had become part of the government structure. Another strategy is to recognize certain Islamist parties or groups as legitimate political actors (Lebanon, Iraq). Or governments (like Saudi Arabia’s) alienated and eliminated radicals but communicated with neo-salafists who forswore violence and cooperated with the state. Nonetheless, no effort was made to transform their core values, which are not much different from the radical extremists (Saudi Arabia). Or militaries and intelligence services like the Israelis targeted political leaders since military apparatuses of the radical groups were less vulnerable. They have discounted the possibility of negotiating with Islamist moderates to promote a transition of Palestinian Islamists from opposition to moderate political actors. In Iraq, our military has targeted particular locations in wipe-out mode, while seeking throughout the country to limit sanctuary. But in fact, the militants’ strategy has been so successful that Americans and foreigners cannot venture anywhere without being in a position of strength or without protection.

A NEW JIHAD

Why has Islamist extremism been so pervasive, so easily franchised, and so difficult to extinguish? A new Islamist discourse, produced by the Islamic awakening (sahwa Islamiyya) since the 1970s, has influenced and been influenced by a “new jihad,” which has coalesced and evolved since the mid-1980s and 1990s. The new jihad, in turn, qualitatively has affected the capabilities of extremist leaders and the behavior of combatants.

What’s New about the New Jihad?

It posits a World Islamic Front, promoting and aggrandizing battle against Western nations and local “apostate” governments, without sparing civilians. Members of this Front may appear at will, as they did in carrying out the London bombings. No-one need carry a card, or provide the authorities with recordings of cellular telephone calls to Afghanistan or Pakistan; instead, as one longtime resident of the bombers Leeds’ neighborhood stated, “they need to understand, al-Qa’ida is inside [in the heart].”

It is malleable and opportunistic, utilizing new types of alliances. Groups who aim at the “far enemy” (the United States, other Western nations, and Israel) may ally with groups seeking local autonomy, or with moderates.

It is not anti-modern. Such a large body of literature may now be cited to support this claim that it would be impossible to discuss or enlist all of the sources.13 On the sociological and psychological levels, Farida Adelkhah has described “the new Islamic man,” and I have written about “the new Islamic woman,” which helps explain the internalization of the Islamist message.14 Earlier, in the wake of the Islamic revolution in Iran, some experts chose to emphasize Islamists’ echoes of pre-modern themes such as the medieval scholar, Ibn Taymiyya, who disliked a Muslim ruler’s cooperation with the Mongol conquerors.15 But Ibn Taymiyya was far more tolerant in many ways than those Islamists who emerged in the 1960s, like Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, and those of 1970s to be discussed below. We need to remember that analysts at that time were trying to explain social features that had not yet transformed under modernization along with anti-Westernism. Remember, too, anti-Westernism is not equivalent to anti-modernism.

Other reasons for common mischaracterization of jihadis as barbarians with cars and Websites, throwbacks, or medieval monsters have to do with 1) certain non-Muslims’ (and even some Muslims’) difficulty in comprehending the historicity of the Islamist message which is also revisionist, and expressed in truly modernist language; 2) most Westerners have defined modernity with a secularist lexicon as have many liberal Muslims; 3) some rely on “cultural” definitions of the “Other” that incorrectly posit them as purely non-Western, when most are hybrid. We can see quite clearly that today’s jihadists are Western trained and possess technical and analytical skills. They use the Internet, cellular messaging, chat rooms and e-linked faxes more adeptly than larger organizations with physical recruitment centers. The pathologizing of terrorism causes us to say that their minds “work differently” than ours-when the issue is really one of different values and disassociative techniques. In other words, the jihadi believes, or convinces himself, that his immoral acts of violence are moral, but this in no way impairs the modern logic patterns of his brain.

The new jihad has broken with classical doctrines of jihad and “the law of nations” (siyar) as well as Muslim modernist or reformers’ reconstructions of jihad in the 19th and 20th centuries. The classical doctrines of jihad specified the most permissable form to be between Muslims and polytheists or unbelievers waged “in the path of God,” although jihad could also be conducted against apostates, Muslims who had rejected their faith, revolutionaries, brigands or deserters, and in some cases, members of other monotheistic faiths. However, strict rules applied to jihad; under the siyar, the Muslim “nation” might be an individual duty as opposed to a collective duty, and was differently governed if it applied to land controlled by Muslims or non-Muslims.16 Ethics and rules of conduct were meant to limit brutality and the cycles of vengeance it could unleash, and yet we see today’s jihadis engaged in vicious kidnappings, beheadings, and wide-scale attacks on civilians that would be forbidden under classical understandings of jihad.

The modernist or reformer’s approaches to jihad were developed with a cognizance of the military and political upper-hand of the West. They sought to limit the rationale for jihad (for instance, only when one was prevented from carrying out the duties [or pillars] of Islam) or to redefine it in terms of the lesser (military) and greater (personal striving or goal-setting) jihad, or to provide substitutes for fighting such as economic support, or charity.

An Islamist explains:

Muslim scholars “capitulated” to Orientalist (Western) critiques and falsified facts in order to say “Now, [jihad] is not obligatory anymore, since the cause has disappeared. We hold that jihad has no other aim than defense of our lives and the country we live in.”17

Wahhabism, the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states, decried this “demotion” of jihad’s importance, as did the extremist Islamists. So a central feature of the new “jihad” is that it is a consistent duty and was incapable of being bounded via a peace treaty as was true of the classical definition.

It is fostered through a different approach to acquired knowledge; tarbiyya more than ta`lim. Ta`lim means education in the sense of enlightenment. Tarbiyya involves training and socialization, and, for militants, military information, strategy, rationalizations for violence, and a construction and glorification of jihad and jihadi history.

It rejects democracy and democratic institutions because they promote or allow secularism, and are usually defined by Western sources to mean more than pluralism and representative government, which Islamists may not, in fact, reject. The problem with democracy for Islamists is that it provides an alternative to Islamic governance which should, ideally, be conducted via shura, or consultation. The fact that shura is similar to other forms of elite consultation, or to representative governance that advised monarchs or strong executive branches is the reason that many Muslims also can argue that Islam is not incompatible with democracy. Islamists on the other hand, argue that shura provides popular participation, but that pluralism or democracy are not innately Islamic.

Unfortunately the conflicting messages conveyed by U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Islamic world which include promotion of the GWOT, democratization, and maintenance of U.S. strategic goals actually has intensified the new jihad’s magnetic appeal to Muslims of varying backgrounds. The reasons for this stem in part from Muslim and Middle Eastern antipathy to foreign intervention. But also, in this age of instant information and interconnectivity, it is easy for them to see the myriad misinterpretations of their culture and religion, as well as the enormous hostility to Islam and Muslims on the part of Western commentators, whether on the worldwide web or in the media in nearly all reporting of events in the region, on the GWOT, and in discussions of security and immigration, both in Europe and the United States.

Muslims may desire representative government, and some may even support verbal interventions that will spur their governments to reform, but they may not prefer Western-style democracies or other political features. Or they may truly resent U.S. support for Israel and the seeming lack of stronger pressure on nondemocratic governments like Saudi Arabia or Syria to reform. Still others may dislike the arrogant tone of American statements about the necessity of reform, as if only our nation can determine the shape that reform can take.

Problems with Strategic Responses.

Many disagreements over the proper response to “al-Qa’ida and its affiliates” have taken place. Will they reshape the way the United States and other nations define irregular or asymmetric challenges? Certainly this shift in terminology prevailed after Islamist insurgents in Iraq sabotaged reconstruction efforts. U.S. Government spokespersons and the American media at first identified former Ba`thists or Iraqi nationalists as “the insurgents,” not mentioning or seemingly unaware of the Islamist insurgents at first. Cooperation between these three elements was another ominous feature of the situation. In devising a new strategy against terrorism, U.S. policymakers have prepared both too large and too restricted a canvas. Ignoring much of the knowledge previously acquired about Islamist extremists-the lessons learned in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel/Palestine, Algeria, Pakistan, and elsewhere, officials worked with the definition of terrorism as a “global” phenomenon. This definition did not take account of features that appeal or have special relevance for Muslims because, according to its articulation, terrorism could be identified with any religion or ideology.

But then, the specific efforts of intelligence, fact-finding, and analysis sought to highlight al-Qa’ida and its “network” or association as Enemy No. 1. By highlighting the differences between al-Qa’ida and world jihad networks and other organizations with more limited territorial objectives, the United States could more easily claim a strategic victory if bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida or any of a few groups thought to be directly connected to him were eliminated. This predominant approach is truly questionable for a number of reasons:

• First, all nations possess local, regional and international goals. The United States has, in fact, recently iterated bold new goals in the Muslim world which have caused Muslims to see a continuing and intensifying interventionism extending into the indefinite future.

For example, President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union message suggests that only the force of human freedom will “stop the rise of tyranny,” and that the United States must eliminate “the conditions that feed radicalism and the ideologies of murder.”18 In March 2005, he related this theme more specifically to the broader Middle East, parts of which have “been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism” and further suppressed through dictatorship. So not only the defeat of extremists, but a transition to free nations, which incidentally require the “full participation of women,” “new thinking,” the encouragement of democracy, economic progress, political modernization, honest representative government, the “rule of law,” and patience and resolve are needed to reach these ends.19

These are worthy goals, but they produce several question marks: 1) Who designated the United States as the ultimate authority determining the future of the broader Middle East? (Can we imagine a State of the Union delivered in Iran or Saudi Arabia that laid out specific goals for the transformation of America?) 2) Doesn’t this transformational strategy resemble the liberal and Western efforts against Arab socialism and nationalism, and the British as well as American approaches to communist influence in the broader Middle East in years past? 3) Where is the role of Islam in this anticipated Middle East? and 4) Would not democratization enlarge the role of Islamists in the region?

• Second, targeting a narrow list of groups such as al-Qa’ida, the Zarqawi network, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, al- Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula, and possibly the Jama’at Islamiyya of Indonesia excludes others who also oppose their home governments and the United States and engage in violence. Actually, many other organizations with local territorial or political goals share a great deal with al-Qa’ida and similar groups. They recruit and derive local support because people identify with certain themes, for example, freedom and justice that may be part of governmental rhetoric but which do not appear to be genuine values. Violent groups have and may continue to interact with moderates, or those not directly linked to al-Qa’ida. Both types derive support from the much broader Muslim awakening, or renovation20 that also features a new Islamic discourse.21

• The provision of a convenient hit list, like the post-invasion deck of cards representing Iraqi officials, or chart of Zarqawi’s captured or slain amirs, or QAP’s most wanted, underscores the successes of counterterrorism, and enhances the political fortunes of the successful anti-insurgent/extremist strategists. Unfortunately, the scorecard against radical actors does not reflect their regeneration or ability to appear in a new guise in an entirely different region. Nor do such targeting methods help us understand extremist “networks,” alliances, or associations that may merely be temporary unions, or marriages of convenience.22

The U.S. inabilityto properly analyze or construct effective strategies for the GWOT has many causes:

• For obvious reasons, large numbers of analysts and contractors have been drawn from Europeanist or Soviet studies backgrounds or a general security focus to an Islamic world focus. They lack necessary regional training, language skills, and requisite field experience. In addition, the Foreign Area Officer’s typical language skills are based on 1 or 2 years of Arabic language study and do not suffice for needed communications or intelligence skills. Because of geographical transfers and other reasons, 4-year programs may not be required. Even graduates of lengthier programs are not able to comprehend key material on the Defense Language examinations. Native speakers were not widely recruited, but when they are, it is frequently for work as contractors without specialized security policy knowledge; they may be drawn from any professional field. Lack of experience in the region outside the cocoon of the military base or embassy is an even greater deficit because analysts do not understand the worldviews shaping the actors and individuals they study.

• The United States most critically encountered the expansion in Islamist-terrorist capabilities in Iraq. There, the Coalition’s immediate needs-to rein in insurgents and pursue reconstruction simultaneously-left little time for deep reflection and careful analysis.

• Disagreements about the nature of the threat, as described above, confuse and misdirect policymakers. Also many, including some in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DOS), fault Islam or Islamic culture or the Islamic lack of development or reform, rather than Muslim miscreants for the explosion of Islamist extremism. This even though the U.S. National Security Strategy declares that “terrorism” can be anywhere and should be disassociated from the practice of Islam.23 The resulting confusion reflects ignorance of Islam, its discourse and history, and also political factors and divisions between factions. Some fear alienating the Muslim world and others have no such sensitivities; some also support or doubt the potential for socio-political transformation in the Muslim world.

• Similarly divided ideas on the future of Islamist extremism tended to sideline many experts who could shed more light on the problem, as with the example of those writing about post-Islamism-a term inspired by post-modernism and the “end of history,”24 or those who have studied the nature and development of salafist and other Islamist groups. This is not necessarily a conscious omission but a feature of the compartmentalization of disciplines and lack of time to “read outside the box,” as well as think there.

• Western and non-Western academics agreed that salafism and Islamism were transforming political and religious discourse even though local governments successfully had fended off the establishment of more formal Islamic governments in place of nation-states.

• Strategic and security studies have not truly internationalized. Western experts frequently have not been interested in, nor exposed themselves to the ideas of, their Middle Eastern or Muslim counterparts. As in any professional specialization, it seems more important to quote insiders to the policymaking world. Sometimes strong xenophobia results (as strong as anti-Americanism on the other side of the world); we hear “foreigners” blamed for an inefficient control over “their terrorists” that culminated in 9/11. Most often, though, specialists simply lack access to non-Anglophones and their ideas, which would be useful if, in fact, we hope to address the ideology of Islamist extremists.

• By the same token, in recommendations made in the policymaking community and DoD, ideas from Islamic ideology elicit great interest, but taken piecemeal and poorly understood, create a terrible goulash of ideas about the information war, a bewildering confusion of cultural, psychological, and political interpretations. One reason is that in following a directive to integrate more “cultural” awareness, “culture” is primarily defined as behavior, but sometimes, as ethnic, or historical, political, or sociological information, as well as religious concepts that are obtuse to outsiders. Another reason for this confusion is the understandable desire for the greatest possible amount of information to feed into data banks, but there is no sound plan for integration of that information into action-proposals, and no capacity to analyze potential negative effects of such proposals. For example, many suggestions have been made that Muslims must develop, or be taught (presumably by Westerners) a new kind of jihad. Some discuss ways to convert or secularize Muslims and whether or not a moderate form of Islam (not Islamism) exists. Notions that all Muslims would be attracted to a Caliphate, or that this is even a primary concern for Muslims, are similarly off target.

Understandable confusion about the nature and definitions of jihad come from modernist interpretations, mostly developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries of the so-called “greater” and “lesser” jihad as is explained later on in this monograph. Americans then suggest that if Muslims actually teach that the greater jihad consists of striving for Islam in the sense of being a good Muslim, why can’t they engage in that instead of fighting nonbelievers? This division is useful in a summary version of Islam as presented in an interfaith dialogue, or to explain to outsiders why jihad can mean more than “holy war.” However, it is, at heart, a modernist interpretation that has not been acceptable to many Muslims, and the notion of substitution of “greater” for “lesser” is not expressed in the classical treatises on jihad. Jim Guirard of TruthSpeak defines himself as an anti-al-Qaeda language warrior, arguing that writers should substitute criminal for the word “jihad” (like some Muslim governments) or, instead, substitute hiraba. Muslims have also discussed hiraba as a term that could describe acts of terrorism against the civilian public,25 but there are theological, philosophical, and legal problems with these suggestions that Muslims should not identify terrorist actions with jihad. “Hiraba” is a criminal category that is detailed in the Qur’an in “Al-Ma’idah, Surah V,” following the story of Adam’s two sons, Habil (Abel) and Qabil (Cain). Then after a verse (32) that is usually interpreted to refer to Israel’s rebellion against Allah, the punishment is described for a hiraba crime that combines sedition, apostasy, and brigandry.26 Hiraba is usually used to mean a crime that causes public disruption and involves theft of money or property, rape, or destruction of agriculture or animals. Jihad on the other hand, is fighting on the path of Allah.

The events of 9/11 were not the first surprise attack by extremist Muslims that caught experts short, and will not be the last. A similar moment of existential shock took place when Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran in 1979, and a barrage of hastily written literature about the Islamic threat, the failures of political development, and the future of political Islam was produced. In that case, the primary event was the fall of an ally, the Shah, and his replacement with a hostile theocracy. The Iranian revolution was a true revolution in the sense of a complete shift in the political order. Some have tried to diminish the role that Islamist ideology played in these events by pointing out that the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) did not defeat its more secular or socialist enemies immediately, but the fact remains that the revolution responded to Islamist ideology and organization. The secondary event, the seizure of American hostages, was more obviously a “terrorist” event. Analysts then documented the rise and spread of Islamist movements in Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf states; revived earlier analyses of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) founded in Egypt, or examined brief outbursts of violence such as the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. While few Islamic revolutions followed Iran’s (other than the coup in Sudan and the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, and an electoral shift in Turkey with the victory of the Refah [Welfare] party), Islamization and a new Islamic discourse have swept through the region.

The New Islamic Discourse.

Islamist discourse replaced or transformed Arab socialist or other Muslim-leftist values of mid-century all over the region, even in Syria, which supposedly had extinguished its Islamic movement with the massacre in Hama in February of 1982. Was Syria’s repressive strategy successful? Despite the dominance of the mass Ba`thi party system, any urban resident of Syria in the 1990s could identify Islamist groups operating quietly. But more importantly, Islamist groups have used Syria to plan and stage attacks elsewhere, and insurgents in Iraq have derived support and financial aid there.27 The Syrian government reported clashes with Tanzim Jund al- Sham lil-Jihad wa-al-Tawhid (Organization of the Army of Greater Syria for Jihad and Unicity) in Damascus.28 On the one hand, this demonstrates governmental efforts to control radicals, but also that they have indeed reemerged from, or despite the destruction of, the earlier Islamist uprising in Syria. Islamist discourse responds to an internal debate in the region expressed as a battle raging between `asala (authenticity, but not necessarily traditionalism) and mu`asara (modernity). The tenets of each vary according to the country and decade in question, but to summarize, local intellectuals hoped to retain the positive aspects of cultural authenticity but rid themselves of archaisms and backwardness. They worried about features of modernization that they could not control such as the breakdown of the extended family system, increasing income gaps, or partial or wholesale adoption of Western fads or habits that were at odds with local values. Thinkers engage today in this debate in the context of an era of privatization and more economic vulnerability to the world economy than under protective state economies of the past. They want to stave off a Big Mac/MTV/music and dance video culture, embraced by younger sectors of the population. They predict the breakdown of the family system now that many women have entered the workforce and obtained greater independence. Many moderates and Islamist extremists share the anti-materialist features of these ideas and other aspects of reformism, reinterpreting and renovating Islamic traditions and ideas.

But politics-international, regional and local-predicated responses to Islamists from power elites in the various countries affected. Extremists, moderates who are by no means secularists, and conservatives outnumber liberals. And liberals-even those dubbed Arab democrats-have problems with the questions of Islamic identity, or the great divide between their views and those of the sha`b (ordinary citizens) as we have seen in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Islamists have made tremendous gains whether through the weak democratization policies of Jordan or the Gulf, or where secular political movements faltered, as, for example, in the West Bank town of Qalqilliya. Qalqilliya was once a stronghold of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, one of the four parties of the PLO. Today the town is pro-Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Extremist leaders gain strength from elements of a new Islamic discourse, and they also contribute to it. At the most basic level, that is because their efforts to live more “Islamically” are in tandem with the aims of many other Muslims today, even though their efforts to swiftly revolutionize the social and political environment by violent means set them apart. The blurriness of this distinction is ignored somewhat by the policymaking and intelligence communities which have attempted to separate the “good Islam” from the “bad”-the extremists. One strategy (U.S. and foreign) has been to dub Islamist moderates with the “good” label, so long as these groups avoid or have forsworn violence. At the same time, they actually pathologize extremism without noting the relevance of certain themes in the strategies and tactics of the hundreds of Osamas now emerging to the broader Muslim awakening. This, along with negative reactions to foreign interventionism, cause some Muslims to sympathize with a bin Ladin, or a Zawahiri, or more often, simply fail to see them as “enemies.”

Part of the new Islamic discourse is devoted to the new jihad. The separation of personal striving to be a better Muslim, the so-called greater jihad, is stated in it, along with the re-energized necessity of the lesser jihad, or fighting. The new Islamist discourse calls for implementation of shari`a, Islamic law, the enhancement of Islamic morality and ethics, reinterpretation of Islamic texts, pursuit of da`wa, Islamic mission, and also, to various degrees, the Islamization of existing political systems. It opposes Darwin’s theory of evolution, and upholds complementarity of the sexes rather than symmetrical equality, and insists on Islamic modest dress for women. It may include ideas identified as Sufi in nature, such as the progressive stages of personal spiritual advancement, the utility of brotherhood and guidance (suhba, the spiritual companionship of the group-an experience provided by Islamist radical associations as well). Or it may counter Sufi precepts by emphasizing training and guidance (tarbiyya) versus enlightenment, and social responsibility rather than the highly individual pursuit of unity with God.

The new Islamist discourse can, and sometimes does, include the salafist ideal of purifying the faith from the effects of cultural synthesis, or “un-Islamic” innovations, but sometimes also incorporates suspect textual interpretations, for example, in the use of hadith (a secondary source for Islamic jurisprudence). Not all Islamists are salafis, another frequently misunderstood term in the current lexicon of U.S. policymakers. The word really means “purists”-those returning to the spirit of the early generation of Muslims, and today’s salafis are more and less than this term implies; also, not all salafis are engaged in violence.

European scholars had promoted the notion of post-Islamism-a term that, like post-modernity, posits a temporal and philosophical space where ideas have run dry or failed to realize their goal-in this case, an Islamic state. But 9/11 illustrated the ferocity of a group of individuals who do not believe that liberal democracy is the “end of history.”

Writing within the new Islamist discourse are others more inclusive in their perspectives. For example, Iranian `Abd al-Karim Soroush,29 a 60-year-old philosopher who is part of Iran’s pro- democracy movement and has challenged some of Khomeini’s ideas, considers the role of Islam beyond the Islamic revolution. Some emerge from anti-Islamist political systems, like Muhammad Sa`id Ramadan al-Buti of Syria who criticizes Wahhabism.30 Then, there is Moroccan Islamist `Abd al-Salam Yasin,31 who promotes aspects of mysticism. One could point to leaders of the well-established Muslim Brotherhood, such as the articulate `Isam al-`Aryan (Essam al-Eryan) of Egypt,32 or the Wasatiyun, a moderate party that broke away from the Brotherhood and has counterparts in Jordan, Kuwait, and elsewhere. On the popular, as well as the intellectual, level, Islamist discourse has been attracting a broad audience.

Take, for instance, the nonintellectual popularity of Egyptian televangelist `Amr Khaled, who calls his mission the appeal of the heart. Khaled markets a new Islam to the younger generation. He is the antithesis of a turbaned, robed cleric, appearing in natty business suits, and discussing issues relevant to his younger audience members. One of his slogans available on T-shirts is “I am a Maker not a Taker,” and his goal is an Islamic renaissance (nahda). He promotes a 12-step program towards Islam in his show, Lifemakers (Sunna` al-Hayat). So seductive was Khaled that he was dubbed a Rasputin and banned from preaching in Egypt in 2002. He moved back and forth from the UK to Lebanon, and back to the UK,33 and his fans now comprise other Arabs and immigrants to Europe as well as Egyptians.

Even Muslim modernists now express Islamism, or what some call neo-salafism, an updated, or more intense version of Sunni purist thought with political and religious aims. Some are more tolerant or critical than others. Fahmi Huwaydi, a journalist and Muslim thinker promotes pluralism and opposes the extremists because they do not.34 My point is that Muslims have new spokespersons, or heroes-and they are not necessarily scripturalist, or salafi, like the frequently described “fathers” of modern Islamism, Abu al-`Ala al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, or Sayyid Qutb or, on the Shi`a side, reinvigorated Ja`afari Islamists like Khomeini or `Ali Shari`ati. But neither are they secularists. To be a secularist today is to be considered religiously delinquent, and one cannot be an atheist or an agnostic in Muslim society as is quite possible in the West. The Arab and Muslim media therefore speak of liberals rather than secularists.

If the United States continues to promote secularism, in one form or another as the antidote to extremist or revivalist Islam, it will not reach hearts and minds. These new figures are calling for reinvigoration of Islam and its application throughout life through an activist agenda. They will not sit still while their governments order the construction of Western-style democracies (though democratiza- tion may grant them a new political role, they do not want a replication of Western features of democracy or the implementation of secularist aims). Both they and the extremists aim at establishment of a New Ummah (community of Muslims); the latter, however, believe that only jihad and the overthrowing of impious political leaders will prove effective in that aim.

ISLAMIST APPEAL

Extremist recruitment successes are due to forces that ideologi- cally attract or repel-factors that push the public away from other political movements or the state, and qualities that attract them to Islamist extremists. President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address and March 2005 speech on terrorism indicated that despair and tyranny are factors impelling ordinary Muslims toward such movements and away from other allegiances, and so democratization is called for.35

While this transformational sentiment is an admirable, if unusual, addition to U.S. foreign and national security policy, it might be more accurate to assent that despair and tyranny are recipes for many different types of disastrous situations. Yet, they are not the sole, or even the major, reasons impelling Muslims toward extremist Islamism. Despair can emerge from economic distress, but also from immobility, impotence in the face of state violence, lack of access or wasta (influence, mediation, an intermediary who can intervene for one), disgust with corrupt local leadership, impermeable elites, or state systems. It is true that Islamist groups have been sensitive to socioeconomic needs of their target populations and use these to their advantage-for instance in the Ikhwan’s response to the 1992 earthquakes in Cairo, assistance of $1000 to every homeless family.36 Such efforts parallel a broader rise of Islamically-oriented volunteerism in Egypt, and not all organizations are linked to any politically active group.37 Or one could note Hizbullah’s provision of electricity in Beirut in the early 1990s, hospitals there and in Ba`lbak, and private schools. Marriages are extremely expensive for populations with low wages; it is estimated that it takes 10 years for a man in Egypt to save for his wedding and all the related costs. Islamist groups around the region have met this social challenge actively by hosting group weddings and footing many of the expenses, such as in a recent wedding Hamas sponsored for 452 couples.38

The Palestinian party, Hamas, and the Lebanese Hizbullah recently have seen higher recruitment in the Palestinian territories as a result of their response to the scandals concerning the collection of prisoners’ pensions. Even after the two token releases of political prisoners, some 8,000 Palestinians remain incarcerated, and their families depend on small pensions of about $150 per month. Their female relatives have been harassed, or worse, when they try to collect these pensions, so these Islamist organizations intervened to provide assistance.39 Islamists, particularly moderate and well- organized groups like Hamas, are expected to do well at the polls in the West Bank. In Gaza, on the other hand, they resisted the Palestinian Authority (PA)’s efforts to exclude them from gains after the disengagement of August 14, 2005. The overall security situation has been plagued with infighting. The PA was unable and apparently unwilling to control the thuggish behavior (assaults, shakedowns, harassment) by some of the al-Aqsa Brigades, yet, to show its tough side, has imprisoned and even tortured Brigade members in Jericho.40 The future of the Brigades is uncertain; they may be absorbed into the PA security structure, but the PA is trying to isolate and destroy their more able leaders, while inciting and manipulating some of the above-mentioned thuggery. That causes more distrust of the PA, and siding with dependable or morally compelling organizations as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah are perceived to be.

Israeli strategies against these groups have ranged from “targeted elimination,” or assassinations to put pressure on the PA to rein them in, or their receiving no further concessions toward peace or withdrawal. In general, insistence on security before peace seems both impractical and to be dividing the Israeli and Palestinian populations among themselves, causing despair on the part of pro- peace individuals on each side of the Wall.41 This may imply that security might not be achievable in Iraq, and that a state of low-level battle with insurgents is likely to continue for some time.

The Israelis exiled members of Hamas, but that caused further radicalization. Hamas exiles in Lebanon were a public relations problem for the Israelis, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad already has shown its ability to operate from a Damascus base. Israelis also launched informational campaigns about the violence preached by Muslims which, in light of the overall discrimination against Arabs and Muslims in the country, only translated into greater Israeli distrust, yet little transformation of discourse. Israeli authorities closed Hamas’ charities, and the basic effect was that support was withdrawn from the most miserable sectors of the camp-dwelling Palestinians.42 Heightening public distress has not decreased the Islamist groups’ popularity, and there may be other ways that it has channeled assistance and funds.

In Egypt, at least two new radical cells emerged in the fall of 2004 and the spring of 2005.43 Meanwhile, the government’s violent and coercive responses to an indigenous democracy movement, as well as Muslim Brotherhood protests in May 2005, might encourage people to join one of the forms of political opposition available to them-liberal, Islamist, or extremist. Stringent counterterrorist measures that involve detention and torture, and which have been employed in Egypt, play a role in radicalizing those already involved in extremist movements. These measures cause the government to be viewed just as the extremists depict them; as anti-Islamic, those who suppress sincere Muslims.

Former Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda, an Iranian-American who grew up in the Arab world and remembered Islamist activists from his youth in Syria, characterizes militant Islamism as being “essentially a political movement, not a religious one,” that nonetheless will threaten the West and be “lethal to the Muslim world.”44 The problem is that other Muslims see Islamist insurgents quite differently, because religion and religious discourse can encompass political, social, and economic goals. Tony Blair, Francis Fukuyama, and others have made the same point-that extremists are not operating on a religious basis. That betrays a misunderstanding of Muslims’ holistic view of life; everything is religion, everything is Islam; financial, social, intellectual, theological, military, and political.

The basic principle, “Islam is religion and state” (Islam, din wa dawla), has been constrained by nation-states for some time. Also, Muslims generally are concerned with whether or not a person, action, or substance is Islamic, categorizing each as “allowed,” “forbidden,” or “neutral.” Which looks more Islamic: a party that aids prisoners’ families, or secularist party officials who are known to torture young militia members and siphon off party funds? Which looks more Islamic: radicals who claim that they will restore a Muslim way of life to Egypt’s rapidly changing environment, or government officials also associated with corruption and torture? Liberals, such as the followers of the Kifaya (Enough) democracy movement in Egypt, do not favor a religious state. Factions which support the PA, or at least accept its leadership more thoroughly than they support Islamist parties in Palestine are also pro-secular. But both are very small groups. The larger segments of these populations so fervently accept the principle of an Islamic state that any effort to distinguish between “religious” and “political” is fraught with difficulties. Such distinctions aren’t a useful way to delegitimize Islamists, or extremist Islamists.

ISLAMIST STRATEGIES

Martin Kramer, an Israeli-based authority on Middle Eastern politics, claimed that radical Islamists had an Achilles heel-their inability to cooperate with other actors.45 This general statement, made in the 1990s, is no longer accurate, if it ever was. Moderates, as well as extremists, formed useful alliances for themselves in Egypt, Lebanon, and now in Iraq. We could say that is due to the flexibility of their grand strategy (destroy, then rebuild a New Umma by whatever means are necessary). Specific factors of their historical experience, responses to local repression, forged their flexibility.

When Egyptian Islamists faced trial in that country, many fled, recruiting others to the jihad in Afghanistan and later Chechnya. They traversed various temporary sanctuaries: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or through the Western desert to Libya. The Saudi Arabian government argued its inability to contain Osama bin Ladin, though it stripped him of his citizenship. He traveled to the Sudan where he could continue to build his organization. All of the above helps explain networking, alliances of convenience, and franchising.

It also explains the futility of exiling extremists, as the Israelis tried with PIJ and Hamas. If Islamists lose ground in Iraq, some will melt back into society, and others will move on to Saudi Arabia, or Syria, or return to Egypt, the Sudan, and other points. Some already have tried moving back into Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states. Iraq has been the most important training ground to date for such fighters; their proficiency has increased there, although their numbers do not equal those of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. In other words, jihad leads only to more jihad.

Islamist leaders employ various strategies that enhance their ideological impact and transmit it to potential recruits. Some are the natural consequence of their worldview, shaped by various influences from their milieu, for example, the inclusion of various themes of Third Worldist ideology or Leninist notions about the development of the vanguard which provides a good fit for small groups with international aims. Their history of opposition also affected their tactics and strategies. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt created a secret apparatus (tanzim sirri) in the 1940s that carried out violent actions, including assassinations, because they were blocked from political advancement in other ways.46 Despite the MB’s evolution of a different strategy, creating a mass-base through education and gradual change, its secret apparatus served as a model for the radical Islamist groups emerging after the 1967 war.

Tactical decisions such as the selection of particular targets in preference to others, or the forging of alliances with groups not necessarily identical to the al-Qa’ida model, heighten groups’ malleability and abilities to survive. Thanks to movement, reconstitution, franchising, and the flexible aspects of their grand strategy, extremists replace themselves and benefit from the various alliances available to them. New Islamist-extremist leaders have been quite successful in constructing and defending their ideological authenticity. They have altered and elaborated certain themes, elevating their programs to a new level of sophistication. This strategic success is something of a paradox because these leaders of the next generation claim to be defending the “true jihad” which is, as are most ideas, a constantly evolving construction.

METAMORPHOSIS OF ISLAMIST LEADERS

Osama bin Ladin, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and other contemporary figures can be seen as reincarnations or avatars of earlier leaders of the 1970s and 1980s like Juhayman al- `Utaybi, Salah Siriyya, Shukri Mustafa, Muhammad abd al-Salam Farag, and Shaykh `Abdullah `Azzam. That means that the public and potential recruits identify with themes that have remained constant in these leaders’ messages-for example, the corruption of the current political order in the Muslim world. Yet they have contributed other newer themes to the discourse of jihad.

What may be learned from the experiences of earlier Islamist extremists? Salah Siriyya, a Palestinian agronomist who was an adherent of the Islamic Liberation Party originally established by Shaykh Nabahani in Palestine, infiltrated the Technical Military Academy in Egypt. His followers tried and failed to kill President Anwar Sadat there in 1974. His group’s effort was mirrored in a later successful assassination operation carried out by the Tanzim Jihad. Both attacks involved members of the Egyptian military, which has provided Egypt’s political leadership ever since the dissolution of the monarchy with the 1952 revolution of the Free Officers. Moreover, both parties continued to operate-the mother Islamic Liberation Party that spawned Siriyya’s Military Academy Group has gained strength in other areas ranging from Uzbekistan to London, where it could freely promote its aim of a caliphate and the cessation of the system of nation-states.47

Shukri Mustafa, another charismatic personality, led his followers in the Egyptian group, Takfir wa-l-Higrah, underground, describing their flight, or higrah, from jahiliyya (barbarism like that in the pre-Islamic era) as a necessary stage in jihad akin to the Prophet Muhammad’s (s.a.w.s.48) journey from Mecca. In 1977, they attacked Egypt’s fleshpots, nightclubs along Shari`a al-Haram, a playground for Arab tourists, and a few months later kidnapped the moderate, Muhammad adh-Dhahabi, a former Minister of Awqaf (Islamic Endowments), and held him for ransom. More than 400 members were arrested, and Mustafa was executed. He had broadened the scope of action for future radicals by challenging the Islamic nature of Egyptian society,49 targeting an exemplar of moderate Islam, and legitimating such attacks on agents of the state.

Juhayman al-`Utaybi, grandson of an Ikhwan warrior, challenged the guardianship of the Saudi royal family over Islam’s holy cities, Mecca and Medina-and by extension, their leadership in the Islamic world-when he took over the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979. The Saudis were in an even more uncomfortable position than Americans in Iraq who must respond to shelling from mosques, because there were many hostages taken, and a lengthy stand-off was only resolved with the aid of foreign forces. Al-`Utaybi actually did not claim leadership of his own movement but instead presented his followers with an historically-sanctioned leader, a mahdi-a guided one-his brother-in-law, al-Qahtani. In doing so, he provided a linkage to the rationale of Islamic purist movements of the past.50

Muhammad `abd al-Salam Farag, ideologue of the Egyptian Tanzim al-Gihad Islami (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) whose operative Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981, emphasized jihad as well, claiming that it was a sixth pillar of Islam, and the only acceptable means of its expression is armed struggle. Jihad cannot be avoided; it is an incumbent individual obligation like fasting during Ramadan. He employed a Trotskyesque concept (ironically similar to the notion of continuous revolution employed by the Ba`th Party both in Syria and Iraq), writing of a “continuous” or “perpetual struggle,” a never-ending jihad.51 He wrote that Muslims should wage jihad against the governments of all the modern Muslim states because their laws were created by infidels. Muslims should not work for, nor cooperate with, such governments nor join their armies.52

Shaykh `Abdullah `Azzam, who taught Osama bin Ladin, originally came from a Palestinian village near Jenin, moved around the Middle East from Jordan to Syria where he graduated from the University of Damascus, went from there to Egypt where he attended al-Azhar University, to Saudi Arabia, and from there to Pakistan. He inspired disciples with his strong personality and an uncompromising message. In one of his key tracts, he explains:

<quote>When a span of Muslim land is occupied, Jihad becomes individually obligatory (fard `ain) on the inhabitants of that piece of land. The woman may go out, without her husband’s permission, with a mahram, the one in debt without the permission of the one he owes, the child without his father’s permission. If the inhabitants of that area are not sufficient in number, fall short, or are [too] lazy [to wage jihad], the individually obligatory nature of jihad extends to those around them, and so on and so on until it covers the entire earth, being individually obligatory (fard `ayn) just like prayer, fasting, and the like so that nobody may abandon it.

The obligation of Jihad today remains fard `ayn (an individual obligation of a believer) until the liberation of the last piece of land which was in the hands of Muslims but has been occupied by the disbelievers.53

Foreign occupation or military presence on Muslim lands then becomes the most powerful argument for jihad, and one hinging on American foreign policy in the Middle East and the Muslim world. Azzam’s definition and prioritization of jihad is echoed by many other “Osamas,” such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who said from his Jakarta prison cell that martyrdom actions for jihad cannot be postponed for any reason, not even to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, or to visit sick parents-it “must be number one.”54

Azzam bolstered the new jihad through his mobilization efforts and, additionally, through his insistence that jihadists should confront the Western enemy and use Muslims in the West with all of their global connections. This encouragement to fight the far enemy has a direct relationship to the 9/11 attacks and to attacks on Westerners in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Spain, the Philippines, and London. But it should be understood that up to that point, jihadists were, and may still be, pragmatic. It is not that they eschewed attacks on the “far enemy,” since their analysis pinpointed the U.S. role in supporting the local governments that were battling or containing Islamists. The issue was simply a gauging of response. What kind of a response would a direct attack on Americans engender? If groups aimed at local sovereignty, it made little sense to elicit an American response, for example, to attacks on American tourists. What changed in those like `Azzam was the conviction that a heightened jihad must take precedence, and direct attacks would intensify the conflict between the West and Islam, illustrating the inevitability of jihad and martyrdom both to mujahidin, and other Muslims who might join them instead of moderate groups calling for reform.55

Just as al-Qa’ida capitalized on the new elements of jihad supplied by these leaders, current recruiters and leaders are amplifying them. Take, for instance, the leaders and operation planners for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ believes that Israel must be destroyed through jihad and that its own role in such a war is as a revolutionary vanguard.56 PIJ has utilized its resources judiciously, limiting the numbers of attacks mounted against Israelis, and these are generally effective. It recently rejected participation in a unity front proposed by President Mahmoud Abbas, as did Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.57 These three groups contested the PA’s insistence that it provide sole security in Gaza after Israeli withdrawal in August. Meanwhile, the Israelis announced that they intend to resume targeted “eliminations,” i.e., assassinations of PIJ figures.58

Ramadan Abdullah Shallah of the PIJ-who speaks Arabic, Hebrew, English, and even a little Yiddish-attended university in Zagazig, Egypt, and the University of Durham in the UK, where he established good connections with other Arab and Muslim students, and subsequently appeared in Tampa at a Muslim research institute, World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), established through the auspices of the University of Florida. Shallah’s doctoral thesis had focused on Islamic economics, and his efforts to meld political economy with Islamist thought runs parallel to efforts of earlier figures like Muhammad as-Siba’i, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Shallah, who has a sharp intellect,59 actually wielded some influence on the academic discourse about Islamist movements as the editor of Qira`at Siyasiya (Political Readings), the journal of WISE. By demonstrating to Arabic readers that American academics, like Louis Cantori, Richard Bulliet, Bernard Lewis or John Esposito, were treating Islamist ideas as manifestations of a broader intellectual phenomenon and placing their articles in Arabic translation alongside Islamist writings or interviews (with figures like Hasan Turabi, the Sudanese Islamist leader), the image of the Islamist movement and the notion of its inevitability grew. It should be noted that none of these academic collaborators knew Shallah would later assume the leadership of Islamic Jihad. So, one could see Shallah as a sleeper jihadist who tried his hand at influence via persuasion, prior to his assumption of leadership in a violent struggle.

Shallah has made claims, repeated by young jihadis, that Israel will never defeat human bombs, “not even by nuclear bombs,”60 emphasizing the indefatigable thirst for martyrdom, persistence, and inverse relationship of small operational cost to much larger effect that characterizes this strategy. Western analysts wrongly have pointed to suicide operations (jihadis insist these are martyrdom operations) as a mark of desperation, arguing that groups would only engage in such efforts when there is no other hope left to them. In fact, popular songs, children’s games, and public discourse shows that the linkage of martyrdom to suicide attacks is accepted by many individuals who see these actions as being “moral.” Jihadists further claim moral superiority when they say that their willingness to die expresses a type of commitment that Israelis and Americans lack.

FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO THE WORLD

Osama bin Ladin achieved infamy eclipsing Shallah’s through the attacks in the United States. He represents both the regionalization and, if you will, the globalization of the jihad effort. When he identified a key Muslim jihadist cause in Afghanistan, he created a regional nexus for fighters who then articulated goals in all parts of the world. His own avatars have now emerged, launching themselves into new arenas. So his capture or demise will not end the jihad. If bin Ladin is killed, he will remain a martyr, resistance hero, and popular icon forever, and the United States would do better to put him on trial- that should ideally be an international cooperative effort-filming him periodically in captivity, to diminish his allure, and minimize his inspiration to future generations of Osamas. This is in no way meant to diminish the justice owed to the families of 9/11 and other victims, but an observation about the process of martyrdom that needs to be kept in mind.

His distaste for Arab and Muslim governments is due to his idealistic pursuit of a new ummah, a purified Muslim society.61 He is battling for leadership of this society, and al-Qa’ida, as Michael Scheuer has pointed out, has been able to take advantage of U.S. ambitions and setbacks in the region to heighten tensions against the United States and the “apostate” governments.62 Unfortunately for the United States, many in the Muslim world admired bin Ladin and saw him as a sort of Robin Hood, rather than demonizing him. A recent survey shows that, although support for “Islamic extremism” generally has decreased, some in the region continue to admire bin Ladin.63 He stood for the defense of the Muslim world through jihad, creating a central cause and gathering place for mujahidin.

Now isolated somewhere in Pakistan or in rural Afghanistan, does he continue to attract adherents? The answer is that through his connections and financial wherewithal, and al-Qa’ida’s ideological influence over other groups, he exerts influence over other extremist- Islamist groups without necessarily making decisions for them. He and other key members of al-Qa’ida use familiar arguments-that local governments were oppressive and corrupt; anti-Islamic, or that they suppress true Muslims. And they argue that the most holy sites of Islam in Saudi Arabia are corrupted by the West and the Saudi royal family. Iraq, with its holy cities, is now occupied as well, and the holy sites in Jerusalem were seized by Israel, ally of the West, in 1967.

In the leadership of al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula, (QAP, al-Qa’ida fi Jazirat al-`Arabiyya) we perceive the methodology of Salah Siriyya’s underground organization and the cyber-expertise of many of today’s groups. This group self-franchised to al-Qa’ida, and after a series of bombings and attempted and successful attacks since May 2003, the Saudi security forces claimed they had crippled QAP and had nearly eliminated its leadership. QAP nevertheless published its web-magazine, Sawt al-Jihad, in 2004, and recruitment began anew. The web publication interviewed the late QAP leader, al-`Awfi, who denied that it was best to go fight in Iraq, rather than Saudi Arabia:

Your country, the Peninsula, is in greater need of your services. There are several borderlines here to protect. The enemy that you want to go to, those who are defaming the honors in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in Palestine, that enemy is here, amongst you. He is on your land, pillaging your religion and your treasures. It is the lawful duty of a Muslim to close the hole that is nearest to him. Clerics have agreed that, if an enemy occupies one of the Muslim countries, he needs to be pushed away from the nearest point, then the one after that.64

He also demeaned those neo-salafists participating in negotiations with the Saudi government. Since then, many Saudis have traveled to Iraq to fight. Israeli writer Rueven Paz contends that the largest portion of foreign fighters in Iraq are Saudis, but Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi analyst, disagrees. Saudi security forces contend that their antiterrorism campaign has diminished public support for the jihadists in their country. This campaign featured televised meetings in which religious officials spoke against extremism and huge billboards; for example, one in Riyadh with a depiction of bombing damage, reads poignantly, “My Country, Did You Do This?”65 In this conservative society, it is significant that a debate about Saudi Arabia’s role in inspiring acts of terrorism is taking place, though it is amid much discomfort about the incorrect labeling of Islam and Wahhabism itself.

Saudi officials at first reported that al-`Awfi was killed at al- Qassim in early April 2005, his body too badly burned to identify. But jihadi web-postings were scornful of this news, and a Saudi dissident claimed that the movement’s leader, Sa’ud al-`Utaybi, was killed then, not al-`Awfi,66 who may have taken part in the Jedda attack. This kind of uncertainty probably bolsters the insurgents. As this dissident pointed out, a general Saudi sentiment of support for jihad in Iraq could aid QAP, despite its losses over the last 2 years, especially if they were to shift their targets to the royal family, an idea supported by at least one faction within QAP.67 On August 18, 2005, Saudi authorities announced they had identified al-`Awfi as one of the militants they had killed in a raid on extremist hiding places in Medina.

U.S. policymakers and analysts have misunderstood the delineation between those in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere who are fighting the far and the near enemy. It is important to note an existing overlap and ability to shift from one target to another. They would be ill-advised to take their eyes off of this group, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, merely on the grounds that a small group aimed at the near enemy will not present a global challenge. Likewise, the argument that al-Qa’ida or Zarqawi are running out of steam68 is premature. While Saudis point to the successful elimination of many QAP leaders, they designated a new set of leaders to be targeted, and, if fighters return from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, a relatively small number might be quite dangerous, given the vulnerability of the country’s oil fields and of many areas in the larger cities, including public buildings.

AYMAN ZAWAHIRI AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose maternal grandfather was Shaykh Abdelwahhab Azzam, who became a dean at Cairo University and ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and whose father was deputy chair of the pharmacology department at Ain Shams University, also studied medicine and became a member of Islamic Jihad. Egyptians finally understood that, if upstanding families like the Azzams and Zawahiris could produce this militant leader, then the “enemy is within.”69 He spent 3 years in jail after Sadat’s death, then left for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, where he met Usama bin Ladin. His own and the organization’s hijrah (migration) from Egypt to Afghanistan transformed much of Gihad Islami (as pronounced in Egypt) into al-Qaida. Al-Zawahiri was not the only member of the group to achieve importance to al-Qai’da, certainly the late Muhammad Atta was a key combatant as well. Some claim that Zawahiri and bin Ladin are too busy fleeing for their lives to be of any importance in global jihad, and that Islamic Jihad, like al-Qa’ida, may be on the verge of extinction. Yet the group’s history illustrates its regenerative capacity, that not many militants are needed to cause havoc, and factionalized groups can join forces. In this case (some members came from other organizations such as Shabab Muhammad), EIJ was actually two different organizations-one founded by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (Farag, in Egypt), and the other founded by Muhammad Salim al-Rahal, a student of the Islamic al-Azhar University.

When Rahal was expelled from Egypt, Kamal al-Sayyid Habib, a young economics graduate of Cairo University, became the new leader. The two groups merged when Habib was introduced to Faraj by Tariq al-Zumur, whose brother-in law, a major in army intelligence, was the strategist of the Farag group. Various critics of extremist Islamists have maintained that, like other revolutionaries, they lack clear platforms, institutions, or programs, yet EIJ’s structure and training program was well-developed early on. The group was headed by a majlis al-shura (literally, council of consultation) with subcommittees for preparation, prograganda, and finances. Its goal was a state with a majlis al-shura and a council of `ulama, similar to Iran’s-not an amorphous caliphate. The group’s initial plan for an Islamic revolution mimicked the 1952 revolution in that it proposed the seizure of the Radio and Television building. Stage one of the training program included first aid, knowledge of topography, vehicle training, defense, and physical exercises. At stage two, techniques of attacks and ambushes and securing strategically crucial sites were introduced, as were proper use of weapons and explosives. Simulations were carried out in the third stage, supervised by Nabil al-Maghrabi.70

Islamic Jihad became widely known when Khalid al-Islambuli, a lieutenant in the Egyptian Army and EIJ member, assassinated President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981. In fact, EIJ leadership was not of one mind regarding Khalid Islambuli’s plan to assassinate Sadat. Abbud al-Zumur felt the organization required more time before it could lead a popular revolution,71 which was to have broken out following the assassination. Another later disagreement concerned the subsequent role of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, the supposed ideologue of the movement.

Once in court, al-Islambuli stated that he assassinated Sadat because Islamic law, the shari’a, was not being applied in Egypt because of the peace treaty with Israel and arrests of religious clerics without justification.72 He and other EIJ members expressed their opposition to corruption, robbery, embezzlement, and bribery-it was common knowledge that members of the government were involved in such activities, and the EIJ held that the Egyptian government enforced or encouraged the physical display of women (tabarruj al-nisa’).73

Many Egypt-watchers as well as analysts saw basic similarities between all of the Egyptian “jihad groups”-Takfir wa-l-Higrah, the Military Academy group, the Gama`at al-Islamiyya, and Islamic Jihad-in that they were militant and directly confrontational. They are enacting a commitment to jihad formulated by Sayyid Qutb and the notion of jihad as a sixth pillar. The idea that jihad was the absent, or neglected, requirement of Muslims was most fully iterated by Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Faraj. Actually, Faraj differentiates between the various “jihad groups” in his treatise, critiquing Takfir wa-l-Higrah and Gama`at Islamiyya, as well as the modernist rebuttal provided by then Shaykh al-Azhar, Jad al-Haqq, who wrote a defense of the government’s authority. Faraj’s main point is that jihad is obligatory. Fleeing jahillliya society in a hijra as Takfir wa- l-Higrah recommended, instead of taking up jihad, was religiously improper. But using da`wa (mission, proselytization of the correct Islam) to create a mass base like Gama`at al-Islamiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood and postponing jihad was also wrong; he argued that one cannot substitute “populism for jihad.”74 And furthermore, the nearest enemy is the Egyptian government, not Israel: only under true Muslims will Jerusalem be liberated. This last argument essentially distinguishes the Islamic Jihad from the Muslim Brotherhood as well. Finally, Faraj’s attack on al-Haqq, who spoke for the Egyptian government, basically argues that the Sword Verses-those verses of the Qur’an that explain jihad to be obligatory-have abrogated all other verses and so jihad is, as bin Ladin and Azzam also claimed, just like fasting.75 Al-Haqq pointed to the propriety of jihad by the heart and the tongue, instead of the sword, but more strongly made the argument that the ruler is not an apostate, because an apostate is only one who rejects all, not just part, of the shari`ah.76

The Egyptian government’s response was to deny first, then suppress Islamic extremism. Meanwhile many members of EIJ went to the Gulf, Afghanistan, and later Albania, Kashmir, Chechnya, and finally in 1998, Zawahiri joined forces with al-Qa’ida. He was motivated by the fact that some leaders of al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya agreed to nonviolence following the Luxor attack on a large number of tourists, but EIJ, at least Zawahiri’s faction, swore to carry on jihad.

Ayman Zawahiri carried Faraj’s ideas further in his own book, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, which was serialized in the popular Arabic newspaper, al-Sharq al-Awsat. Here he portrays himself as an educator to Muslim youth. He is spreading jihad successfully, and the proof may be found with thousands of young men in prisons who have become Islamists there. He recommends a “by any means necessary” strategy, pointing to the damage that even small numbers can exact and suggests targetting the UN, multinational corporations, the media, and international relief groups because these are covers for other operations, according to him, as well as rulers of Arab states.77 Further, he and al-Qa’ida have now linked the Palestinian and Iraqi causes to jihad with the argument that the occupation of Muslim lands requires jihad. In an August 4 videotape, Zawahiri drew a parallel between Iraq and Vietnam, and threatened the British and Americans with more violence, saying that if they [their governments] did not cease “aggression against Muslims,” they would “see horror that will make you forget what you saw in Vietnam.”78

Stringent counterterrorist measures apparently backfired in Egypt.79 Torture, hostage-taking, and abuse of Islamist family members, including sexual abuse, has been documented.80 This was an important lesson. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood and other moderates hope to overcome obstacles to political participation and could continue to provide an Islamist alternative to extremism.

MUHAMMAD MAKKAWI OR SAYF AL-ADEL

Some experts say that Muhammad Makkawi, a colonel in the Egyptian special forces who became an Afghan Arab, was the victim of al-Qa’ida infighting.81 But most believe that Sayf al-Adel is Makkawi’s nom de guerre, and that he has headed al-Qa’ida’s military wing, providing much of its strategic thinking. Whether al-Adel or Makkawi, he is a major strategist for the group. He describes al- Qa’ida’s aims as going beyond Afghanistan, where they supposedly “sacrificed” the Taliban, moved from Iran into Iraq (as Zarqawi, in fact, did),82 and will also engage the United States in other areas; he specifies Syria, and Lebanon, as well as Iran, suggesting that the United States may attack Iran. Al-Adel credits al-Qa’ida with foreknowledge of U.S. attacks, and planning capabilities that may aggrandize the truth.83 In this way, al-Qa’ida is able to adapt to changing circumstances, taking responsibility for actions planned by independent cells, or adapting their own plans as in the videotape that announced that Usama bin Ladin would proceed to Iraq to strengthen his amir’s, al-Zarqawi’s struggle there.

THE ROLE OF THE SPIRITUAL LEADER: FROM EGYPT TO INDONESIA

Another strategy fraught with difficulties is the identification and punishment of those clerics who inspire or approve acts of violence. This strategy resembles the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) efforts to target political leadership of Islamist groups rather than their military operatives, because spiritual leaders frequently are disassociated from actual planning by design, as well as the need to focus extremist abilities. For example, many Westerners, including Middle East scholar, Daniel Pipes, blame the influential Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi, Dean of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar, for supporting jihad and linking it with martyrdom. Actually, Qaradawi strongly condemned the 9/11 attacks and all killings of civilians. But he differentiated these from attacks on Israelis because, he made the point, there even women are militarized, and he suggests that “acts of martyrdom” are authorized when a population has no way to counter occupation.84 His is far from a unique position on this issue; various Muslim clerics have pointed to the mobilization of the entire Israeli population, defining them as combatants. The linkage of jihad to martyrdom in other contexts-assassination attempts in various countries, operations in Iraq, or in attacks involving other than civilians-has not been debated sufficiently in some places. That said, bringing “inciters to jihad” to justice violates the customary freedom of speech enjoyed by spiritual leaders in Islam, which is seen to be a part of their religious role. Some readers may not understand that it is considered the duty of the religious preacher to make political statements and call for action when he believes Islamic rights are violated. Also, it may not be quite clear that martyrdom and jihad are, in fact, topics enmeshed in Islamic history and mentioned in numerous instances in the Qur’an and other sacred literature. Hence, a governmental authority cannot forbid a religious preacher to discuss martyrdom, which has become a populist theme of sorts in a perceived struggle between the East and the West.

The difficulties in pursuing justice for those linked with more clearly defined terrorist actions, such as Shaykh Umar abd al-Rahman of Egypt or Abu Bakar Ba`syir of Indonesia, lie also in legal definitions of terrorism, culpability, and differences in evidentiary proceedings, as well as in hostile local reactions to public trials, because it seems to the public of these Muslim countries that Islam and Islamism, rather than terrorism, is on trial. This parallels public sentiment that there is a Global War on Islam (rather than Terror). Extradition, as of abd al-Rahman, is one response, which affords the West greater judicial leeway to prosecute. However, `abd al-Rahman’s lawyer, the well-known Islamist, Muntasir al-Zayyat, who incidentally wrote a “tell-all” about Zawahiri and then withdrew it from circulation since Zawahiri could not defend himself, warned that some follower of the Shaykh might well attack Americans or U.S. interests outside of Egypt in response to the “humiliation” of the shaykh.85

Abu Bakar Ba`syir or Bashir, originally of East Java, was a founder of Ponodok Ngruki and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) of Indonesia. The JI was formed at least in part as a response to the Indonesian military regime’s attacks on Muslim groups,86 as has the Darul Islam movement more generally.87 He faced various charges and escaped to Malaysia. Bas’syir became the JI’s spiritual leader in 1999 when his co-founder died. Ba`syir was tried in connection with the Bali bombings and the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriot hotel. He also was charged in connection with a foiled assassination attempt on President Megawati Sakarnoputri. Many Australians were outraged when, in contrast to the 30-months sentence Ba`syir received for inspiring a crime in which many of their fellow nationals were killed, Australian tourist Schappelle Corby was sentenced in May 2005 to 20 years in jail for allegedly bringing four kilos of marijuana into Bali in her suitcase. Her trial received a good deal of publicity as well. Further, the Indonesian government had not outlawed JI in the spring of 2005, although it has imprisoned more than 150 members of the organization in the last 3 years, since doing so would give the impression that the West was dictating to the government.

Much evidence in Ba`syir’s case was eliminated from consider- ation, including the reports of his attendance of a graduation event at the terrorist training Camp Hudaybiyya in the Phillipines in 2000, where he gave a speech promoting jihad. He was cleared of seven charges and convicted of treason and an immigration violation. He appealed his 4-year sentence, which was reduced to 18 months, whereupon he was recharged under Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Act, allegedly following U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge’s call that “Hopefully in due time . . . he will be brought to justice in a different way.”88 Haroon Siddiqui commented that America “advocates democracy but seems to pine for Indonesia’s old authoritarian ways.” He added, “It needs Muslim moderates, but alienates them.”89 Ba’syir is no moderate, advocating that the fight against America “is compulsory,” and that Muslims should attack Americans in America, and, as bin Ladin urges, that they should free the Arabian peninsula from occupation.90

Two other instances of clerics’ relevance to the GWOT should be mentioned. First, Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, a mentor for the Jordanian and Iraqi group al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, decried attacks on Muslims in Iraq on al-Jazirah television and in the press, saying that such attacks “might distort the true jihad.”91 Subsequent web postings showed that this statement shocked some of his hardline followers. Many clerics also criticized the London July 7, 2005 (7/7), bombings; as they did 9/11. But in this instance, some of the clerics are neo-salafis who support jihad, like Syrian scholar Mustafa ‘abd al-Mun’im Abu Halimah, who lives in London and is known as Abu Basir al-Tartusi. After virulent responses to a fatwa, he issued another statement that basically said that Muslims must operate with integrity, instead of seeking equivalent degrees of revenge.92 One can see ambiguity in that clerics might provide rationales for extremists, but not support their actions.

Second, clerics have been useful members of groups for national dialogue and debate, and in bodies that demilitarize or negotiate with militants. In any process which seeks to rehabilitate or include Islamist oppositionist groups, they are critical voices. Judge Hamoud al-Hitar chaired Yemen’s National Dialogue Committee, established in 2002, to conduct dialogue with detainees from groups like al- Houthi’s followers, al-Qa’ida, Takfir wa-l-Hijra, Afghan veterans, and the Aden-Abyan Islamic army. By treating the detainees with respect, but firmly opposing their ideas, it persuaded some to relinquish violence. The clerics on the committee formulated their arguments by drawing on their knowledge of the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet). The detainees argued their own version of jihad, which simply was not well-grounded Islamically, and not persuasive in the face of superior scripturally-based arguments.93 Dialogue as a means of communicating and providing a way out of violence also was promoted by Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. It was tried as well in Algeria in 1994, but “eradicationists” and “dialogists” from within the Algerian government and military clashed, and it took time for the latter method to result in political normalization.94

ZARQAWI: BANE OF IRAQ

Abu Musab Zarqawi’s organization’s brutal bombings and beheadings added a new twist to coercive measures toward local populations, without which his group, al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, QAP, and others could not operate. Zarqawi’s virulent anti-Shi`i attacks contrast with Osama bin Ladin’s silence on this issue. Bin Ladin’s salafi followers are also grounded in negative attitudes toward the Shi`a in general. In Iraq, salafi-jihadist objections to the Shi`a have much to do with perceived Shi`i cooperation with American “occupiers.” Zarqawi, whose real name is Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalayla, was born in 1966, a Jordanian from the town of Zarqa and a member of the Abu al-Hassan tribe. He left school early, apparently out of frustration when it was recommended that he attend a vocational rather than an academic high school, and though formerly a “sinner” who drank, womanized, and sported tattoos, he became fervently involved in Islamism. Some analysts have tried to make a case that al-Zarqawi became a jihadi because of poverty or desperation. In fact, he was not especially poor or miserable, and many young men are uninterested in vocational or any other form of education, though others become Islamists or jihadists while attending higher education. Al-Zarqawi first traveled to Afghanistan in his early 20s but did not then join bin Ladin’s jihad. After taking the 13-year-old daughter of one of his associates as a second wife, he operated a jihadist training camp outside of Herat near the Iranian border. Experts misattributed and even misidentified him at times and some of his contacts, such as Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a key icon to the Jordanian salafists along with Shaykh `Umar Abu `Umar, also known as Abu Qatadah.

As with bin Ladin, some rumors circulate that Zarqawi is an American creation, although when he apparently was wounded in May 2005, rumors of his death or impending death strengthened an argument for his existence and mortality. Given the supposed weakness of his education, some question the eloquence of his missives. Certain statements have come from other commanders, for instance, Abu Maysara al-Iraqi who defined al-Qa’ida in Iraq and its goals in a webposting of Dhurwat Sanam al-Islam, a phrase which refers to jihad and means Crest of the Summit of Islam. Most political leaders know the value of a good speechwriter, of course, and dead, alive, or wounded, Zarqawi is important as a nucleus for Islamic resistance. Both Zarqawi and Abu Maysara explained that the killing of Iraqi security forces is licit, even though they are Muslims, because their cooperation with the infidels renders them apostates or beyond the pale of Islam. Zarqawi went further in enlisting the enemies of Islam in Iraq-these being the Shi`a (termed rafidhin, or renegades); Iraqi police and soldiers (because they serve the occupying force); the `ulama or clerics of Iraq, who he terms Sufis and hypocrites; the Kurds, because of their support of the U.S. occupying force; and, naturally, the Americans. The Iraqi mujahidin are described as being courageous but “uneducated and inexperienced,” while fighters coming from outside Iraq are still “too few in number,” and Iraqis welcome them [verbally] but won’t allow them to use their homes or land for bases.95

Zarqawi has been opportunistic in his alliances; for example, with Abu Abdullah al-Shafi`i of Jund al-Islam; Mullah Kreikar, originally of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and later identified with Ansar al-Islam and its several jihadist offshoots; the Tawhid group; and Kurdish Hamas. Kreikar allegedly made contact with Zarqawi through a Jordanian lieutenant and, while this relationship goes back to 1997, it seems to have been formalized in 2002 and was more fully realized in 2003-04.96 Ansar al-Islam’s primary rival was the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), so, though its goals differ substantially from al-Qa’ida’s, the alliance brought Afghani-trained fighters into Iraq. The alliance did not particularly benefit Kreikar who denied it and was deposed and exiled, although he remains an Islamist committed to jihad. Ansar al-Sunna was officially formed on September 20, 2003, alongside Ansar al-Islam, and Zarqawi’s own Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, a force of about 1500 fighters, took shape. Zarqawi utilized Syrian connections to some degree, dating back to 2002, and information about these was revealed in March 2005.97 The major benefit of Zarqawi’s later alliance with al-Qaida was jihadic legitimacy and appeal to salafists both inside and outside of Iraq.

It should be noted as well that Zarqawi allied himself with al-Qa’ida, not the reverse, and characterizes himself as resisting pressure from the United States, in contrast with Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq, who Zarqawi calls “the leader of infidelity and heresy,” or Muqtada al-Sadr. Zarqawi accuses the Shi`a of being “the crafty evil scorpion, the enemy lying in wait with a poisonous bite,” who are intent on fighting the Sunnis, wreaking vengeance on them after the fall of Saddam’s Ba`thist regime, and says they want their own state extending from Lebanon to Iran. He enlists all of their supposed historical acts of treachery as well, including their “cursing of Sunnis” and validates his anti-Shi`a views with citations from Imam Malik Bukhari, Ibn Hazm, and Ibn Taymiyya, (medieval Islamic sources).98

Zarqawi is not the only Islamist opponent of democracy. In general, Islamists have objected to democracy because it is described as a product of Western civilization; in the West, it has supported secularization and promotes the rights and representations of all groups in societies. In the Islamist vision, the state should be based on consultation, shura, but need not be democratic. Certain Islamist thinkers believe Islam has democratic features, or that shura can serve the same purpose as democratic representation, but the legal system in their idealized state is an Islamic one. Non-Muslims are treated differently under this system and must assent to the will of the Muslim majority. They might even be subjected to Islamic principles. Egypt’s Constitutional Court recently ruled that the Islamic practice of enforcing the obedience of a wife is incumbent upon a Greek Catholic woman, and that is under the current legal system.99 Zarqawi, his group, and others like it fear the democratization of society, not least because minorities and non-Sunnis will play a role in government that they would not achieve under Islamist governance.

Zarqawi describes his movement in the language of early Islam when the Ansar and the Muhajirun (Emigrants from Mecca) united forces.100 The next stage of early Islamic history featured Uhud and Badr, key victorious battles for the early Muslims. We need to understand that to Zarqawi it does not matter how long it takes to reach the Badr stage, or even if his forces are eliminated in the process-so he said in his May 2005 tape, “We will either win or die trying.”101 According to Zarqawi’s thought, even the extinguishing of his group in battle would heighten jihad, leading to the expansion of the ummah and the migration and continuation of the jihad to other places in Iraq and the world.

MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR AKA ABU MUSAB AL-SURI

Abu Musab al-Suri is another of the hundred Osamas. Still in his teens when Hafiz al-Asad cracked down on militant Islamists, he reappeared years later as a key trainer and jihadist idealogue, backing Zarqawi, and also, allegedly, al-Qa’ida-linked groups in the West. His real name is Mustafa Abdul-Qadir Mustafa Hussein al- Sheikh Ahmed al-Mazeek al-Jakiri al-Rifa`i, but his family is referred to as al-Sitt Maryam. He hails from Aleppo and joined the Tali`a al- Muqatila, the Islamist offshoot of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, charged with violence against Syrian cadets and others. His background suggests the reemergence of jihadism in Syria, but he is more properly a member of the global jihad generation. After 1982, he apparently escaped to Afghanistan, joined the mujahidin, and then surfaced in Spain where he became a part of al-Qaida and forged connections with Algerian extremists. Later he returned to Afghanistan and is now working in Iraq, supporting al-Zarqawi as far as we know. Abd al-Suri is suspected of involvement in the March 11, 2004, Madrid attacks. This charge disturbed him sufficiently that he disclaimed a role in these or the 9/11 attacks in a December 2004 letter to President Bush. `Abd al-Suri has influenced many of the 100 Osamas through his book which discusses jihad and jihadist movements, tactics, fundraising, information warfare, and other topics.102

FROM IRAQ TO THE WORLD

Experienced and younger leaders and trainers share a deep commitment to jihad for the forseeable future. This, along with the migration of jihad from Afghanistan to Iraq, bodes ill for a counterterrorist policy that focuses primarily on the elimination of leaders and second tier operatives. Hence, the slayings of Abu Khattab, Abu Anas al-Shami, Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani, Abu-l-Harith, Abu Anas al-Turki, Abdel Hadi Daghlas, and Abu Muhammad Hamaza Hassan Ibrahim, and the capturing of high profile lieutenants like Abu Qutayba and at least 11 others has not really dampened the insurgency or thirst for jihad.103 We hope that the Iraqis, who long for stability and the opportunity to participate in a representative and democratic political life, will be successful in developing and enacting other types of counter and antiterrorist campaigns and policies. Yet, they may have to contend with a lingering or sporadic insurgency that may be especially troublesome when U.S. troops are withdrawn.

EXTREMISTS’ STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Much is made of extremist use of the worldwide web in attracting recruits and promoting their organizations.104 It is worth understanding the jihadist effort to communicate the principles of their successes. First, they have explained that their aim is to embroil the United States in the region, where it can be fought. That may not rule out attacks on Western targets, of course, because, as Abu Bakr Naji’s Idarat al-Tawahhush (The Management of Barbarism) pointed out, the enemy must be exhausted and its activities disrupted, so it is important to vary targets and do so “in all parts of the Islamic world and beyond it.”105 The Western enemy is depicted as huge, unwieldy, hypocritical, and unjust. The entrapment of this Western Goliath also will be accomplished because of flaws or theoretical stultification in Western strategy. As Salim al-Makki (and another strategist) noted,

America today is facing a huge problem with Clausewitz’s theories. The latter are premised on the existence of a centralized hostile power with a unified command. Assuredly, the mujahidin, with the al-Qa’ida organization in their vanguard, believe in decentralized organizations. Thus the enemy cannot ascertain the center of gravity, let alone aim a mortal blow at it. . . . Just a few hundred fighters can “drive crazy the mightiest, best trained, and best armed armies. With God’s help, this is happening.”106

We know that U.S. strategists are engaged in debate over the “new way of war,” and will find methods to improve approaches to such asymmetric threats or the problems of alienating civilians in response to numerous smaller attacks. And the jihadi “strategy” statement above may be wishful thinking. Yet, as the Islamists constantly point out on their PR-oriented websites, their efforts in multiple locations (along with our own force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan) provide many targets, distract from the business of stabilization, and test public confidence in counterinsurgency in general. This, in turn, influences the “will of the people,” whether in the United States or Iraq, neither of which is a monolithic entity. The extremists also gleefully point out the multiplication effect-the huge amounts of money the United States has spent in the GWOT compared to their relatively modest financial investment. New security arrangements, for instance bag-checking on New York’s subways and airport security procedures, also cost a great deal. Cameras installed in the London underground are also expensive and helpful tools in tracking terrorists, but did not prevent their attacks.

Various web magazines focus on the particularity of groups’ local enemies: the Saudi royal family in Sawt al-Jihad and Muaskar al-Battal; and the `Alawi regime in Syria for the Risalat al-Mujahidin, which began publication in 2005. Its home page features a picture of the Syrian Mazzeh prison, and a fallen sculptured head of late President Hafez al-Assad which evokes the toppling of Saddam’s statue. The magazine contains pieces like a call to jihad to “youths in Levant,” the “criminal history” of the Minister of the Interior, and one entitled “The Torture of Women in Syria.”107 The anti-Islamic nature of governing regimes constitutes a key component of the call to jihad. Some articles in other magazines, like Sawt al-Jihad, have justified and praised attacks on Westerners.

In sum, we may characterize extremist themes, tactical and strategic, as:

Distract, Annoy, Destroy

Takfir (Charging Muslims with Apostasy or Anti-Islamic Behavior)

Justifications for the New Jihad

Enmity of Jews and Crusaders (Christians) to Islam

The Failure of Western Strategies and Counterterrorism

David vs. Goliath

Promotion is All

Sow Sectarian Discord (as in Iraq)

Alternative Timeline to Eternity

Internet postings of visual materials promote recruitment, expand and document Islamist jihadists’ actions, provide details of encounters with Western forces, and demonstrate the zeal of young fighters. Zarqawi’s information group posted a video entitled “All Religion Will Be For Allah” on a Web page with sophisticated features and many links, enabling the viewer to see suicide bombers being trained and download a musical tune of the video onto a cell phone. As with a recruitment tape described below, the graphics and overall professional quality of the work project another message: You Can’t Stop Our Information War!

EXTREMISM, EDUCATION, AND INFORMATION WARFARE

Islamic madrasahs frequently are attacked as the source of jihadist venom. Sometimes people simply assume that Islamic education in general promotes war on the West, while others have no idea what curriculum is followed but oppose religious education on principle. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandev expand on this,

It is one of the widespread assumptions of the war on terrorism that the Muslim religious schools known as madrassas, [sic] catering to families that are often poor, are graduating students who become terrorists. Last year, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell denounced madrassas in Pakistan and several other countries as breeding grounds for “fundamentalists and terrorists.” A year earlier, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld had queried in a leaked memorandum, “Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?”

While madrassas may breed fundamentalists who have learned to recite the Koran in Arabic by rote, such schools do not teach the technical or linguistic skills necessary to be an effective terrorist.108

Further, these authors explained that only about 1 percent of Pakistanis attended madrasahs, according to information from the World Bank. In this author’s opinion, although it is correct to associate the Taliban with unpalatable Islamic ideas, Westerners who call for the closing of all religious schools are pursuing another misguided strategy against Islamist terrorism.

Recently, President Musharraf announced the expulsion of the 1,400 foreign students in Pakistani madrasahs.109 This measure, along with promises to control extreme speech in the mosques, is probably a good thing, but it does suggest that the underlying basis for terrorism is external to Pakistan.

Those who believe that Muslims should eschew or censor Islamic education need to be aware that private Islamic schools, especially those that offer sex-segregated facilities and well-developed curricula, are today more popular than the overcrowded public school systems operating in many countries. These contrast with the stereotypical Muslim kuttab or small Quranic elementary program, and with madrasahs which are essentially Muslim academies. To keep Islam viable as a holistic lifestyle, Muslims require education in their religion, its philosophy, and moral values. Dogmatism, intolerance, and narrow interpretations should be addressed, but there is probably no more of these problematic attitudes in Islamic schools than in national schools in certain country cases.

Indeed, national educational systems, for example in Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan, contain many Islamists in key positions. Moderates exert a certain effect, and more radical aspects of the curricula, such as the glorification of activist jihad, can be found there as well. The Kuwaiti government apparently has critiqued anti-Shi`a sentiments in its curricula, and is very concerned with the way in which jihad is being promoted, as well.110

Some Westerners mistakenly believe that the lack of modern education has caused the rise of Islamism and its radical interpretations.111 Many of today’s Osamas received modern educations in the sense of a nationally-determined curriculum that included rational sciences as well as history, language, mathematics or vocational skills, and ideas that bolster national (rather than Muslim) identity. Actually, the breakdown of the traditional system of Islamic education, wherein one was apprenticed to a master, the `alim (enlightened one), eroded the clerics’ authority. Religion, as taught in the national curriculum, located authority in any and every religious product. That made it easier for those with a lesser intellectual background and Islamist leanings to promote their views. As Gregory Starrett, a scholar who has looked closely at the spread of Islamist discourse in Egyptian society, pointed out, “who the producer is” (and he is very often one of the new Islamist intellectuals) is “less important than the marketability of what he has to say.”112 Governments are then trapped into using Islamic discourse to try to defeat radicals who are more adept than they at marketing. And at the same time, the general climate of support for Islamist thought and ideas has grown immensely in the last 25 years in every Muslim country, even Turkey, once dedicated to Islamic “secularism.”

Proposed campaigns to secularize Muslims and replace offensive concepts with others are counterproductive avenues for information operations and, moreover, smack of ultra-imperialism. Besides, many efforts were made to secularize and “liberalize” Muslims earlier in the century that were internally inspired, and these did not stand up to the Islamic “alternative” or awakening. As previously mentioned, one Western expert proposed to replace jihad with mentions of hiraba, another crime usually translated as brigandry, but which has a separate legal and philosophical history. Many people call for a Muslim Luther (as if Islam has not had its own reform movements), and some suggest that reestablishment of a Caliphate could aid the West in the GWOT by forcing a centralized authority on Islam. Muslims are startled to hear spokespersons such as Irshad Manji, a feminist, lesbian Canadian Muslim, author of The Trouble With Islam, touted as experts on progressive Islam. Manji declares she has renounced her faith, which would make her an apostate in Islamic terms. Though she is not very familiar with Islamic principles, that does not prevent her from lecturing about the fundamental contradictions and evils of the faith. This may be why Muslims now feel that the War on Terror is a cultural onslaught. Instead, avenues of communication need to be opened and maintained in forums for debate and discussion in both the Muslim, non-Anglophone world, and in the West. A proper critique of jihad can be undertaken, but not on the basis of hype, missionary zeal, or disdain for the views of others.

FROM EXTREMISM TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Can jihadists be convinced to lay down their arms under any circumstances? If they do so, should our strategy address them? Some readers will object here to my use of the label “moderate Islamist” for organizations like Hizbullah, Hamas, the MB, or the Wasatiyun (Centrists). But there is no doubt that they are more moderate than Zarqawi’s organization, for instance. Two other points are important: they have refrained from attacks on Western civilian targets. No targeting of the numerous American tours in Israel has occurred to date, nor did the MB or Wasat ever attack tourists in Egypt. Second, they have strongly influenced their co-citizens’ attitudes toward Islam and moderate Islamism.

Hizbullah of Lebanon, whose founding nucleus came from Iraq, and Hamas of Palestine appear to be following a different path. Both organizations call for Islamic government, but are situated where compromise is essential. Analysts who examine the World Islamic Front, or “Caliphists,” are not including Hizbullah and Hamas, despite various allegations that Hamas members have or had connections to al-Qa’ida. Similar to Palestinian Islamists, Hizbullah gained some strength when the reputation of its secular competitor in the Shi`a community, the AMAL party, was tarnished. Hizbullah emerged in a period of chaos and has international and inter-regional linkages.

Hizbullah illustrates the Iraqization of Shi’ism in Lebanon, as well as Iranian influence in its efforts to create a rational and modernist version of Islamic life.113 Dating back to 1982, its primary raison d’e_tre was to resist the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, a military goal, and to represent and uplift the oppressed masses of the Shi`a, political and socioeconomic goals. The leadership of Hizbullah has demonstrated various qualities: tenacity, pragmatism, and popular appeal with its political leader, Hasan Nasrallah, and more erudite and enlightened interpretations of Islamic principles with Shams al-Din Fadlallah, an `alim, or religious inspiration of the movement. Hizbullah faced down factionalism in the Biqa` when one contingent of the Party led by Shaykh Tufayli rebelled against accommodation with the Lebanese government after the Lebanese war had ended.

Lebanon has a multireligious political and social base, with 18 officially recognized confessional groups. Therefore, Hizbullah’s aim of an Islamic state where vilayat e-faqih (the rule of the jurist) will prevail is not practical as a political design for Lebanon as a whole. But Hisbullah’s competition with other political forces in the Shi`i community has been quite successful. The Party transformed itself from a militia/religious movement to a political party/religious movement with residual militant goals of opposing Israel, arguing, for instance, that no settlement can be made with Israel, certainly not without attention to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and in Syria. Hizbullah is not universally popular with every Lebanese or even every Shi`a,114 but it is respected and considered less corrupt than most other political actors and groups.

Shaykh Hasan Yousef, the prominent West Bank Hamas political branch leader, joined the Muslim Brotherhood while a university student in Jordan. He used to travel from West Bank village to village preaching, so he retains great local credibility there, despite lengthy periods spent in Israeli prisons and exile in Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon. Hamas has struggled ideologically with the PLO for the hearts and minds of young Palestinians. It has encountered political limitations on the part of the PA that returned from Tunis, in particular. In an interview with the International Crisis Group, Yousef recently stated that “for the first time, we feel there is a genuine potential for a partnership with the PA.”115 And in June, Yousef expressed his desire to communicate with the West to me, “to establish better relations that will lead to a better dialogue in the future,” though he was amused by the title of this monograph, asking me if he was one of my “100 Osamas.” He is strongly troubled by the many key issues that remain unexplored while the Gaza disengagement proceeds, like the large number of political prisoners, the ill effects of the new “Wall,” the misery caused by the closure of Hamas charities (though “Hamas is willing to be the most transparent of organizations”), and Israeli efforts to reduce and hem in the Arab presence in East Jerusalem, while permitting settler establishments and house seizures there. He hoped that people of conscience could make the United States and Israel more aware of the contradictions inherent in promoting Middle Eastern democracy and supporting a system in which every movement, passage, phone call, and interaction is monitored, and there is “absolutely no freedom.” Yousef, who was rearrested in September, pointed to Hamas’ inclusion of women in its political leadership and list of candidates as well as Christians.116 All in all, Yousef’s characterization of Hamas goals casts and rationalizes them as the aims of all Palestinians, so that the organization appears more nationalist than pan-Muslim, and more pragmatic than idealistic.

RECRUITMENT

Viewing Islamist extremists as strategic leaders can be useful, but counterinsurgency should focus on two additional levels-operations experts and recruiters, and potential mujahidin. Some analysts believe there may be as many as 200,000 insurgents in Iraq, for example. In fact, the organizational culture of extremist movements still is not well-understood. Experts have applied a criminological approach, seeking to identify particular profiles for “deviant” behavior. The new jihad is so widespread and appealing, and the confusion between general Islamists versus extremists is so profound, that the criminological or pathological approach is not serving the GWOT well. For example, the accepted profile-a young, impoverished male from a rural or recent urban migrant background-no longer fits all recruits or volunteers.117 The same fuzziness in profiling suicide attackers should be noted. According to such profiles, women were not supposed to engage in “martyrdom” activities nor were mature men with families. In fact, women have served as mujahidat since the early days of Islam, playing an increasingly important role in the last decade.118 Likewise, a believer is not supposed to take up jihad if he owes money, and those with dependents were thought less likely to volunteer; however, men with families have carried out attacks in Israel, and two of the bombers in the 7/7 London attacks had young children.

A “successful strategy” is one that brings what an organization can do (its competencies) into alignment with the needs and demands of its environment “. . . achieving a ‘strategic fit’.”119 Engaging the United States in regional hostilities certainly fits the capacities of many of these relatively small extremist groups more aptly than any sustained operations in the West. Also, extremist groups have found suicide attacks to be a successful strategy because they:

• are force multipliers,

• attract media attention and increase recruitment,

• are relatively inexpensive, and

• are suited to the irregular nature of the organization.

Organizers for martyrs’ cells recruit, indoctrinate, provide materials and training, and, most importantly, construct a moral contract with operatives that binds them to the group and their specific mission. Sometimes larger entities like a sub-brigade are designated to such operations as in Zarqawi’s group’s June 20 announcement that it had formed a unit of “martyrs named al-Ansar” from the Martyr Brigades of al-Baraa ibn Malik.120

Just as local governments employed both carrot and stick to deal with their Islamist insurgencies, new Islamist insurgents try to attract or terrify locals of their bases or neighborhoods. In recruitment, it is mostly the carrot of jihadi allure; the association of martyrdom and glory with jihad, along with young people’s strong desire to affect their environment and general inability to do so along other avenues, that aids recruitment.

A video made by Zarqawi’s organization and obtained in Falluja is a superb recruiting tool that critiques the West, documents and ritualizes martyrdom, demonstrates the pan-Muslim membership of the organization, and multiplies its impact. The video features religious quotations and nontraditional “religious” music, borrowing from the Eastern/Arab church and Western traditions, that add to the drama of the tape. In the very first segment, American soldiers kick their way into an Iraqi home and lead away a small child who calls for her father. This illustrates the reality of Muslims under siege, when jihad is compulsory for all and obviously necessary in order to save children and innocents.

Young suicide-attackers from various Arab countries read their “wills” on the tape to satisfy the cultural and religious instructions to obtain permission and provide for one’s dependents. Each attacker appears against the background of a translucent martyr’s stairway, leading upwards to the light, to Paradise. Martyrs do not require the ritual washing of other deceased Muslims, but the video shows the special mourning given them, to give would-be martyrs a taste of what they anticipate. Muslim intellectuals have spoken and written about the need to separate martyrdom from these violent acts of jihad, but there is no mistaking the power of the call to martyrdom in this tape.

The tape also illustrates subtleties of coercion. Given the cultural construct of Arab masculinity, what young man would retract his sworn, video-taped testimony? And Western news footage, maps of attack areas, actual bombings, and news items are cleverly embedded, used both as graphics and to demonstrate the power of the group.

These mujahidin cannot explicate their leader’s methodologies, rather they emotionally identify with components of an organic philosophy. Jihadi-recruiters must convince these foot-soldiers of the morality of killing and the utility of dying. Timing is important so that they will not change their minds or consult others who may report them or pursuade them against such action. Islamist-extremists also seek out young people who can be manipulated easily. According to testimony from captured operatives in Saudi Arabia, some were coerced into committing crimes so they would not go to the police.

However, recruiters and strategic planners must also build a continuing force. Here skills, experience, and group cohesion are important; and factionalism actually plagues many extremist organizations, which seek to differentiate themselves from moderate, or more pragmatic elements.

SWIMMING IN FRIENDLY WATERS

To retain sanctuary, Islamist extremists of all functional levels also employ two basic strategies-carrot and stick. On the one hand, they appeal to the young and less powerful because they so emphatically oppose tyranny, injustice, and corruption.

They also have intimidated surrounding civilians. This has been achieved through violence: attacks on Shi`a sites in Iraq, on police and contract workers, as well as the now infamous kidnappings and beheadings of so-called “apostates” and “infidels.” Brutal kidnappings and murders of civilians took place during the Lebanese civil war, and a huge number of people remain unaccounted for.121 Widescale coercion in the form of violence against local populations also took place in the GIA massacres in Algeria that peaked in 1997 and evidenced a smaller peak in 1994.

In Iraq, kidnappings of foreigners, or “apostates,” were used in efforts to force troop withdrawals, discourage international busi- nesses and agencies, obtain ransoms, postpone the formal installation of diplomats, and attract the attention of sympathizers inside and outside of Iraq.122 Kidnappings of Iraqis coercively demonstrated extremist strength and also yielded ransoms and political benefits.

Extremists have attacked Iraqi women who were not wearing hijab (the headscarf) or abaya (the outer robe) and barbers who shave men’s beards and cut their hair in modern styles. But the suicide attacks have been most devastating to Iraqis, causing despair, even to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani who described the fighting as “genocidal.”123 Suicide attacks will likely continue, and, if tighter security measures are not employed, they will, no doubt, be utilized again in the West. Israelis adopted the most logical tactics, employing security guards to search bags outside of every large store and inspect passengers boarding public transport.

We might like to believe that such actions illustrate the desperation of extremists, or that massacres and bombings by extremists eventually will hurt their cause. But this has not always been the case. Islamists feel they are demonstrating superior and morally necessary force. Moderates sometimes support extremists for defying the United States, or un-Islamic governments and local populations may be hedging their bets, playing it safe by not castigating those who threaten them. When the object of Islamist violence can be demonized as an outsider, then, of course, violence is perceived differently. So Hizbullah, which initially exerted coercion against civilians (against liquor stores and coffee houses where men play games like backgammon) and fought other Lebanese, eventually reserved its violent actions for Israelis. As a result, the organization is feared but also respected by the Lebanese population. Hamas, al- Aqsa Brigades, and Islamic Jihad rationalize their violence against Israelis by pointing out that every Israeli is a combatant since all serve, or will serve, in the armed forces. As for the effect of unpredictable small- or medium-scale attacks, we have seen that they do disrupt daily life and that negotiation may result, as, for example, in the response to the attacks of the al-Aqsa Intifadha.

Attempting to remove the jihad from the jihadi, the allure of the freedom-fighter, is a delicate task. Somehow this task must be accomplished to erode sanctuary, but it cannot be accomplished in the style of 19th century missionaries. To date, the widely-viewed television program, “In the Grip of Justice,” in Iraq has managed to tarnish jihadi allure in a terrorist reality show that reveals the base, cowardly, and Islamically unsound nature of captured insurgents. In select shows, two Shi`a cells of hitmen admitted that they worked for Zarqawi’s movement, shocking members of both sects. This is the flip side of recruitment videos.

However popular an Iraqi reality show is, the tactic of discreditation is a two-edged sword. How credible is the force that tolerated the criminal behavior at Abu Ghraib (thus far, Muslims and Arabs have read that a criminal process is ongoing, but that only a few perpetrators were charged and there were legal problems with their prosecution) or the “softening” tactics, lack of habeus corpus, and unspecified terms of confinement at Guantanamo Bay? These problems, while representative in the least of American intentions, were nevertheless very damaging to the U.S. moral position. Also, many Iraqis believe that the former “insurgents” have been beaten into their testimony; some footage from the above mentioned program, including that screened on al-`Arabiyya television, features sound track dubbing. Whether or not it is actually read by an actor, a portion of the Arab public believes this to be the case.

In sum, there is a disjuncture between the mujahidins’ ultimate goals and their present abilities. But we cannot narrowly focus on this chink in Islamist armor, nor merely on eliminating leadership or discouraging recruitment. We need to encourage Muslim and Middle Eastern governments to carry out these tasks simultaneously while establishing trust in their own political systems to provide an alternative for would-be jihadists of the future. Similarly, if we set our goals at the elimination of a few select groups that most clearly resemble al-Qa’ida, we will fail to comprehend the 100 Osamas now emerging and their likely future impact. If we discredit Islam, Muslim discourse, and Islamic education, we win few friends and foster many enemies.

The impact of Islamist discourse is amplified further by the extensive reach of moderate ideas today. These convey a sense of commitment to Muslim ideals. So, as efforts to reform and democratize proceed in some parts of the Muslim world, a greater number of Islamists will attain political power. This is a cause for concern, and a careful and cautious weighing of the costs and benefits of our tactics in the War on Terror. A new Hundred Years War is as likely as the emergence of 100 Osamas. If we can encourage the transformation of certain of those 100 into viable political leaders, if they forswear violence and can compel their followers to follow suit, then we can narrow the scope of that future war. If we carefully consider those elements of our foreign policies in the Middle East and the Muslim world that can encourage a locally-driven democratization and greater trust in the U.S. stewardship of global power, that will be to the good. All of this can be done by remembering that all politics are local, and that pragmatism and idealism are not necessarily forces that cancel each other out.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some recommendations follow.

1. Revise strategies that narrowly define extremist networks and their modus operandi. The five groups with ascertainable ties to al-Qa’ida may relatively soon (within a few years) be neutralized, but by that time, 10 to 15 or more different groups may be exerting pressure elsewhere.

2. Revise approaches that too broadly define terrorism and extremism and our responses to them. Regional, ideological, and country specificity is essential.

3. Acknowledge the evolution and change of Islamist extremist leadership and develop strategies to contain it. Co-optation and elimination are, in essence, no more than methods to contain these movements. No centralized Islamic authority exists that can excommunicate renegade leaders who are, in any case, regarded more as popular heroes, members of a resistance-insurgents, rather than terrorists. Yet, ideological, political, and intelligence methods must be employed against them. Broaden counterterrorist responses to go beyond leadership to the lower levels of organizations and their sympathizers. Utilize those who know the operating bases well and speak the appropriate languages, instead of relegating this enormously difficult task to those who have no deep understanding of the area, the issues, or their delicacy.

4. Focus on antiterrorist as well as counterterrorist principles. Denying friendly waters or sanctuary can take place only where citizens perceive the benefits of their participation in any given social or political system. That is why democratization, or at least the establishment of just, representative, and effective political systems in the region, is key. Beyond that, we need to foster the concept of “world citizens” who band together against new challenges, and attempt to break down the xenophobias that divide us. That said, antiterrorist campaigns must go beyond propaganda, advertisement, and empty promises to protect the public, and address the ideological themes of insurgency, terrorism, and specifically, extremist Islamism.

5. Understand and respond to the increasing sophistication of Islamist tactical and strategic efforts. In this monograph, I have outlined the progress of radical Islamist thought at the leadership level. Theories of cultural superiority always are treacherous. We should not imagine that, because Western militaries have been more effective than those in Muslim countries, leadership cannot be cultivated or represent any kind of challenge to a technologically superior force. Extremist Muslims could penetrate armed forces in the region. In fact, the Egyptian and Saudi governments have been concerned about the presence of jihadists in their armed forces or police and rightly so, if we remember al-`Awfi, al-Islambuli, and others. Extremists will certainly further challenge the new Iraqi military and security forces if the United States withdraws from the country. But these forces, along with local political leadership, are going to be the point at which the war against terror is won or lost. We should then support them through all possible avenues.

6. Carefully consider the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and in other areas of the Muslim world on the stated aims of the Global War on Terror. The Palestinian issue is of paramount importance to many of the Muslim Middle Eastern countries and has become important even to Muslim countries outside the Middle East. Clear public statements about America’s relationship with Israel and long-term interests in Iraq and Afghanistan all require open communication and some modifications and resolution, or they will continue to be used as evidence of pervasive American hypocrisy.

7. Continue working with local governments in their counterterrorist efforts. This, in turn, requires careful attention to the lessons learned by local leadership, and representatives of civil society. But we should condemn the use of inhumane practices and help local forces resist infiltration by Islamist extremist forces into security, military, or police forces, wherever possible.

8. Establish centers for international counterterrorist operations to specifically address the threat posed by Islamist extremists. These should make use of international resources and knowledge of these groups and go far beyond name-sharing. Building on the February 2005 proposal of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and some recent suggestions of Australian governmental representatives, these centers might be set up with Saudi, Australian (for Southeast Asia), South and Central Asian, and North African/European focuses. While Islam should not be singled out as the only religion to have produced violent, purist, or separatist movements, these centers would do well to focus on this particular manifestation of violent extremism, rather than diluting their programs to fit all possible global circumstances.

9. Continue making legitimate efforts to obtain and coordinate information concerning the interaction, travel, and whereabouts of Islamist extremists. The use of physical and psychological torture and extralegal procedures is counterproductive to the moral terrain necessary for the establishment of a terror-free world.

10. Encourage local governments to normalize relations with certain Islamist groups, and utilize dialogue programs or amnesty efforts, where appropriate, in order to return supporters of jihad to society. Rehabilitation and the forswearing of violence can be monitored. We should encourage local authorities to provide alternatives to fighting that include a wage and possibly a commitment to social welfare.

11. Recognize the potential of moderate Islamist groups and actors to participate in the political process. As with the legitimization of Islamist parties in Iraq, such parties have a role to play elsewhere in the region, where they would express the popular will in open and free elections. While the author is concerned about the rights of women and minorities and freedom of expression and religion, compromises with such moderate groups are far more likely than with their extremist counterparts, and they can, if they are motivated to do so, help to constrain indiscriminate acts of violence. Policymakers should acknowledge that Islamist moderates, or even government- linked conservatives, will not see eye-to-eye with Americans on a variety of issues related to the GWOT. That does not mean that we go our way and they go theirs. But we should not behave as neocolonialists, dictating judicial practice in legal systems other than our own, or requiring popular amnesia of the political wounds dealt by authoritarian governments.

12. Energetic diplomacy should be utilized to achieve mutual understanding on the relevant issues or obstacles to a more “global” pursuit of the Global War on Terror. This should be carried out by professional diplomats, but also by articulate citizens, businessmen and women, and members of the military and other professions.

13. Establish a multi-country full media (Web, television, radio, and print) program to discuss and debate Islamist and other forms of religious extremism. It is particularly important that such communications be made in the local languages, and at a fairly sophisticated level that will not insult the intelligence of viewers and readers in the Muslim world, and which also will serve the purpose of educating the Western public about the complexity of the issues. Discussion of other “extremist” ideas ranging from Muslim questions about Christian efforts to proselytize and convert Muslims, to the role of other religious nationalisms (Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian) is important here, if indeed, Islamic extremism is not being treated as a unique phenomenon.

14. Stay the course in promoting democratization of the region. This monograph lacked space to explain the difficulties of promoting democracy while battling extremism. The 100 Osamas are, by and large, opposed to democratization, as was mentioned above, because such movements compete with their own and encourage other values, like pluralism, personal freedoms, and populism. While local allies have and will continue to object to the destabilization that democratic transformation may carry, blind authoritarianism has no more future in the Muslim world than in the Christian one. The democratization process will be slow and painful, but the building of stakeholders, those with an investment in their society’s future, is more essential to the future of counterinsurgency than any stockpiling of armored vehicles or antimortar weaponry. One point made in this monograph is that it may not diminish the thirst for an Islamic lifestyle, and the role of moderate Islamism in democratization needs to be considered.

15. Provide advanced training to military, intelligence, and political leaders on the history, evolution, and tactics of Islamist extremists that goes far beyond the current typical single-session briefings or conference-style meetings based on discussion models in which expert information is occluded by interpretation, political opinions, and misunderstandings of basic features of Islam.

Summary

If America’s pursuit of a Global War on Terror is strategically and politically well-grounded, then why are Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements continuing to operate, generating parallel cells that terrify the world with violent attacks from Iraq to London? While analysts debate the intensity and longevity of the latest round of terrorist attacks,1 we would do well to consider whether U.S. long-term goals in the war on terror-namely diminishing their presence and denying terrorists the ability to operate, while also altering conditions that terrorists exploit-are being met. If we are not pursuing the proper strategy or its implementation is not decreasing support for terrorists, then we should adapt accordingly. This monograph addresses these questions and examines the efficacy of proposed or operative strategies in light of the evolution of Islamist jihadist leaders, ideas, and foot-soldiers. Jihadist strategy has emerged in a polymorphous pattern over the last 30 years, but many Americans only became aware of the intensity of this problem post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and through observation of the 2003- 05 insurgency in Iraq.

The author proposes that extremist (jihadist) Islamist groups are not identical to any other terrorist group. Islamist discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition,2 and certainly contests the interests of other smaller states (like Iran), why are we aiming at eradication, rather than containment, and is erad- ication possible? Differentiating a “true Islam” from the false and destructive aims of such groups is an important response. Each region-based administration has so crafted its anti-terrorist rhetoric, and Muslims, in general, are not willing to view their religion as a destructive, anachronistic entity, so this unfortunately difficult task of ideological differentiation is an acceptable theme. But it is in- sufficient as a strategy because Islamist insurgencies have arisen in the context of a much broader, polychromatic religious and political “Islamic awakening” that shows no signs of receding. That broader movement informs Muslim sentiment today from Indonesia to Mauritania, and Nigeria to London. Official statements will not diminish recruitment; deeds, not words, are needed. Finally, eradication may be impossible, but containment is philosophic- ally unattractive. A combination of eradication (denial) and co- optation, as we have seen in the Muslim world thus far, probably makes sense. Certain assumptions that underlie U.S. strategies of denying and diminishing the terrorism of Islamist extremists there- fore need to be reconsidered.

Among the recommendations made in this monograph are:

1. Revise strategies that too narrowly or too broadly define extremist networks and their operational modes.

2. Acknowledge the evolution and change of Islamist extremist leadership and develop strategies to contain it. Utilize those who know the extremist bases of operations well and speak the appropriate languages instead of relegating this enormously difficult task to those who have no deep understanding of the area, ideological issues, or delicacy of the issues.

3. Focus on antiterrorist as well as counterterrorist principles.

4. Understand and respond to the increasing sophistication of Islamist tactical and strategic efforts.

5. Carefully consider the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and in other areas of the Muslim world on the stated aims of the Global War on Terror.

6. Continue working with local governments in their counter- terrorist and counterinsurgency efforts.

7. Establish centers for international counterterrorist operations to specifically address Islamist extremists (rather than all global forms of terrorism).

8. Avoid the use of physical and psychological torture and extralegal measures.

9. Encourage local governments to normalize relations with Islamist groups, and utilize dialogue programs or amnesty efforts in order to return supporters of jihad to society.

10. Recognize the potential of moderate Islamist groups and actors to participate in political processes. This does not mean that moderate or “progressive” Islamists as defined in urban American settings can serve as mediators or spokespersons for counterparts in the region.

11. Extra-governmental diplomacy should be used to achieve mutual understanding on the relevant issues or obstacles to a more “global” pursuit of the Global War on Terror.

12. Establish a multi-country, full media (Web, television, radio, and print) program to discuss and debate Islamist and other forms of religious extremism.

13. Stay the course in promoting democratization of the Middle East and the Muslim world.

14. Provide advanced training to military, intelligence, and political leaders on the history, evolution, and tactics of Islamist extremists.

NOTES

1. Dexter Filkins and David Cloud argue that insurgents in Iraq are stronger, more sophisticated, and being quickly replaced. See “Defying U.S. Efforts, Guerrillas in Iraq Refocus and Strengthen,” New York Times, July 24, 2005. On the other hand, George Friedman claims that al-Qaeda’s global counteroffensive is a weak last-ditch effort. See “Al Qaeda’s Global Campaign: Tet Offensive or Battle of the Bulge? Stratfor, July 26, 2005, at http://www.strafor.biz/Story. Nora Bensahel of RAND explains that charting short-term trends in insurgent violence can be very misleading, hence we should measure progress against them with different yardsticks. See Commentary, “Gauging Counterinsurgency,” Baltimore Sun, August 9, 2005, at http//www.rand.org/commentary.

2. Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005, pp. 16-21. What is of interest to me are Biddle’s astute perceptions about the nature of international competition and the costs of a transformational policy like the Global War on Terrorism. In the next section of the monograph, Biddle suggests that only radical political reform will address terrorism in the Middle East, but I do not see the end of terrorism as the only possible, or most likely, result of such reform, nor has such reform really begun. Rather, states and elites are resisting these processes, and the Iraqi and Afghani cases illustrate the difficulties of simultaneously building states, reforming preexisting structures and behaviors, and fighting extremism and terrorism. Lack of space prohibits a full exploration of these issues in this monograph.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

`Alim: Muslim cleric, literally means enlightened one. `Ulama is the plural form.

`Asala: Cultural authenticity.

Bay`a: A Muslim oath of allegiance sworn to the Caliph. A symbolic demonstration of the Caliph’s political and religious legitimacy.

Confessional group. Officially recognized religious sect in Lebanon, often described as a polity moving toward a confessional democracy. Also means a religious sect in other countries.

Da`wah: Islamic mission. In the contemporary period, refers to proselytization, awakening “born but unconscious” Muslims, urging them to adopt an Islamist agenda, or merely to more faithfully adhere to their religious duties.

Dhurwat Sanam al-Islam: Crest of the Summit of Islam. A term meaning jihad, and also the title of a recent web-publication.

Fard `Ayn: Obligatory in Islamic terms.

Fatwa: A juridical response to a question about Islamic law, usually couched in terms of the Islamically-permitted nature of any given item or practice.

Hadith: A secondary source for Islamic jurisprudence, for producing juridical opinions (fatawa or responsa) grounded in Islamic law. A hadith is a short text concerning the opinions, words, or practice of the Prophet Muhammad, or sometimes his Companions, or those close to him. It is preceded by a chain of transmittors called an isnad. In Sunni Islam, the first source to be consulted is the Qur’an, and then those hadith collections considered to be authoritative. Consensus and analogy are other approved sources for jurisprudence.

Al-Haras al-Watani: The pagan guard, as the mujahidin of Iraq term the U.S.-trained Iraqi forces.

Hijra (Higra in Egyptian dialect): The emigration of the first Muslims from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D.

Hiraba: A crime in Islamic law, taking or destroying the property of others, brigandry. Also rape is classified by some in this category.

Intifadha: Uprising. Literally means a “shaking off.”

Islamic Republican Party (IRP) of Iran: Clerics who were followers and former students of Ayatollah Khomeini established this party in February 1979. It became the dominant force in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ja`fari: Of the Shi`i legal school known as the Ja`fariyya; Twelve Shiites, as in Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

Jahiliyya: The time of ignorance and barbarism, before Islam. Islamist extremists charge contemporary society of being in a state of jahiliyya today.

Kuttab: Qur’anic school, or class at the elementary level.

Madrasa: General term for a school, public or private, secular or religious. Refers as well to a college or academy of Islamic thought and sciences.

Majlis al-shura: A council of consultation, a methodology for governance which Islamists prefer to Western-style democracy. This same term also stands for the Parliaments or councils of various governments.

Mu`asara: Modernity.

Nahda: Rennaisance. Also the name of the Arabic literary revival.

Neo-Salafist: A category of extremists who have more recently gained popularity. To be distinguished from “early” or original salafists or purists. For example, certain neo-salafists became more popular in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War of 1991.

Qa’idin: Those who sit and simply talk or reflect on jihad but who will not join the armed struggle.

Al-Qa’ida fi al-Jazirat al-`Arabiyya: al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), the Islamist extremist movement in Saudi Arabia.

Rafidhin; Renegades, those guilty of sedition. Zarqawi’s term for the Iraqi Shi`a.

Sahwa Islamiyya: Islamic awakening; sometimes referred to as tayar Islami (Islamic trend).

Sha`b or `Amma: Ordinary people, common folk, or the “Arab street.”

Siyar: The Muslim “law of nations” or international law.

Suhba: Guidance, the spiritual companionship of the group-an experience provided by Sufi brotherhoods, Muslim educational systems, and Islamist radical associations.

Tabarruj al-nisa’: The illicit display of women’s bodies in Western fashion, according to those who support Islamic modest dress.

Takfir: To call someone an unbeliever, to charge a Muslim of being sinful or even with apostasy (rejecting his/her faith).

Ta`lim: Education, enlightenment.

Tarbiyya: Guidance in the sense of training and proper upbringing or vocational knowledge versus enlightenment, and social responsibility rather than the highly individual pursuit of union with God.

Tawhid: Oneness, or unicity of God.

Wasta: Mediation, or intercession, or an intermediary who can provide access. Similar to the Farsi term, parti.

Vilayat e-faqih: Governance by an Islamic jurist. Khomeini elaborated on this theory in a book on Islamic governance.

Luanda, Angola.

Cassidy Johns Chitali.

Angolan old President José Eduardo dos Santos must not be a Presidential candidate or nominee elections 2012.

Angolan old President must not be a Presidential candidate or nominee elections 2012.Angolan old President must not be a Presidential candidate or nominee elections 2012. Angola has approved a new constitution that abolishes the presidential election and could enable the big thief incument, José Eduardo dos Santos, to remain as head of state until death. Whats the super power no 1 doing about it?.

By: Cassidy Johns Chitali. Luanda, Angola.

The United States of America is a super power number one in the World meaning has the ability to solve World problems in general including military issues and politics of which Angola is a real case.The political situation of Angola has deteriorated and dwindled so much. Almost no democracy in practice but heard in theories. Much to the MPLA’s frustration, the fundamental changes it helped to engender for the region have not ushered in a new era of true peace leading to development of Angola. In fact, the country’s agony does not seem to have an end in sight. This article has suggested that the MPLA government overemphasised the connection between regional changes — however fundamental — and domestic security. Although friendly regimes in the region might provide Angola with an external environment conducive to tackling difficult domestic problems, this is not a sufficient condition for reconciliation and peace at home. Domestic peace requires much more, including an inclusive political system with a wider space and greater role for civil society; the re-establishment of the rule of law; and the responsible and accountable use of the country’s natural resources, especially oil and diamonds. Angola’s current domestic condition and its international position are particularly regrettable, since the country was expected to achieve a measure of international relevance when it attained independence in 1975 after a 14-year anti-colonial struggle. This expectation was neither unfounded nor unrealistic given Angola’s considerable natural resource endowment, including vast deposits of oil and diamonds. Unfortunately, such expectations were shattered in the process of decolonisation. This process was precipitated by a military coup that deposed the regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal on 25 April 1974. The coup leaders were mostly military officers who opposed the old regime’s colonial policies. Therefore, one of their main objectives was to end costly colonial wars quickly. Thus, Portugal placed its colonies on the fast track to political independence. The former colonies of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe, and Mozambique were granted independence without major problems. This was facilitated by the unity within their respective liberation movements. Angola’s situation — where three armed liberation movements representing different ethnic and ideological constituencies were unable to find agreement on a common approach to decolonisation and beyond — was considerably more complex. Predictably, Angola’s decolonisation process quickly degenerated into civil war as the three liberation movements attempted to grab power — forcefully and individually — from the departing colonial authorities.

Each of the three liberation movements attempted to grab power with the help of foreign allies. Consequently, Zaïrian troops invaded Angola from the north in support of the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) while South African troops invaded from the south in support of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). However, only the MPLA — given its ethnic powerbase around the capital city of Luanda — succeeded in seizing and maintaining itself in power with the help of Cuban troops. Since the outcome of the Angolan conflict was expected to have significant geostrategic implications for Southern Africa, Angola quickly became an important Cold War battleground. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union used ties developed with the FNLA and MPLA during the anti-colonial war to intervene in the civil war. However, compared to Soviet and Cuban support, American support to the FNLA was at best ineffective. In the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, the US was averse to major foreign military interventions. However, as will be discussed below, the US and South Africa continued to pursue destabilisation strategies — carried out mainly through UNITA — aimed at toppling the young Marxist-Leninist regime that took power in Angola once Portugal departed.

Angola’s foreign policy, then, can be best understood in terms of the MPLA regime’s survival strategies since gaining power. For example, while its ideological background predisposed the new regime to intervene in the liberation wars against settler minority rule in Southern Africa, these struggles were understood to be directly connected to the regime’s own long-term survival. In other words, support for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa constituted an overt attempt to influence Angola’s regional environment by supporting revolutionary change in neighbouring states that exhibited hostile intentions and/or provided support and sanctuary for UNITA and the FNLA. The expectation was that, once liberated, these countries would provide the necessary military, economic and diplomatic assistance to enable the MPLA to solve its domestic problems.

The domestic problems that have conspired to weaken the MPLA regime have not been confined to the military domain. Although the civil war frustrated the new regime’s statebuilding project, economic mismanagement also seriously weakened the Angolan state. The new regime did not have the resources to fill the administrative void left by departing colonial administrators. The mass departure of the settler community also hastened the breakdown of the Angolan economy. It was therefore not surprising that the post-colonial state in Angola never really had the capacity or competence to exercise authority beyond the capital city and provincial capitals. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and, more recently, the United Nations have been carrying out most tasks commonly associated with the state, especially in rural areas affected by the war. The rudimentary bureaucracy functions on a quasi-voluntary basis partly because the state is not able to provide full remuneration to its employees. Consequently, bureaucrats resort to extorting bribes and/or joining the informal sector to survive. The collapse of key sectors like health care, education, transport, communications and banking has accompanied the breakdown of the rule of law.

Given this domestic context, characterised by war and other forms of decay, a dynamic foreign policy was seen as an important tool to help the new regime to create the necessary security environment to solve its myriad of domestic problems. For the new Angolan regime, an improved security environment entailed fundamental changes in Southern Africas.

The human and material losses incurred during Angola’s civil war will continue to affect the viability of the state for decades to come. Therefore, Angola’s foreign policy must be redesigned as a tool to help the state reconstitute itself as a first step to an eventual and relevant participation in both regional and international affairs. For Angola, this process of reconstitution can best be achieved through greater diplomatic and economic involvement at the regional level. In particular, Angola must learn from the experience of other countries in the region — like South Africa and Mozambique — that have found ways to overcome the legacy of many years of internal conflict s.
There  After months of delays and speculation, Angola’s National Assembly approved a bad and wrong country’s new constitution–which abolishes the need to hold a presidential election and substantially strengthens the president’s powers–on January 21st. President Barak Obama must make efforts to bring this constitution to normal. Revision of the constitution, which dates from 1991, has been on the political agenda since the crushing victory of the ruling party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), in the September 2008 legislative elections. Bolstered by an overwhelming majority in National Assembly, the government created a 60-member commission, dominated by the MPLA, to draw up proposals for revising the constitution prior to the holding of the presidential poll. However, negotiations between the MPLA and opposition parties dragged on, and it was not until November 2009 that the commission finally submitted three proposals to a public consultation: Project A, which advocated a strengthened presidential system; Project B, which advocated a semi-presidential system (with the prime minister as head of government); and Project C, which advocated a parliamentary-presidential system, with no prime minister and the leader of the party with the most parliamentary seats automatically becoming head of state. The MPLA was known to favour Project C, which would in effect do away with the need to hold a separate presidential election, while the opposition vehemently denounced this as violating constitutional law. In the end the government took both the opposition and commentators by surprise by rushing the vote through the National Assembly in January, two months earlier than had been expected–possibly in an attempt to capitalise on the distraction provided by the African Cup of Nations football tournament currently under way in Angola.
The outcome of the constitutional revision is a huge disappointment for both the opposition and local civil-rights groups, which had been pushing for a reduction in the president’s power, a more accountable National Assembly and, most importantly, the timely holding of a presidential election. José Eduardo dos Santos, who completed 30 years in power in September 2009, has never been properly elected as Angolan president. Selected as a consensus candidate who could lead the MPLA after the death of its founder, Agostinho Neto, in September 1979, Mr Dos Santos defied all predictions to entrench himself and his family in power, in the process becoming one of the world’s longest-serving leaders. Mr Dos Santos did contest the country’s first democratic presidential election in September 1992, winning the first round, but a second round was never held as the main rebel movement, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, returned to war; since then Mr Dos Santos has, in effect, been acting president of Angola.
Since the end of the civil war in April 2002 Mr Dos Santos has repeatedly promised to hold a presidential poll but then delayed it, first because of the legislative elections in September 2008, and then because of the constitutional revision which lasted the whole of 2009. However, with the rapid approval of the new constitution the issue appears to have been resolved definitively, doing away with the presidential election altogether and leaving selection of the country’s leader to the ruling party, a similar system to that currently in operation in South Africa (and the UK). This has made a mockery of the so-called public consultation process, as Luanda abandoned previous plans to hold a referendum on the new constitution and instead used its absolute majority to push the measure through the National Assembly.
Despite the protestations of the opposition, the new arrangement does not represent a major change in the country’s polity, but merely confirms the status quo. President Dos Santos has long been the supreme arbiter of political affairs in Angola  and involved in sealing huge sums of money banked for his personal gain full of corruption and theft, and the new constitution removes any equivocation about the limits of his which is power which is wrong and unfair to Angolans. The new constitution does away with the prime minister, who is little more than a ceremonial figure, and instead allows the Angolan president to appoint his own deputy-president to head the government, who will be under direct presidential control which is also wrong. The new constitution does set a two-term limit for presidents, but as has been the case in many other African countries Mr Dos Santos’s previous 30 years in office will not be considered by the new constitution, enabling him to continue in office until at least 2022 which is unfair he must be ruled out and must not be a presidential candidate if he want must not be a presidential nominee.

Nevertheless, the widespread assumption that the constitutional revision was carried out to enable Mr Dos Santos to remain as president for life which is wrong and internationally condemned is proving to prove misplaced and mislead. Throughout his tenure Mr Dos Santos has overseen a “cryptocratic” government, in which the levers of power are hidden, decisions come down from on high and ministers can be fired without warning like clerks. The Angolan president has deliberately chosen not to groom a successor and instead prefers to keep his real intentions secret from potential rivals. Moreover, anyone unwise enough to emerge as a popular rival within the party has been swiftly sidelined, ensuring the continuing dominance of the president’s inner circle. The true motivation behind the constitutional change might therefore have been less about securing Mr Dos Santos’s indefinite grip on power and more about giving him control over if or when he decides to step down as MPLA and Angolan president. Given his increasing age and persistent rumours of his ill health, it is just as likely that he can not step down from power for years. Under the new constitution, however, the decision is now entirely in his hands, ensuring that the hobbled opposition will be left guessing his next move.
To this end, I request you to compel and to influence to change the Angolan Constitution to enable normal human values and conditions prevailing.
Awaiting your action soon.
Cassidy Johns Chitali.
United States Army and CIA Top Adviser Special Forces.
Luanda, Angola.
Phone call: +244937705925

Good morning. Greetings to you. I saw you profile and got interested in you so much. I will be coming to Windhoek by June 2011 to meet my friends and family so i can also have a chance of meeting you pls sed me your phone number so we can Angola Politics: Angolan old President José Eduardo dos Santos must not be a Presidential candidate or nominee elections 2012.

Angolan old President must not be a Presidential candidate or nominee elections 2012. Angola has approved a new constitution that abolishes the presidential election and could enable the big thief incument, José Eduardo dos Santos, to remain as head of state until death. Whats the super power no 1 doing about it?.

By: Cassidy Johns Chitali. Luanda, Angola.

The United States of America is a super power number one in the World meaning has the ability to solve World problems in general including military issues and politics of which Angola is a real case.The political situation of Angola has deteriorated and dwindled so much. Almost no democracy in practice but heard in theories. Much to the MPLA’s frustration, the fundamental changes it helped to engender for the region have not ushered in a new era of true peace leading to development of Angola. In fact, the country’s agony does not seem to have an end in sight. This article has suggested that the MPLA government overemphasised the connection between regional changes — however fundamental — and domestic security. Although friendly regimes in the region might provide Angola with an external environment conducive to tackling difficult domestic problems, this is not a sufficient condition for reconciliation and peace at home. Domestic peace requires much more, including an inclusive political system with a wider space and greater role for civil society; the re-establishment of the rule of law; and the responsible and accountable use of the country’s natural resources, especially oil and diamonds. Angola’s current domestic condition and its international position are particularly regrettable, since the country was expected to achieve a measure of international relevance when it attained independence in 1975 after a 14-year anti-colonial struggle. This expectation was neither unfounded nor unrealistic given Angola’s considerable natural resource endowment, including vast deposits of oil and diamonds. Unfortunately, such expectations were shattered in the process of decolonisation. This process was precipitated by a military coup that deposed the regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal on 25 April 1974. The coup leaders were mostly military officers who opposed the old regime’s colonial policies. Therefore, one of their main objectives was to end costly colonial wars quickly. Thus, Portugal placed its colonies on the fast track to political independence. The former colonies of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe, and Mozambique were granted independence without major problems. This was facilitated by the unity within their respective liberation movements. Angola’s situation — where three armed liberation movements representing different ethnic and ideological constituencies were unable to find agreement on a common approach to decolonisation and beyond — was considerably more complex. Predictably, Angola’s decolonisation process quickly degenerated into civil war as the three liberation movements attempted to grab power — forcefully and individually — from the departing colonial authorities.

Each of the three liberation movements attempted to grab power with the help of foreign allies. Consequently, Zaïrian troops invaded Angola from the north in support of the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) while South African troops invaded from the south in support of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). However, only the MPLA — given its ethnic powerbase around the capital city of Luanda — succeeded in seizing and maintaining itself in power with the help of Cuban troops. Since the outcome of the Angolan conflict was expected to have significant geostrategic implications for Southern Africa, Angola quickly became an important Cold War battleground. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union used ties developed with the FNLA and MPLA during the anti-colonial war to intervene in the civil war. However, compared to Soviet and Cuban support, American support to the FNLA was at best ineffective. In the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, the US was averse to major foreign military interventions. However, as will be discussed below, the US and South Africa continued to pursue destabilisation strategies — carried out mainly through UNITA — aimed at toppling the young Marxist-Leninist regime that took power in Angola once Portugal departed.

Angola’s foreign policy, then, can be best understood in terms of the MPLA regime’s survival strategies since gaining power. For example, while its ideological background predisposed the new regime to intervene in the liberation wars against settler minority rule in Southern Africa, these struggles were understood to be directly connected to the regime’s own long-term survival. In other words, support for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa constituted an overt attempt to influence Angola’s regional environment by supporting revolutionary change in neighbouring states that exhibited hostile intentions and/or provided support and sanctuary for UNITA and the FNLA. The expectation was that, once liberated, these countries would provide the necessary military, economic and diplomatic assistance to enable the MPLA to solve its domestic problems.

The domestic problems that have conspired to weaken the MPLA regime have not been confined to the military domain. Although the civil war frustrated the new regime’s statebuilding project, economic mismanagement also seriously weakened the Angolan state. The new regime did not have the resources to fill the administrative void left by departing colonial administrators. The mass departure of the settler community also hastened the breakdown of the Angolan economy. It was therefore not surprising that the post-colonial state in Angola never really had the capacity or competence to exercise authority beyond the capital city and provincial capitals. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and, more recently, the United Nations have been carrying out most tasks commonly associated with the state, especially in rural areas affected by the war. The rudimentary bureaucracy functions on a quasi-voluntary basis partly because the state is not able to provide full remuneration to its employees. Consequently, bureaucrats resort to extorting bribes and/or joining the informal sector to survive. The collapse of key sectors like health care, education, transport, communications and banking has accompanied the breakdown of the rule of law.

Given this domestic context, characterised by war and other forms of decay, a dynamic foreign policy was seen as an important tool to help the new regime to create the necessary security environment to solve its myriad of domestic problems. For the new Angolan regime, an improved security environment entailed fundamental changes in Southern Africas.

The human and material losses incurred during Angola’s civil war will continue to affect the viability of the state for decades to come. Therefore, Angola’s foreign policy must be redesigned as a tool to help the state reconstitute itself as a first step to an eventual and relevant participation in both regional and international affairs. For Angola, this process of reconstitution can best be achieved through greater diplomatic and economic involvement at the regional level. In particular, Angola must learn from the experience of other countries in the region — like South Africa and Mozambique — that have found ways to overcome the legacy of many years of internal conflict s.

There  After months of delays and speculation, Angola’s National Assembly approved a bad and wrong country’s new constitution–which abolishes the need to hold a presidential election and substantially strengthens the president’s powers–on January 21st. President Barak Obama must make efforts to bring this constitution to normal. Revision of the constitution, which dates from 1991, has been on the political agenda since the crushing victory of the ruling party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), in the September 2008 legislative elections. Bolstered by an overwhelming majority in National Assembly, the government created a 60-member commission, dominated by the MPLA, to draw up proposals for revising the constitution prior to the holding of the presidential poll. However, negotiations between the MPLA and opposition parties dragged on, and it was not until November 2009 that the commission finally submitted three proposals to a public consultation: Project A, which advocated a strengthened presidential system; Project B, which advocated a semi-presidential system (with the prime minister as head of government); and Project C, which advocated a parliamentary-presidential system, with no prime minister and the leader of the party with the most parliamentary seats automatically becoming head of state. The MPLA was known to favour Project C, which would in effect do away with the need to hold a separate presidential election, while the opposition vehemently denounced this as violating constitutional law. In the end the government took both the opposition and commentators by surprise by rushing the vote through the National Assembly in January, two months earlier than had been expected–possibly in an attempt to capitalise on the distraction provided by the African Cup of Nations football tournament currently under way in Angola.

The outcome of the constitutional revision is a huge disappointment for both the opposition and local civil-rights groups, which had been pushing for a reduction in the president’s power, a more accountable National Assembly and, most importantly, the timely holding of a presidential election. José Eduardo dos Santos, who completed 30 years in power in September 2009, has never been properly elected as Angolan president. Selected as a consensus candidate who could lead the MPLA after the death of its founder, Agostinho Neto, in September 1979, Mr Dos Santos defied all predictions to entrench himself and his family in power, in the process becoming one of the world’s longest-serving leaders. Mr Dos Santos did contest the country’s first democratic presidential election in September 1992, winning the first round, but a second round was never held as the main rebel movement, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, returned to war; since then Mr Dos Santos has, in effect, been acting president of Angola.

Since the end of the civil war in April 2002 Mr Dos Santos has repeatedly promised to hold a presidential poll but then delayed it, first because of the legislative elections in September 2008, and then because of the constitutional revision which lasted the whole of 2009. However, with the rapid approval of the new constitution the issue appears to have been resolved definitively, doing away with the presidential election altogether and leaving selection of the country’s leader to the ruling party, a similar system to that currently in operation in South Africa (and the UK). This has made a mockery of the so-called public consultation process, as Luanda abandoned previous plans to hold a referendum on the new constitution and instead used its absolute majority to push the measure through the National Assembly.

Despite the protestations of the opposition, the new arrangement does not represent a major change in the country’s polity, but merely confirms the status quo. President Dos Santos has long been the supreme arbiter of political affairs in Angola  and involved in sealing huge sums of money banked for his personal gain full of corruption and theft, and the new constitution removes any equivocation about the limits of his which is power which is wrong and unfair to Angolans. The new constitution does away with the prime minister, who is little more than a ceremonial figure, and instead allows the Angolan president to appoint his own deputy-president to head the government, who will be under direct presidential control which is also wrong. The new constitution does set a two-term limit for presidents, but as has been the case in many other African countries Mr Dos Santos’s previous 30 years in office will not be considered by the new constitution, enabling him to continue in office until at least 2022 which is unfair he must be ruled out and must not be a presidential candidate if he want must not be a presidential nominee.

Nevertheless, the widespread assumption that the constitutional revision was carried out to enable Mr Dos Santos to remain as president for life which is wrong and internationally condemned is proving to prove misplaced and mislead. Throughout his tenure Mr Dos Santos has overseen a “cryptocratic” government, in which the levers of power are hidden, decisions come down from on high and ministers can be fired without warning like clerks. The Angolan president has deliberately chosen not to groom a successor and instead prefers to keep his real intentions secret from potential rivals. Moreover, anyone unwise enough to emerge as a popular rival within the party has been swiftly sidelined, ensuring the continuing dominance of the president’s inner circle. The true motivation behind the constitutional change might therefore have been less about securing Mr Dos Santos’s indefinite grip on power and more about giving him control over if or when he decides to step down as MPLA and Angolan president. Given his increasing age and persistent rumours of his ill health, it is just as likely that he can not step down from power for years. Under the new constitution, however, the decision is now entirely in his hands, ensuring that the hobbled opposition will be left guessing his next move.

To this end, I request you to compel and to influence to change the Angolan Constitution to enable normal human values and conditions prevailing.

Awaiting your action soon.

Cassidy Johns Chitali.

United States Army and CIA Top Adviser Special Forces.

Luanda, Angola.

Phone call: +244937705925

Corruption and money laundering Angola.

Switzerland steps back from global fight against corruption and money laundering

Switzerland is about to reaffirm its commitment to fighting corruption and money-laundering, yet Geneva’s Public Prosecutor has inexplicably closed a corruption case linked to debt repayments by Angola to Russia.

Today sees the completion of a review of Switzerland’s implementation of the OECD Anti Bribery Convention. Switzerland is currently strengthening its money laundering and terrorist financing laws. Its Federal Council recently stated: ‘Switzerland attaches great importance to a healthy financial centre. It is particularly committed to ensuring that the financial centre is not abused for criminal purposes.’ (1)

Despite these commitments, the Genevan Public Prosecutor has just dropped a long-running corruption investigation against businessman Pierre Falcone. The case arose out of a deal to reschedule Angola’s $5.5 billion debt with Russia in 1996, and focused on the role played by a shell company set up by Falcone and his partner, Arcadi Gaydamak, called Abalone Investment Limited. Falcone is currently under investigation on corruption-related charges in France. (2)

The Prosecutor’s decision makes no reference to the charges at the heart of the investigation. The decision states that, as the Russian Federation is making no complaint, there can have been no fraud committed. Implicitly, the decision accepts the defence argument that money transferred from Abalone’s account in Geneva to offshore accounts belonging to Angolan officials constituted “strategic funds” placed abroad in a time of war. This ignores evidence of the misappropriation of millions of dollars of public money which leaves the Angolan and Russian people the real, silent victims in the case. (3)

Swiss anti-corruption campaigner Stefan Howald said: ‘the case in Geneva throws into question Switzerland’s attempts to clean up its banking system, and threatens to turn its commitment to the international fight against corruption and money-laundering into empty rhetoric.’

Global Witness last year highlighted evidence that vast amounts of oil revenues deposited in Abalone’s Geneva bank account, ostensibly to buy back Angola’s debt, were siphoned off. Of a total $774 million paid into the account during 1997-2000, only $161 million went to an account marked Russian Finance Ministry. Around $600 million was transferred to accounts belonging to Falcone, Gaydamak and a series of obscure companies. Millions also ended up in the private accounts of high-ranking Angolan officials, including President Dos Santos. (4)

Global Witness campaigner Sarah Wykes commented: ‘The decision gives a green light to corrupt public officials and their middlemen everywhere, and implies Switzerland is not serious about stopping the looting of public revenues. In our post 9/11 climate, no state should allow suspicious bank transfers to go uninvestigated and unpunished.’

International NGOs will now ask for the case to be reopened, and for Genevan and Swiss Federal authorities to make public all information related to funds blocked during the investigation. (5)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ee Swiss Federal Government statement ‘Implementation of the revised FATF Recommendations on money laundering: opening of the consultation procedure’, 12/01/05

    1. In the Genevan case, Falcone was charged with money-laundering, support for a criminal organisation and corruption of foreign public officials
    2. Swiss criminal code, Art. 322septies
    3. Corruption active d’agents publics étrangers

Celui qui aura offert, promis ou octroyé un avantage indu à une personne agissant pour un Etat étranger ou une organisation internationale en tant que membre d’une autorité judiciaire ou autre, en tant que fonctionnaire, en tant qu’expert, traducteur ou interprète commis par une autorité, ou en tant qu’arbitre ou militaire, en faveur de cette personne ou d’un tiers, pour l’exécution ou l’omission d’un acte en relation avec son activité officielle et qui soit contraire à ses devoirs ou dépende de son pouvoir d’appréciation sera puni de la réclusion pour cinq ans au plus ou de l’emprisonnement. http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/311_0/a322septies.html

    1. See Global Witness Time for Transparency, March 2004.

http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/index.php?section=oil. A Swiss Banker reportedly testified that $56 million in an offshore account belonged to President Dos Santos, and the report reproduces documentary evidence from representatives of a Luxembourg Bank that funds deposited in a private account belonged to ‘Mr Jose Eduardo dos Santos – Luanda, Angola’.

  1. According to press reports, the paltry sum of around $20 million blocked in Swiss banks will now be returned to Angola. There is no public information about the amount of money to be returned or the conditions for its repatriation. Given Angola’s appalling track-record of corruption, without ongoing public scrutiny how is the Swiss government going to ensure that any money returned will go to the country’s development? Unlike the current process for the return of millions stolen by Nigerian dictator Abacha and deposited in Swiss banks, there has been no public consultation in either Switzerland or Angola over this decision.